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Abstract 
Background: Recent studies have confirmed a significant comorbidity between eating disorders 
and self-harm; they linked the presence of self-harm to a more severe and treatment-resistant 
eating disorder symptomatology. Difficulties with impulse-control were suggested to mediate 
this association. The present study explored another variable believed to be involved: 
mentalising. Method: A  cross-sectional, questionnaire-based, between-groups design was 
employed and a measure of mentalising was compared in individuals presenting with eating 
disorders and in individuals presenting with eating disorders and concurrent self-harm. Both 
groups were compared with a control group. R esults: Findings suggested that individuals with 
concurrent presentations reported less mentalising ability compared to individuals without 
concurrent difficulties. In addition, both groups significantly differed from the control group. 
Conclusions: Results are discussed in relation to clinical implications. 
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Preface 
Preface to Portfolio of Work 
This portfolio comprises of three parts: 1) a journal article; 2) an empirical research project and 
3) an extended case study. Each section has been completed as part of my training for the 
Doctorate in Counselling Psychology at City University and as part of my journey towards 
becoming a qualified Psychologist. Indeed, the sections are separate and they exemplify 
different core competencies of my knowledge and skills as both a scientist and a practitioner. At 
the same time, it can be argued that all of the parts of this portfolio are linked by a common 
theme, namely that of the embodiment of mental distress, which can translate into direct or 
indirect self-harm. These topics have been my interest since my MSc years. The order in which 
the sections are arranged has been decided with a clear rationale. It seemed helpful to introduce 
the reader to the argument of the portfolio and the research-project in a concise way. Hence, the 
first part of the manuscript is a journal article that has won the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) Division of Counselling Psychology (DCoP) Research Prize 2015 and has been published 
in the Counselling Psychology Review (Cucchi, 2016). The paper summarises the thesis’ main 
findings and the possible implications for psychotherapy in a succinct way, therefore 
familiarising the reader with some of the core concepts and ideas that will be expanded upon 
later. Following this section, it seemed logical to build upon the concepts discussed in the 
journal article through the presentation of the empirical project. Lastly, it seemed appropriate to 
show how embodied emotions can translate into diverse clinical presentations and how people 
who use their body as a vehicle of communication for their own distress can struggle to engage 
in traditional therapeutic approaches. As the reader proceeds through this portfolio, they might 
wonder about my epistemological stance as I recommend a post-modernist, systemic standpoint 
in some of my writing, yet employ a quantitative analysis which might suggest a positivist 
position. Following extensive consideration on this matter, which has matured during the course 
of my academic and professional journey, I have come to regard myself as a pragmatist. It has 
been argued that being a pragmatist requires neither an ontology nor an epistemology because 
what counts as true is not the actual correspondence to the “real” world, but rather whether a 
stance is functional and progressive (Schuh & Barad, n.d.). Indeed, during my personal and 
professional journey, I have experienced and witnessed the dangers of becoming too overly 
reliant on a “lens” to interpret the world. The cognitive bias of the “Mental Filter”, used to 
describe the gloomy impact of depression on life, can be a valid metaphor for most things in 
life. It can be argued that if human beings become too inflexible in their stances, or if 
standpoints are decided a priori, things can be read through that lens and biases can develop. 
Rogers (as cited in K asket, 2012) himself warned professionals about laying aside 
14 
 
preconceptions and clear cut-constructs as he asserted that there was no special virtue in any one 
procedure. On the contrary, the clinician argued that the method of testing should be appropriate 
to the hypotheses.  
In this regard, I made a commitment towards avoiding trying to fit things, ideas and people into 
pre-conceived boxes. I made a commitment towards curiosity, where this is defined as “a 
conscious strategy of actively avoiding the acceptance of one position as more correct than 
another” (Cecchin, 1987).  I adopted a focus on functionality instead. Indeed, this seems 
congruent with a Counselling Psychology perspective as described by Milton (2010). Milton 
reminds the reader that the ethical integrity of the discipline can only benefit from holding 
different emphases and different epistemological perspectives together. Undeniably, theoretical 
and epistemological variety is inherent to human nature and it can be argued that, since total 
knowledge is impossible, many partial perspectives are ultimately better than only one (Milton, 
2010). A similar position was advocated by the 2012 joint Research Lead of the Division of 
Counselling Psychology, Elaine K asket. The clinician/researcher argued that,  
you may consider yourself a social constructionist, but that does not preclude you 
pursuing a quantitative methodology for your Doctoral thesis” because ultimately 
“being a Counselling Psychologist researcher means being open to exploring all the 
paradoxes, divergences and different perspectives and being curious about the multitude 
of researches approaches available. (K asket, 2012) 
Initial investigations suggested that the J ournal of Eating Disorders might have been a good 
journal for the subimission of the article. This decision was made on the basis of recent reviews 
published in the same journal; these attempted to shed light on the current status of self-injury in 
eating disorders (ED; K ostro et al., 2014) and on the current evidence for the treatment of ED in 
young people (Bailey et al., 2014). K ostro et al. (2014) substantiated the greater severity of ED 
psychopathology in individuals presenting with self-harm (SH) and urged clinicians to carefully 
evaluate these clients and refer them to appropriate treatment. However, Bailey et al. (2014) the 
latter argued that the evidence-base for ED is not well established and that gaps remain in terms 
of effectiveness of interventions. Bailey et al. (2014) further recommended that interventions 
should be preventative, and called for further research. In addition, a further paper published in 
the same journal called for the development of meta-cognitive interventions targeted towards 
thinking about internal states in women presenting with ED (V ann, Strodl & Anderson, 2013). 
Lastly, a critical review of the literature explored the relationship between alexithymia 
(difficulty identifying and expressing emotional states) and ED. As the reader will learn in the 
course of this portfolio, alexithymia is a crucial concept for mentalising and an intrinsic feature 
of the empirical project. Hence, for all the points discussed above, it was felt that the J ournal of 
Eating Disorders, would be a suitable platform for the proposed submission of the article. 
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However, since the initial submission of this thesis, the journal paper in Section A has won the 
Division of Counselling Psychology BPS Research Prize 2015 and it has been published in the 
Counselling Psychology Review (Cucchi, 2016).  
The paper in Section A introduces the reader to the empirical project by summarising some of 
its findings in relation to differences in mentalising ability in individuals presenting with ED, 
individuals presenting with ED and concurrent SH, and a control group. The introduction 
touches upon the literature that supports the existence of a specific link between ED and SH and 
upon some of the existing current explanations for this comorbidity. In this context, I present an 
alternative hypothesis recently emerged in the international panorama, namely the suggestion 
that mentalising could be responsible for this association. Following a brief description of 
mentalising and its conceptual roots, the paper focuses on “pre-mentalistic states of mind”, the 
ways of functioning that precede the acquisition of the capacity to mentalise. Specific references 
to how those states of mind might translate in ED and SH psychopathologies and the 
implications that these might have on individuals’ capacity to engage in traditional 
psychotherapy are discussed. Lastly, following the presentation of the results, the implications 
are discussed in relation to theoretical constructs and clinical practice, highlighting the need for 
targeted interventions that take into consideration this client group’s specific difficulties. 
The second section (section B) is the empirical research. As previously mentioned, the empirical 
research is an extension of the concepts discussed in the journal article. Together with reporting 
data on the difference in mentalising ability in the three groups mentioned above, this project 
also addresses in advance some of the potential limitations of the choice of the scale employed 
to assess mentalising. More specifically, as work on the validation of this measure in different 
populations is ongoing, I made a pragmatic decision to employ the scale, but also to investigate 
the relationship between reflective function and other related concepts. This was done in an 
attempt to verify the construct validity of mentalising. In terms of literature review, this section 
places more emphasis on the natural process of development of mentalising and on the core 
conditions for its emergence. Instead, the discussion expands upon the theoretical and clinical 
implications mentioned in the previous section to include a specific outlook on current 
approaches to the management of self-injurious behaviour in the ED population. In this regard, 
the implications of the current findings upon available treatments are emphasised. A  broader, 
systemic stance is adopted to discuss some of the findings and to encourage critical awareness 
of the impact of social and contextual factors upon the development, and also upon the 
treatment of eating and SH psychopathology. In this regard, I suggest the need for clinicians to 
adopt a trans-diagnostical approach that takes into consideration the complexity of human 
beings. In terms of conceptual framework employed for this study and my viewpoint on 
16 
 
epistemology, the empirical project will further expand and elucidate upon that discussed at the 
beginning of this preface. 
The last section of this portfolio (section C) includes an extended case study which I hope will 
symbolise the scientist-practitioner paradigm and attempt to reduce the theory-practice gap 
through the integration of psychological theory within practice. The case was selected from 
many not only for its specific features, which arguably exemplify some of the core concepts 
discussed throughout the portfolio, but also because, to-date, it represented one of the most 
challenging cases that I have encountered thus far. The work was carried out at a specialist 
Clinical Health placement with a client who presented with severe chronic pain and other 
physical issues which could be partly viewed as embodiment of emotions and indirect SH. In 
line with the British Psychological Society (BPS) guidelines (2006), the case illustrates the 
clinician’s commitment to “recognise the social contexts and to work in ways that empower 
rather than control”. It further depicts my commitment towards the application of a working 
style that “fits” the individual (Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1992), rather than the clinician, and 
highlights some of the struggles professionals face when negotiating treatment protocols and 
clients’ needs within the constraints of services, the context and the economic climate in which 
they are embedded. This last point also arguably responds to BPS recommendations that require 
counselling psychologists to consider “the context in which they work and the impact that such 
a context is likely to have on the client’s therapeutic experience” (BPS, 2006). Ultimately, the 
case study illustrates some of the difficulties experienced in the work and how those were 
managed through supervision and consultation with different professionals. This is arguably in 
accordance to BPS guidelines that urge one to recognise “all contexts that might affect a client’s 
experience and incorporate it into the planned intervention for discharge” (2006). A final point 
worth mentioning is in respect to the formulations used to conceptualise the client’s difficulties 
in the case study. Without doubt, these conceptualisations are speculative and indeed I do not 
try to formulate ’objective truths’ about the origins and/or the maintenance of difficulties. 
Instead, I aim to develop ‘working hypotheses’ (Dallos & Draper, 2005) which can be more or 
less helpful at any given moment in time. Ultimately, I view the client as the “expert” of their 
own life.  
 It is hoped that these three pieces of work combined together will demonstrate my developing 
skills within the “scientific demand for rigorous empirical enquiry with a firm base grounded in 
the primacy of the psychotherapeutic relationship” (BPS, 2006). Ultimately, it is hoped that this 
portfolio will convey my passion for learning which I sincerely hope to continue to build upon 
during my professional career.  
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Section A: J ournal article 
 
Differences in Mentalising Ability in Individuals Presenting with Eating 
Disorders with and without Concurrent Self-Harm: 
A  Comparative Study. 
 
 
Abstract 
Background: Recent studies have confirmed a significant comorbidity between eating disorders 
and self-harm. They linked the presence of self-harm to a more severe and treatment-resistant 
eating disorder symptomatology. Difficulties with impulse-control were suggested to mediate 
this association. Instead, the present study explored another variable believed to be involved: 
mentalising. Method: A  cross-sectional, questionnaire-based, between-groups design was 
employed and a measure of mentalising was compared in individuals presenting with eating 
disorders, and in individuals presenting with eating disorders and concurrent self-harm. Both 
groups were compared with a control group. R esults: Findings suggested that individuals with 
concurrent presentations reported less mentalising ability compared to individuals without 
concurrent difficulties. In addition, both groups significantly differed from the control group. 
Conclusions: Results are discussed in relation to clinical implications. 
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B. Section two 
E mpirical research 
 
Differences in mentalising Ability in Individuals Presenting with Eating 
Disorders with and without concurrent Self-Harm: 
a Comparative Study. 
Abstract 
Background: Recent advances in the literature (Cucchi et al., 2016) have confirmed the 
significant comorbidity between eating disorders (ED) and self-harm (SH). Studies have also 
confirmed that SH is correlated to more severe (Anderson et al., 2002; Claes et al., 2003) and 
treatment-resistant ED symptomatology (Nagata, K awarada., K iirike, & Iketani, 2000). 
However, despite these findings being now widely recognised, the association between the two 
presentations is still unclear (Levitt, Sansone, & Cohn, 2004). Some researchers have suggested 
that difficulties with impulse-control mediated this association.  
Aims: The present study explored another variable believed to be involved: mentalising 
(Skarderud, 2007; Perkins, 2009).  
Method/design: A  cross-sectional, quasi experimental, questionnaire-based, between-groups 
design was employed and a measure of mentalising was compared in individuals presenting 
with ED only (ED_noSH) and in individuals presenting with ED and concurrent SH (ED_SH). 
Both groups were compared with a control group. The dependent variable (DV ) was the 
Reflective Function Questionnaire (RFQ-54), a collection of items that were in development 
and the independent variable (IV ) was group-type. Three one-way between-subjects 
MANOV As were conducted to compare differences in mentalising ability across the three 
groups, across the two ED groups and the control, and across the ED group with/without SH. 
Following recent developments with the validation of the RFQ (Fonagy et al., 2016), the same 
dataset was retrospectively re-analysed using the newer version of the RFQ. 
Results: Individuals with concurrent self-harm reported more mentalising ability impairment 
than individuals without concurrent SH. In addition, both groups differed significantly from the 
control group.  
Conclusions: Results are discussed in relation to clinical implications of current psychological 
interventions and recommendations for future studies.  
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T he Structure of the T hesis 
In order to explore mentalising differences in individuals who present with ED 
with/without SH, the researcher has divided this thesis into four different sections. The first part 
encompasses the literature on mentalising, including a definition of the core concepts, an 
overview of mentalising in history, the proposed origins of the capacity to mentalise and a 
discussion on related concepts and pre-mentalistic states of mind. A ll of this information was 
eventually evaluated in a critical appraisal (p. 84). The literature search was conducted using 
Psych Info, Medline and Psych Articles databases and City University library and catalogue. 
Search words included variations of several subject terms, which were eventually combined 
amongst them. These words were: mentalisation, reflective function, eating 
disorders/difficulties, Anorexia/Bulimia Nervosa, self-harm, deliberate self-harm, self-injurious 
behaviour, self-mutilating behaviour, self-cutting/cutting, and parasuicide. Results were 
subsequently combined between them. Articles pertinent to the scope of the study were 
thoroughly inspected, and forward and backward chaining was conducted.  
Unpublished doctoral theses were looked at and found to be extremely pertinent to the 
current project. However, given the heavy reliance of this project on unpublished material, the 
relevant Doctoral dissertations will be included as PDF files for the examiners’ information.   
 The second part of this thesis includes the Method section. This encompasses 
information on the design and the procedures of the study, information on the questionnaires 
and information on the statistical analysis employed for this study. Ethical considerations are 
also discussed in this section. The third part includes the result section, outlines the main 
findings.   
 The last part of this thesis comprises the discussion: findings are elaborated upon in 
terms of theoretical and practical implications. Current treatment approaches to the management 
of ED and SH are reviewed, highlighting the implications of the present results for 
psychotherapy and for the therapist’s stance. Finally, strengths and limitations of this empirical 
project are considered, with suggestions presented for possible future research.   
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Defining the Core Concept 
A  crowded and hectic supermarket, where hundreds of people rush around in a sort of 
methodical chaos. Suddenly, the fairly taciturn atmosphere of the shop is broken by the loud and 
piercing screams of a toddler who rolls herself on the floor, kicking. The child's mother's 
curious and inquisitive look sets upon her daughter with loving and genuine interest and 
affection. Mother then starts what appears more like a reflection of an internal dialogue, rather 
than a set of questions that require answers. “What's the matter, darling? Are you tired? Are you 
bored? I am sorry mummy did not buy you sweets... you must be feeling frustrated too”. While 
she lovingly says those words, mother picks up her daughter from the floor and gives her a 
cuddle, holding the little girl's head to her shoulder and swinging gently, before putting her back 
into the trolley's seat. Mother then adds: “let's put your cardigan on, just in case you are cold”. 
Such brief, primarily one-sided interaction seems to soothe the child as she happily settles into 
the seat with a contented smile. 
This scenario exemplifies the everyday, often implicit and unconscious use of the core 
concept that the current study seeks to investigate: the concept of mentalising. Adopting a 
mentalising stance can be described as endorsing a reflective attitude, being aware of mental 
states and being curious and inquisitive about how different mental states might be related to 
behaviour. This is both towards others, as illustrated in the former example, as well as towards 
oneself. More formally, mentalisation has been defined as “the mental process by which an 
individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of himself and others as meaningful on 
the basis of intentional mental states” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, p. 21). 
For example, in the above anecdote, the mother promptly and attentively considers 
several reasons that might be behind her daughter’s untimely tantrum. Mother appears to 
attribute feelings, emotions, wishes and sensations to her little girl and she openly speculates 
upon the reasons that might be driving her daughter’s behaviour—  such as being tired, bored, 
frustrated and/or cold. It appears that mother recognises her daughter as an intentional being 
whose internal world is not observable, yet is externalised and expressed in behavioural terms. 
It further seems that mother attempts to assign a status to her little girl’s intentional act in order 
to deal with the behaviour. As eloquently described by Allen and Fonagy (2007), it appears that 
the mother keeps her daughter’s “mind in mind”, whilst retaining that tentative and exploratory 
position that is a central tenant of a good mentalising stance. 
Whereas mentalising might seem like a basic concept and something that we do on a 
daily basis, it can also become very demanding and difficult, especially in the face of stress and 
sickness. In everyday life, we mentalise when we attribute intentions to each other’s behaviours, 
either explicitly as above, or implicitly. Conversely, when we fail to adopt a mentalising stance, 
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we are governed by outer forces, impulses, coincidences and/or simple stimulus-responses 
(K arterud & Bateman, 2011). For example, the scenario above could have taken a different turn 
had the mother been feeling excessively embarrassed and overly concerned about being judged 
by passers-bys for her daughter’s tantrum, or had the mother been feeling distressed herself, or 
sick, or intoxicated. Weighed down by the intensity of her own emotions, the mother might 
have struggled to respond effectively to the baby’s distress and she might have, instead, reacted 
to the tantrum on the basis of her own emotions.  
In this regard, Allen and Fonagy (2007) report the scenario of a tired, sleepy mother 
who is awaken in the middle of the night by her crying six months old baby. The mother’s 
initial reaction might be of irritation, anger and exasperation for having to attend to the baby 
ahead of a long day’s work. However, despite this first, instinctual response, the mother might 
also be able to keep her baby’s physical and emotional needs in mind and curiously wonder 
about and attend to the infant’s distress. What might have started with a failure of mentalising as 
a result of the mother’s vulnerable and tired state, quickly turned into a situation in which the 
caregiver was able to retrieve her capacity to mentalise. The authors then contrast this example 
with the case of a mother who might be sleep deprived, alone and/or stressed and might not be 
able to separate the child’s distress from her own, resulting in her interpreting the child’s crying 
exclusively as hostile.  
In the latter instances of both scenarios, the mother might not even be able to consider 
any alternative explanation for her baby’s distress apart from her own feelings of discomfort and 
irritation. The mother’s capacity to keep her baby’s motives and reasons in mind and to use 
those to consider a different perspective from her own has shut down in the face of stress. The 
mother’s capacity to mentalise has, albeit perhaps temporarily, failed and a pre-mentalistic state 
of mind known as the “psychic equivalence mode” has emerged. When functioning in the 
“Psychic Equivalence mode”, individuals’ internal worlds is projected onto external reality and 
no other possibility from the one experienced seems feasible. Hence, the mother’s own negative 
emotions become the dominating force driving her interpretation of the event. 
Given that mental states are opaque and we can never truly tell what someone else is 
thinking or feeling their communicated interpretation of their own feelings, “an important 
indicator of high quality mentalisation is the awareness that we do not and cannot know 
absolutely what’s in someone else’s mind” (Allen & Fonagy, 2007, p. 54). This was illustrated 
in the first example discussed, when the mother adopted a curious stance and mentalised several 
different hypotheses to make sense of her daughter’s tantrum. Mentalising does not concern 
itself with “the truth” of a particular event, feeling, wish or sensation, but rather with the mental 
activity of imagining what oneself/others might be thinking or feeling and what might be 
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driving a specific behaviour. In the latter example, for instance, the lack of a mentalising stance 
relates exclusively to the mental process that the mother engages with to come to the conclusion 
that her baby’s crying was a hostile act. Mentalising regards the content as secondary to the 
process.  
Since mentalising appears crucial for inter-personal, as well as intra-psychic awareness 
and clarity, it can be argued it is an essential component of any successful personal interaction, 
as well as any therapeutic encounter. For example, in a clinical role-play uploaded on Y ouTube 
called Mentalization Based Treatement by Prof. Bateman (2012), Professor Bateman helps 
A lice explore and reflect on her firm and overwhelming fears about him, as well as her 
boyfriend “firing her”, fears that had precipitated an impulsive suicide attempt few weeks 
before. Professor Bateman skilfully, yet emphatically, slows the emotions’ fast and 
overwhelming pace. At the same time, he proficiently, yet gently and compassionately, 
introduces different perspectives and possibilities which conclude with the pretend client 
considering “grabbing the cat and holding it, thinking in the long run, slowing things down” 
instead of self-harming. 
Many different clinical examples of mentalising failures have been reported and 
thoroughly discussed in the literature (A llen & Fonagy, 2007; Bateman & Fonagy, 2007; 
Skarderud, 2007a, 2007b; 2009). Despite the individual differences, they all suggest that 
individuals with different levels of mentalising capacity may differ in their ability to engage in 
psychotherapy (K atznelson, 2014) and that a lack of a mentalising stance (i.e., a propensity and 
willingness to engage in mentalising) might hinder the level of engagement in therapy (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2004). The lack of a mentalising stance that cultivates curiosity, inquisitiveness and 
imaginativeness towards mental states would inhibit willingness to explore and reflect upon 
feelings in oneself and others. The latter being an attitude central to the therapeutic process. In 
addition, a lack of a mentalising stance that fails to recognise that mental states are opaque, that 
emotional and behavioural responses often encompass conflicting elements and that 
emotional/behavioural reactions are multifactorial will hamper an individual’s capacity to 
consider different perspectives. 
For example, in the above-mentioned role play, had the therapist not been successful in 
fostering a mentalising attitude in the client, other possibilities apart from “being fired, rejected 
and being better off dead” would have not been feasible to the client. For this reason, it appears 
that a mentalising stance is the pillar of any therapeutic dialogue, as well as daily inter-personal 
interactions. A lthough arguable that most mental disorders involve some sort of difficulties with 
mentalising (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), it has more recently been suggested that impaired 
mentalising represents a core feature and, hence, a core obstacle to treatment in individuals who 
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present with ED and/or SH (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Skarderud, 2007). Indeed, pre-
mentalistic states of mind, characterised by inner states being presented through the body, by a 
tendency to understand and conceive of behaviour and change primarily in physical terms 
and/or by the tendency to either experience inner life as if too real or too disconnected from 
outer reality have consistently been described in individuals who present with ED (Skarderud, 
2007) and in individuals who engage in SH (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). 
Defining the Secondary Concepts 
The second half of the 20
th
 century has witnessed dramatic economic, social and 
political transformations of all times. Paradoxically, as material wealth in the West increases 
and individuals’ average incomes have nearly doubled compared to fifty years ago, the number 
of people referred to psychiatric services has also dramatically escalated. According to a recent 
report published by the mental health charity Mind, six times as many people are now being 
referred to mental health services compared to the 1940s (MIND, 1998). These figures suggest 
that, despite societies now being wealthier, they are not necessarily more blissful, a point that 
seem to echo and support Lord Laynard’s statement that “we all want more money, but as 
societies become richer, they do not become happier” (Layard, 2005 p. 3).  
In particular, it appears that in conjunction with an increase in wealth, which 
consequently led to an increase in the amount and variety of food readily available, society has 
also witnessed an upsurge in the number and severity of maladaptive eating patterns and eating-
related behavioural problems (Mazzeo, Espelage, Sherman & Thompson, 2003; Micali, 
Hagberg, Petersen & Treasure, 2013). These range from simple dieting to the extreme cases of 
ED. Together with this and closely connected with a poor body image (Graff & Mallin, 1967), 
society has also recently seen an increase in the number of people who engage in direct SH 
(Carr et al., 2016; K apur & Gask, 2009). However, despite this apparent recent rise, it can be 
argued that eating-behavioural deviations and SH have always been embedded in social 
structures and often accepted, as well as encouraged by the community.  
For example, it is extensively documented in the literature how the “father” of ancient 
medicine, Hippocrates (460 BC-370 BC) endorsed the use of herbal potions to cause vomiting 
and/or anal purging (Corpus Hippocraticum) and how such remedies were commonly employed 
until mid 1800s in an attempt to clean the body from diseases and ailments. Additionally, in his 
systematic review of Anorexia in history, Bell (1985) reports numerous mediaeval accounts of 
young women and religious-order followers starving themselves in an attempt to imitate 
Christ’s sufferings. Bell also skilfully describes the Christian tradition of “mortification of the 
flesh”, which not only included starvation, but also self-flagellation and extreme self-
deprivation in order to abstain or punish oneself of sins. Indeed, these socially accepted eating 
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disturbances and SH acts were not simply allowed by the Church, but encouraged and admired 
to the point that those who died out of starvation and self-injury in an attempt to control the 
flesh were venerated as holy martyrs.  
A lthough purging was also widespread in ancient Rome, it had a different function. 
From using purging as a way to castigate or purify the body, ancient Romans had the habit of 
regularly inducing vomiting during banqueting in order to eat more (Seneca, as cited in K eel & 
K lump, 2003).  
It could, then, be argued that the dramatic rise in the incidence of ED and SH in the last 
thirty years might be more a reflection of increased detection of the disorders after their ‘formal 
discovery’, rather than a true increase in incidence rates (Currin, Schmidt, Treasure & J ick, 
2005). Nevertheless, after its formal detection, the term ‘Eating Disorders’ has been used to 
describe, 
a persistent disturbance of eating or eating related behaviour that results in the altered 
consumption or absorption of food that significantly impairs physical health or 
psychosocial functioning, which is not secondary to any general medical disorder, or any 
other psychiatric disorder. (Fairburn & Walsh, 1995, p. 135) 
Anorexia Nervosa (AN) was the first ED placed in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) in 1952 (APA, 1952) as a psycho-physiological reaction 
or a neurotic illness. It was only in the publication of the DSM-II in 1968 that AN was 
categorised under symptoms: feeding disturbances. Instead, it was not until the 1980 DSM-III 
that Bulimia Nervosa (BN) was classified as a separate diagnostic category in its own right. 
Prior to this, BN as a syndrome did not exist, but rather bulimic syptoms were described in 
conjunction to AN and other neurotic and psychotic difficulties (Parry Jones & Parry Jones, 
1991).  
A lthough it is recognised that the use of diagnostic labels is controversial and, some 
argue, stigmatising (Szasz, 1960), a pragmatic decision was made to utilise them for the purpose 
of the current study in order to allow rapid definitions of concepts and efficient, shorthand 
communication. This decision does not reflect the researcher’s stance that acknowledges and 
sympathises with the limitations of diagnostic criteria. Furthermore, despite the current study 
not concerning itself with the separate categories of ED, for clarity of communication it seems 
appropriate to identify the core features of each. Since DSM diagnostic criteria were employed 
in the trusts where some participants were recruited for this particular study, DSM 5 (APA, 
2013) definitions will be presented. 
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A lthough the two major diagnoses have historically been AN and BN, recent changes in 
DSM- 5 classification (APA, 2013) have seen the inclusion of ‘Binge Eating Disorder’ (BED) as 
a separate category. In addition, there are other subgroups which encompass a large variety of 
very similar symptoms that do not accurately fit the above diagnoses: Other Specified Feeding or 
Eating Disorder (OSFED) and Unspecified Feeding or Eating Disorder (UFED).   
Anorexia Nervosa is described as: 
 Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age and 
height (...) 
 Intense fear of gaining weight, even though underweight 
 Disturbance in the way in which one’s body weight or shape is experienced (...). 
 
Bulimia Nervosa is defined as:  
 Recurrent episodes of binge eating (… ) 
 Recurrent, inappropriate compensatory behaviour (purging, vomiting, laxative abuse) in 
order to prevent weight gain 
 Self-evaluation unduly influenced by body shape and weight. 
 
Binge Eating Disorder is classified as: 
 Recurrent episodes of binge eating (… ) eating when not feeling physically hungry, more 
rapidly than normal, until feeling uncomfortably full  
 Feeling disgusted with oneself, depressed, or very guilty after overeating 
 No inappropriate compensatory behaviour. 
A  few authors have recently suggested that ED should be classified as forms of SH, due to 
the indirect destructive effects of repeated purging and food refusal (Ahren-Moonga, Holmgren, 
K norring, & K linteberg, 2008; Anderson, Carter, Mcintosh, Joyce, & Bulik, 2002; van der K olk 
et al., 1991, as cited in Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000). Nevertheless, despite acknowledging the 
above dilemma, for the purpose of this investigation, the researcher will endorse the distinction 
between direct and indirect SH (Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000). Hence, ED will not be 
considered as a form of SH per se. 
The adopted definition of self-harm (SH) is of,  
direct, socially unacceptable behaviour that causes minor to moderate physical injury, 
while the individual is in a psychologically distressed state but is not attempting suicide, 
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nor responding to a need for self-stimulation or a stereotyped behaviour (as found in 
mental retardation or autism. (Suyemoto, 1998, p. 532) 
Examples of such behaviours are: cutting, burning, hitting oneself, hair-pulling. Currently 
SH is associated and listed as a symptom of many psychological disorders, amongst which 
borderline personality disorder (BPD), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), ED, post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), dissociative identity disorder (DID), substance misuse and 
depression.  
Putting it all together: J ustification for the proposed research. Traditionally, ED have 
been associated with a number of psychological and medical difficulties (Claes, V andereycken 
& V ertommen, 2003; DaCosta & Halmi, 1992; Edelstein & Y ager, 1992; Fichter, Quadflieg, & 
Rief, 1994; Mehler & Andersen, 1999, Mitchell et al., 1997, as cited in Levitt, Sansone, & 
Cohn, 2004; Strobe & K atz, 1988). However, more recently, it has been reported that a 
considerable number of individuals who present with eating difficulties also engage in direct 
forms of SH. An association between ED and SH was first suggested in 1978 by Y aryura-
Tobias and Neziroglu (1978)  and was more recently confirmed in a review (Svirko & Hawton, 
2007). Comorbidity prevalence figures in the literature vary considerably with some figures 
reaching peaks of 68% in Svirko & Hawton’s review (2007) and even higher rates in single 
studies (Favaro & Santonastaso, 2008; Reas, Pedersen, K erterud & Rø, 2015).  
However, a recent meta-analysis reported a 28% comorbidity between ED and SH. This 
comorbidity varied from 22% to 33% respectively when AN and BN were evaluated separately 
(Cucchi et al., 2016). This means that one in three individuals who suffer from ED will also 
present with SH, emphasising the importance of targeting SH tendencies in the context of ED 
treatment (Peterson & Fischer, 2015). Shared demographic and phenomenological 
characteristics of ED and SH have prompted some researchers to suggest that this relationship 
goes beyond a purely statistical correlation (Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000) and recent studies 
have suggested similar underlying core features for both disorders (Farber, 2007; Lane, 2002; 
Skarderud, 2007). 
In 1986, Lacey and Evans (1986) noted that a subgroup of individuals diagnosed with 
ED and engaging in concurrent SH put an enormous strain on the emergency services due to 
their impulsive traits that often precipitated crises. The authors argued that access to formal 
psychiatric care for this client group was often inappropriate and that the outcome of treatment 
was bleak. The researchers also suggested that impulse-control difficulties, coupled with a 
failure to consider risks and consequences, mediated the relationship between the inability to 
think about emotions and features of ED and SH, leaving the individual more vulnerable to a 
labile affect and a worse prognosis. Lacey and Evans argued that although this was a distinct 
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minority subgroup, it already represented a major treatment problem and emphasised the urgent 
and overdue need for specific treatment for this subgroup of individuals, highlighting the 
necessity to concentrate on all the symptoms (Lacey, 1993).  
More literature supports this urgency (Reas et al., 2015) as it has been reported that 
although widely recognised, the comorbidity between ED and SH has not been sufficiently 
explored and, to-date, the association is unclear (Levitt et al., 2004). Nonetheless, the presence 
of SH in individuals with ED appears to be a poor prognostic factor (Favaro & Santonastaso, 
2002) and seems to be correlated to more severe (Anderson et al., 2002; Claes et al., 2003; 
Claes et al., 2011; Fujimori et al., 2011; Islam et al., 2015; Peterson & Fisher, 2012; 
Muehlenkamp, Claes, Smits, Peat & V andereycken, 2011) and treatment-resistant eating 
disorder symptomatology (Nagata, 2000; Olatunji, Cox, Ebesutani, & Wall, 2015).  
Requests from the literature (Levitt et al., 2004; Peterson & Fischer, 2015), empirical 
evidence, the high drop-out rates found in both ED and SH, together with the elevated mortality 
risk found in individuals who present with ED, and medicinal options being largely ineffective 
(National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2004, as cited in Russell, Schmidt, Doherty, 
Y oung & Tchanturia, 2009) make the devising of specific treatment for these client groups a 
priority. This is corroborated by empirical evidence that suggests that Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT; Beck & Beck, 1995) is only effective in about 50% of the cases of BN (Levitt et 
al., 2004). It is further confirmed by NICE guidelines (2004), Russell et al. (2009) and Watson 
and Bulik (2013) who state that, in adults presenting with AN, no specific psychotherapy 
treatment stands out as being more effective than another. NICE guidelines further recommend 
research into newer psychological approaches.  
Whereas some researchers proposed the existence of a “multi-impulsive personality 
disorder” and argued that impulsivity failure mediates the relationship between ED and SH 
(Lacey & Evans, 1986), others suggested a “repetitive self-mutilation syndrome” in which SH 
acts alternate with other behaviours such as ED (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993). However, these 
hypotheses appear to fail to address the specificity of the link between ED and SH; instead, they 
group SH together with other so-called impulsive behaviours. In this regards, recent evidence 
suggests that substance misuse, also regarded by the above mentioned researchers as an 
impulsive behaviour, significantly predicted lower rather than a higher occurrence of SH 
(Cucchi et al., 2016). In addition, factor analyses suggested the existence of a “compulsive”, as 
well as of an “impulsive” factor to SH (Favaro & Santonastaso, 1998, 2000, 2002), indicating 
that there might be more to the ED/SH relationship than impulsivity. In this regard, it has 
recently been suggested that another variable, namely mentalising, might play a role (Perkins, 
2009; Skarderud, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  
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Fonagy (2005) proposed that the characteristic thinking pattern present in individuals 
with ED suggested a return to pre-mentalistic modes of thinking which, he advocated, arise 
from a disorganisation of the “self”. The author argued that if the “self” is poorly integrated, an 
individual may experience physical changes in the body as a loss of their own identity and sense 
of self (Fonagy et al., 2002). As the reader will see during the course of this thesis, it is 
suggested that if a person struggles to make sense of their inner experiences, they might 
concentrate their energy on the physical world, which might be more easily controlled and 
manipulated. This, in turn, might provide them with a sense of being in control and, hence, of 
relief. This last point is captured by the following quotes: “I think my anorexia helped to restore 
some order and direction to my life, and return to something more wholesome when my 
environment seemed overwhelming”, and, “My anorexia was there when everything else 
seemed unpredictable” (Skarderud, 2007b). 
In addition to this, building on Bruch’s (1962) work that described a fragile sense of 
self, an inability to discriminate and articulate one` s inner world (interoceptive confusion), and 
an inability to recognise, name and express emotions (alexithymia) in individuals presenting 
with difficulties concerning food, Skarderud (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) also adopted the concept of 
impaired mentalisation (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). More specifically, the researcher suggested 
that the characteristic failure to understand one’s own feelings and emotions, the concrete style 
of thinking, as well as the lack of reference to internal states when explaining behaviour, present 
in narratives of individuals with ED and SH, suggest a common lack of a mentalising stance 
(Skarderud, 2007b). Indeed, a recent review of the literature also indicated significantly higher 
levels of alexithymia in women who engage in SH, compared to women who do not engage 
inSH (Norman & Borrill, 2015).  
A lthough it is arguable that most mental disorders involve some sort of difficulties with 
mentalising (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), the issue is whether impaired mentalisation represents 
a core obstacle to treatment in individuals with ED and concurrent SH. Due to different levels of 
mentalising capacity potentially linked to different ability to engage in psychotherapy 
(K atznelson, 2014) and a lack of a mentalising stance may  hinder the level of engagement in 
therapy (Bateman &Fonagy, 2007), it seems vital to investigate whether differences in 
mentalising capacity might be responsible for a more treatment-resistant symptomatology. In 
addition to this, the present study aims at addressing the issue of whether clients who might 
present a stronger need to control the body, displayed by resorting to both SH and ED 
symptomatology, might also display lower mentalising capacity. This seems important to 
investigate because a recent claim that suggests that psychotherapeutic approaches with 
individuals with poor mentalising capacity should specifically focus on the rehabilitation of this 
function (Skarderud, 2007, p. 324) 
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In this regard, it has been argued that traditional psychotherapy takes for granted 
individuals’ ability for symbolic representation of one’s own and others’ mental states and that 
it presupposes that individuals are able to appreciate and differentiate their own subjective states 
from those of the therapist (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). These reasons, as well as the 
characteristic thinking pattern that distinguishes individuals with impaired mentalising ability 
which will be discussed later, have led some professionals to suggest that people with impaired 
mentalising capacity do not benefit from traditional psychotherapy (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). 
It can be argued that at the foundation of psychotherapy’s process of change is the ability to 
balance “story-making and story-breaking”, in other words, the capacity to form narratives, and 
to disperse it in the light of new experience (Holmes, 1999). These tasks appear to be practically 
impossible for people who operate in pre-mentalistic states of mind, as will subsequently 
become clearer.  
In conclusion, given that mentalising difficulties have been reported in both ED 
(K atznelson, 2014; Robinson, 2014; Skarderud, 2007) and SH presentations (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2007; Rossouw & Fonagy, 2012), that individuals with different mentalising abilities 
might differ in their ability to enagage in traditional psychotherapy (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007; 
K atznelson, 2014) and that SH has been correlated to more severe ED symptomatology, it 
seems crucial to investigate the relationship between ED, SH and mentalising further. To my 
knowledge, no study has addressed this so far, although a couple of researchers highlighted the 
importance of targeting SH in the ED population (Levitt et al., 2014; Peterson & Fischer, 2015). 
In addition to this, shedding some light on the relationship between the above variables also 
seems timely, given the reported successfulness of mentalization-based therapy (MBT; Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2004) in reducing SH in adolescents (Russeouw & Fonagy, 2012) and in individuals 
with ED  (Robinson, 2015). 
E D and SH specifically: Why? F indings from empirical studies. Childhood histories 
and social backgrounds of individuals who present with ED and SH difficulties appear to be 
quite similar: “dysfunctional” families with a controlling mother and usually an absent or 
emotionally unavailable/preoccupied father (Lane, 2002). Both individuals who present with 
ED and SH appear not to have been “held” appropriately in infancy, they seem to lack the 
ability to contain, express and regulate their own emotions (Preyde, Watson, Remers & Stuart, 
2016). Sexual/physical abuse at an early age (Levitt et. al., 2004), lack of affection, or 
conversely over-involvement and disregard for boundaries also frequently occur (K yriacou, 
Treasure & Schmidt, 2008). 
Critical and feminist approaches emphasise, instead, theoretical perspectives that locate 
the roots of the disorders in the patriarchal context and the socio-political structures in which the 
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phenomena occur (Bell, 1985; Farber, 2007; Favazza, 1996; K atzman & Lee, 1997; McGilley, 
2004) and that “force” women especially to feel disempowered. Both syndromes have been 
linked to body dissatisfaction (Brannan, & Petrie, 2008; Olatunji et. al., 2015), internalisation of 
the “thin-model”, as well as the spread of Western standards of beauty and thinness (Nasser, 
2006), ascetism, and a perceived sense of ineffectiveness (Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000, 2002). 
These factors appear to translate into the need to be in charge of one’s own body (Favazza, 
1998), possibly as an attempt to preserve an illusionary feeling of power in a life which is 
sensed to be out of control. In this regard, it is significant that both disorders are still indeed 
more common in the female population and typically develop during adolescence (Favazza & 
Conterio, 1988) which is a time of often puzzling, uncontrollable and confusing body changes. 
Research has long identified early life relationships and subsequent interpersonal 
interactions as crucial for both disorders (Bruch, 1978; Gardener, 2001). Bruch (1978) 
suggested that a primary relationship in which the care-giver imposes their own sense of self on 
the infant fosters difficulties in the child’s differentiation of their own feelings from those of 
their mother. Cutting, or defining one’s own external boundaries through skeletal bodies might 
then be considered a way of differentiating oneself amongst the confusion of the symbiotic 
relationship and psychological oneness. Similarly, SH psychodynamic literature focuses on 
early years’ experiences and inappropriate or disrupted attachment (Gardener, 2001); it 
associates SH with a "transitional object" (Farber, 1997; Favazza & Conterio, 1988). The self-
harmer turns to cutting for the comfort it provides, just as the child turns to their teddy bear or 
blanket to soothe herself in the absence of the mother (Farber 1997). The following quote 
summarises this point: “cutting, burning and poking needles in my arm is a security for me, 
because I know that if all else fails and leaves me feeling emotionless and empty, the pain and 
blood will always be there for me” (Favazza & Conterio, 1988). 
In a similar fashion, people who suffer from an unmet insatiable hunger of love, perhaps 
mindful of the emotional unavailability of the primary attachment figures, might try to 
compensate for this unmet need through food. Again, this is captured by the following sentence: 
“I am a queen and these are my riches. I have all that I have ever needed in my life” (Farber, 
1997). Since our earliest connections with principal-others are inextricably mediated by the 
soothing flow of milk, and since food represents one of our earliest forms of communication, 
equating physical to emotional nourishment seems understandable. Hence, early life experiences 
and relationships/attachment appear to be crucial for the development of both ED and SH 
(Bruch, 1978; Gardener, 2001; Robinson, 2014). However, the origins of both also seem 
inextricably connected to the development of a sense of “self” and mentalising, as the reader 
will learn shortly.  
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In 1962, Bruch described the core feature of AN as a “deficient sense of self” which can 
be conceptualised prior to the development of a mentalising stance. Bruch commented on how it 
appeared that individuals who suffered from AN experienced their emotions in an 
overwhelming way, a finding also confirmed  regardling individuals who engaged in SH, in the 
SH literature (Bateman & Fonagy 2004, 2007; Graff & Mallin, 1967). Bruch had further 
commented on how alexithymia, traditionally considered the antithesis for the capacity to 
mentalise, seemed to be a characteristic component of the illness. This has indeed more recently 
been confirmed by empirical evidence in both ED and SH presentations. Field findings support 
the hypothesis that people with AN appear to have difficulties identifying and communicating 
feeling states (Zonnevijlle-Bendek, Goozen, Cohen-K ettenis, Elburg, & Engeland, 2002), a 
conclusion also confirmed by a scientific review of the literature in other ED presentations 
(Taylor et al., 1997, as cited in Skarderud, 2009) and in people who engage in SH (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004, 2007; Norman & Borrill, 2015).   
In addition, a recent study found that ED symptoms were more common amongst 
people who were described as alexithymic (K arukivi et al., 2010). To confirm this, a critical 
review of the literature on alexithymia and ED confirmed that alexithymia levels are elevated in 
individuals with EDcompared to healthy controls (Nowakowski, McFarlane, & Cassin, 2013). 
The review further confirms that alexithymia levels seem to decrease in response to 
psychological treatments that place an emphasis on identifying and describing emotions and the 
authors suggest more intensive and focused treatment. To date, no specific research appears to 
have been conducted comparing alexithymia and mentalising explicitly; nevertheless, a recent 
study suggested divergent construct validity between a measure of mentalising and alexithymia 
(Moulton-Perkins & Rogoff, 2011). Hence, it is expected that alexithymia will be inversely 
correlated with mentalising. Should that be accurate, one might tentatively conclude that 
therapeutic interventions that decrease alexithymia levels increase mentalising.  
So far, empirical support for mentalising theory comes mainly from attachment studies 
(Fonagy et al., 1991) and evidence suggests that individuals with a diagnosis of BPD, together 
with individuals diagnosed with ED, score lowest on the Reflective Function Scale 
4
(RFS) 
(Fonagy, 1995; Perkins, 2009). To date, a fragile mentalising capacity, extremely sensitive to 
social and interpersonal interactions, is believed to be a core feature of BPD (Allen & Fonagy, 
2007; Allen et al., 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2007) and ED (Skarderud, 2007). This has 
                                                     
 
4
 The idiom reflective function (RF), also known as “theory of mind” in developmental psychology, is the 
operationalised name of mentalising (Fonagy et al., 1998) and refers to the “psychological processes underlying the 
capacity to mentalise” (Fonagy et al., 2002 p. 24). 
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prompted some researchers to suggest that treatment for these client groups should have a 
mentalising stance in focus (Skarderud, 2007), a claim which the current study is indirectly 
attempting to address. At present, the NOURISHED project is currently investigating the role of 
a mentalising–enhancing treatment, namely MBT, in individuals with ED and concurrent 
features of BPD (Robinson et al., 2014). 
Whereas research on BPD and mentalising seems fairly robust, research in ED is scarcer 
and less straightforward. Some researchers have recently highlighted that individuals presenting 
with ED had significantly lower Reflective Functioning (RF) than other Axis I disorders 
(Fonagy, 1996; Müller, K aufhold, Overbeck, & Grabhorn, 2006; Perkins, 2009; Rothschild-
Y akar, Levy-Shiff, Fridman-Balaban, Gur, & Stein, 2010; Ward et al., 2001). In addition, Ward, 
Ramsay and Treasure (2000) studied mother-daughter pairs and found that RF was significantly 
lower in anorexic daughters and their mothers compared to psychiatric controls. Furthermore, 
the predominance of pre-mentalistic states of mind in individuals presenting with ED 
(Skarderud, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009) and a literature review by Ward and colleagues (2000) 
suggest strong links between insecure attachment styles, which hinder mentalising capacity, and 
ED. At the same time, Petersen, Lunn, K atznelson and Poulsen (2012) reported near to normal 
mentalising levels in individuals who presented with BN, despite atypical polarised scores.  
These findings suggest that the relationship between ED and mentalising might be more 
complex than originally expected and that further studies are required to shed light on this. It is 
hoped that this thesis will address the gap in the literature and contribute to the field on several 
fronts: a) by exploring whether individuals with ED display less mentalising ability than a 
control group; b) by investigating whether individuals with comorbid ED and SH 
symptomatology will differ in mentalising skills from individuals with ED only. 
Strong links have also been suggested between a lack of a mentalising stance in 
individuals presenting with ED and/or SH and extreme embodiment (Skarderud, 2007a). The 
body becomes a metaphor for inner states. K aren, who was hospitalised for AN, confirms this 
by saying that “when I am sad, I feel burdened and heavy...and then comes the urge to lose 
weight” (Skarderud, 2007a). A  self-harmer relates a similar concretisation and embodiment of 
emotions: There are times when I hurt too deep for tears, so I cut and it lets out some of the hurt. 
It’s like when you see the blood flowing out, the pain and fear are flowing with it” (Muller & 
Mathews, 2008).  
Given the relatively new origins of the concept of mentalising and the difficulties of 
measuring the construct, research in the context of other psychological difficulties is also scarce. 
Traditionally, mentalising has been measured using the Reflective Function Rating Scale 
(Fonagy et al., 1998) developed for use with the Adult Attachment Interviews (AAI; Main & 
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Goldwyn, 1994). So far, empirical evidence using this procedure suggested that individuals with 
panic disorder did not show globally impaired RF (Rudden, Milrod, Target, Ackerman & Graf, 
2006), nor did individuals with chronic depression (Taubner, K essler, Buchheim, K achele & 
Staun, 2011). Nevertheless, this scale is a unidimensional measure that is very extensive and 
requires training, which limited its applicability in the context of research.  
Mentalising in History 
Despite the concept of mentalising as it is known today being a fairly new one, it has 
been argued that both the French and the Anglo-Saxon psychoanalysts have used it extensively, 
the former, explicitly and the latter, implicitly (A llen & Fonagy, 2007). Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the conceptual origins of mentalising form a basis in several theories, amongst 
which cognitive psychology’s theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 2001), Bowlby’s (1988) 
attachment theory, and Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target’s (2002) developmental model of the 
self. 
In addition, it has also been suggested that the concept of mentalising was in some way 
present in Freud’s notion of “Bindung”, which is universally translated as linking (Fonagy, 
2001). Although the German analyst introduced several variations to this concept throughout his 
clinical work— which have been thoroughly detailed by Holt (1989, as cited in Erwin, 2002)— it 
seems that he mainly used the term to describe two distinct but related views. One of these 
suggested that Bindung referred to the qualitative change in which neural groups altered the 
trajectory of physical activity into a more associative and psychological one through the mental 
apparatus. This seems to be in concordance to the developmental notion of mentalising that 
suggests a progressive move from a physical (teleological) stance, to a more symbolic capacity 
for representation. For the reader’s information, the latter two concepts will be thoroughly 
discussed later on in the course of this thesis.  
Mentalising’s early conceptual roots are further embedded in the French psychoanalytic 
tradition of Bouchard & Lecours (2008) who elaborated Freud’s view of the mind and his 
Project’s hypothesis on the Economics of Thoughts (Freud, 1895, as cited in Busch, 2008). 
Based on Marty and de M’Uzan (1963, as cited in Bouchard & Lecours, 2008) observation of 
unusual psychic modes of the functioning of psychosomatic patients, the authors present an 
intra-psychic notion of mentalising. Mentalising is described as the process that transforms 
drives into affect states and symbols through a gradually more sophisticated process of primary 
and secondary representations. By drawing on the distinction between “representations”, which 
arguably involve the development and use of a stable mental image and “symbolisation” which 
connect representations, Bouchard & Lecours argue that the psychic apparatus elaborates, 
transforms and eventually integrates primary drives into mental representations.  
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For example, it has been suggested that the experience of fear corresponds to a primary 
(or first-order) representation because it only involves the physiological elements of the 
emotion. On the contrary, the ability to reflect on the concept of fear requires the existence of 
cognitive, behavioural, as well as physiological notions that correspond to the actual experience 
of fear. Hence, the latter is a secondary (or second-order) representation (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
This process of transformation, as described by the early work of the French psychoanalyst 
tradition, emphasises the fundamentally intra-psychic nature of this process by adopting a view 
that it would automatically happen from “the sensation of the mental activity of the self” 
(Fonagy et al., 2003). However, it has been argued that this view, which seems almost a 
synonym for the development of ego functions (i.e., the capacity to control and regulate affect 
and impulses), separates the intra-psychic and the interpersonal element of mentalising (Bruch, 
2008). The latter point was addressed by drawing on K ernberg’s theory (as cited in Fonagy, 
2001).  
By suggesting that the transformation of affect into drives happens in the context of a 
relationship with the object (K ernberg, 1976b, as cited in Fonagy, 2001), which eventually gives 
rise to the “self”, Bouchard & Lecours (2008) propose that mentalising can be viewed to emerge 
from a complex process that includes both the infant’s auto-representational and auto-symbolic 
instinctual demands, as well as a more inter-subjective aspect. Whereas early psychoanalytic 
theories strongly rejected the latter view, more recent paradigms emphasise a more inter-
subjective component as the core condition for fostering the development of mentalising 
(Fonagy et al., 2002; Fosshage, 2000; Stolorow, 1997). Regardless of the theoretical position, it 
has been argued that all the above modes imply a breakdown in the progression from primary to 
secondary order representations (Fonagy & Target, 1997); hence, a failure in symbolic 
representation, which, as described above, involves the development and use of a stable mental 
image.    
Furthermore, regardless of the controversy as to the speculated origins of mentalising, 
all authors give accounts of a lack of a mentalising stance as a pervasive mode of functioning 
characterised by (a) affect dysregulation; (b) an overwhelmed and confused psychic apparatus 
that uses mental rejection as a form of protection; (c) primitive forms of thinking (i.e., a 
reduction in the capacity for mental elaboration and symbolisation and concrete thinking; (d) 
absent sense of subjective agency— “empty presence” (Marty & de M’ Uzan, 1963, as cited in 
Bruch, 2008); (e) enactments. More recently, these features have been extensively documented 
and regarded as typical thinking patterns of individuals who present with ED and SH (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2004, 2007; Fonagy et al., 2004; Skarderud, 2007).  
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On the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon object-relations position on the origins of the concept 
of mentalising can be differentiated from its Francophone counterpart in that it moves away 
from a more philosophical stance, narrows its meaning and bases the idea on inter-subjectivity. 
Amongst those psychoanalysts, the name of Bion (1962) stands out as the precursor of the 
theory of mind. Bion’s focus on the origin of thought itself, rather than on the process of 
mentalising, pioneers the role of a “thinker” who can contain and think these thoughts. 
According to the author, thoughts without a thinker (Beta elements) need to be transformed 
through the capacity to think (A lpha function) into thoughts with a thinker (A lpha elements), 
which can eventually be mentalised. Crucial for this process, according to Bion, is also the role 
of the mother as a container and metaboliser for the child’s intolerable affect states. It has been 
suggested that it is only through this interpersonal containment that overwhelming affect and 
drives can be metabolised— mentalised-— into tolerable and thinkable experiences (Bion, 1962). 
Only through having their intolerable affect held by an attuned care-giver, the infant learns to 
hold it themselves. 
Bion equated this process of containment to frustration tolerance which, as suggested, 
individuals presenting with ED and SH significantly struggle with. Bearing in mind what has 
been discussed above in respect to the social environment of the population in question, 
difficulties with emotions-regulation seems understandable. Since it has been argued that the 
containment process requires mentalising, which is a modulator for strong, overwhelming affect 
(Allen et al., 2008), one can conclude that a poor capacity to contain one’s own emotions might 
be an indicator of poor mentalising.  
Bion’s (1962) interpersonal element is further elaborated by Winnicott (1971, as cited in 
Fonagy, 2001; Fonagy et al., 2002) who foremost amongst other theorists emphasised the 
uppermost importance of the caregiver’s attuned mirroring for the emergence of a mentalised 
sense of “self”. It has been suggested that is only through the good-enough mother’s capacity to 
reflect back the infant’s inner states that the child will find their mind (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Winnicott argued that if the mother is preoccupied, or indeed distressed by external factors, the 
infant will only perceive her own emotions reflected back, rather than their own, a claim that 
seems to mirror Bruch’s (1974) statement. This will arguably impact on the child’s ability to 
“find themselves” and to explore self/others’ inner world. Hence, it appears that the quality of 
early life dyadic relationship (the attachment quality) and the frequency with which an infant’s 
mind has been kept in mind is crucial for the development of a reflective function. It can 
confidently be stated that developing the ability to mentalise depends on being mentalised 
(Allen et al., 2008).  
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As previously discussed, there is increasing evidence that suggests that difficulties 
around food, body image and SH are connected to poor quality of parent-child attachment 
(Bruch, 1978; Gardener, 2001; Zachrisson & Skårderud, 2010). Hence, the thesis will now turn 
to the role of early relationships for the capacity to mentalise. 
T he role of E arly Relationships for the Capacity to Mentalise 
The notion of a sound and secure relationship between the infant and the principal 
caregiver is also the corner stone of Bowlby’s (1988, as cited in Fonagy, 1996, 2001) paradigm. 
The author also disregarded early psychoanalysts’ emphasis on unconscious processes and the 
developmental stages of the ego, and suggested instead that children are biologically 
predisposed to seek affectional bonds. Such ties are called “attachment” when there is an 
exclusive, significantly asymmetrical relationship with a principal caregiver who becomes 
irreplaceable. Whereas for early psychoanalysts the emotional attachment was secondary to the 
gratification of oral needs, Bowlby stated that the attachment’s system’s primary aim was 
initially the physical, and subsequently a more symbolic emotional proximity to the attachment 
figure in an attempt to feel safe. This was also confirmed by Harlow’s (1959) studies on rhesus 
monkeys that downplayed the role of the caregiver as meeting primitive needs and emphasised, 
instead, the comforting and emotional role of the attachment figure.  
Harlow’s (1959) most renowned study, which was prompted by Bowlby’s (1950) 
report, Maternal Care and Mental Health, featured the availability of surrogate mothers for 
infant rhesus monkeys. These surrogate mothers, which were made by either wire and wood or 
cloth, were presented under two conditions. In one condition, the wire mother held a bottle with 
food and the cloth mother held no food; in the other condition, the cloth mother held the bottle 
and the wire mother had nothing. The results of the study clearly confirmed the importance of 
comfort contact of the primary relationship as the infant monkeys consistently chose to spend 
time with a cloth ‘mother’ compared to the wire one even when only the latter could provide 
food. This clearly demonstrated that there was more than “oral gratification” to the 
“mother”/infant interaction.  
Attachment theory further suggested that the quality of the attachment leads to the 
internalisation of mental representations (Internal Working Memory, IWM) of the “self”, others, 
and how we relate to ourselves and others. For example, if an infant’s attachment figure is 
attentive, caring and loving towards the child, the little one’s working model of themselves is 
most likely to be of positive self-worth. At the same time, based on the infant’s positive 
experience of being nurtured, their IWM of others will most likely be that they are emotionally 
available, kind and considerate. On the contrary, it has been claimed that a preoccupied 
caregiver is likely to foster representational systems of the child being unworthy of care/love 
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and of others being unavailable and/or rejecting (Fonagy et al., 2002). Hence, it appears that the 
IWM as described by Bowlby (1950) is a set of mental representations that the child uses to 
relate to the world and to make it predictable. This arguably allows the child— mainly 
unconsciously— to interpret, plan, decide and develop prototypes for future life relationships. 
The secure/insecure attachment system, as emerging from the basis on the caregiver’s 
ability/inability to provide safety, support and “a secure base from which to explore the world” 
(Bowlby, 1988 p. 140), generates self-others representational mapping that appears to be strictly 
connected to the reflective function of the “self”, the base for the ability to mentalise (Fonagy & 
Target, 1997).  
Indeed, whereas it can be argued that the earliest psychoanalytic and object-relation 
models described above are primarily speculative, a lot of empirical evidence has been gathered 
to support attachment theory and to link some of the above ideas that suggest that mentalising 
develops in the context of a secure relationship in which the caregiver accurately mirrors the 
infant’s internal states. For example, A insworth’s (1985) Strange Situation procedure, which 
gave rise to the classification of attachment patterns, provides strong evidence for a child’s 
IWM. In the cited experiment, a toddler’s response to the caregiver and a stranger entering and 
leaving the room are observed during a play session. Particular attention during the procedure is 
placed upon the child's reactions to the departure of the caregiver and the child’s reaction upon 
the caregiver’s return. It is universally accepted that such reactions are influenced by the child’s 
internalised rules, learned from the principal caregiver, for displaying and communicating 
negative emotions.  
Procedural instances have shown how some children display anxious/avoidant insecure 
attachment styles and might avoid or ignore the caregiver altogether, outwardly exhibiting little 
or no distress, nor happiness upon the attachment figure’s departure and return. This is arguably 
because their attachment needs have been rejected in the past and/or those parents might have 
not been available to meet the baby’s needs (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978; Fonagy 
et al., 2002). As a result, the child has learned that communication of needs has no influence on 
the caregiver’s behaviour towards them. On the contrary, a more Anxious-Ambivalent/Resistant 
and clinging behaviour has been observed when the caregiver has been inconsistent in their 
care-giving responses towards the child (Bowlby, 1977). This is a behaviour that appears an 
attempt to pre-empt the inconsistency and maintain closeness. 
A  distinct, more disorganised pattern of attachment was observed in children exposed to 
major trauma/neglect and/or whose parents suffered major loss (Main & Solomon, 1986). Those 
children displayed overt fear in the presence of the caregiver, but also co-occurring 
contradictory behaviours and affects, stereotypic or jerky movements, or freezing and apparent 
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dissociation. This could arguably be due to the child's previous experience of the principal 
attachment figure, who is expected to be the source of comfort and a rescuer from distress, is 
also the source of threat or fear. It can be argued that these reactions, which have been 
interpreted as the attachment system been flooded, might mirror the confusion of the child’s 
IWM.  
On the contrary to this, empirical evidence revealed that a child who is securely 
attached to their principal caregiver and who has an IWM of the attachment figure as caring, 
attentive and available, will feel safe to explore their own environment and display their 
distress, knowing that the caregiver will be attentive and responsive to their emotional needs 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978). Evidence suggests that those children have parents who support them 
in achieving a sense of balance and control with respect to the management of negative and 
positive emotions (Steele & Steele, 2005). The authors also reported how it appeared evident 
that the message that those children had learned was that unmanageable negative feelings could 
have been coped with by turning to the caregiver.  
The link between parental mentalising, and its aptitude to reflect upon and deal with 
distress and the quality of the primary relationship has further been evidenced by findings from 
the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI). The AAI is an interviewing technique in which the 
subject is asked about one's own childhood experiences and aims to measure the level of 
mentalising in the adult through an analysis of the participant's discourse. With respect to what 
is mentioned above, George, K aplan and Main (1985) administered the AAI to expectant 
mothers and reported that their narratives predicted attachment classification at the age of one 
(Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991b). For example, dismissing narratives in the AAI predicted 
avoidant attachment whereas preoccupied narratives predicted anxious-resistant attachment 
styles. Similarly, confusion and disorganised discourses were predictive of disorganised Strange 
Situation behaviour; finally, coherent and reflective discourses predicted securely attached 
infants. 
This measure, which provides a strong and reliable tool for measuring the relationship 
between parental reflective functioning, the quality of the primary relationship and their links to 
emotional regulation in the toddler, is further strengthened by other empirical evidence that also 
testifies to the connection between mentalising, meta-cognitive capacity (memory, 
comprehension and communication; Moss et al., 1995, as cited in Fonagy, 2002) and the theory 
of mind (Fonagy, Steele, Steele & Holder, 1997; Meins, Ferryhough, Russel & Clark-Carter, 
1998 as cited in Fonagy & Target, 1997). The theory of mind (ToM), originally described by 
Premack and Woodruff (1978, as cited in Schlinger, 2009) in non-primates, was subsequently 
employed in developmental psychology to describe the steps by which children develop an 
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understanding of other's mental states and perspectives and the capacity to predict others’ 
behaviours. The “social-affective” component (emotional ToM: eToM) concerns the former, 
whereas the “social-cognitive” component (cognitive ToM: cTom) involves the latter (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). 
As suggested at the beginning of this section, ToM provides the basis for developing the 
capacity to mentalise. It is a theoretical model that explains the cognitive processes of 
mentalising and although for most of the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of the research on 
mentalising has been carried out under the name of ToM, the latter term has recently been 
criticised for being too narrow and neglecting the relational and emotional aspect of 
understanding behaviour (Fonagy, Gergely & Target, 2007). According to Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
and Frith (1985, as cited in Schlinger, 2009), “The ability to make inferences about what other 
people believe to be the case in a given situation allows one to predict what they will do”. 
Indeed, the hallmark for acquiring the ToM is passing the 'false belief test' (Winner & Perner, 
1983 as cited in A llen et al., 2008), a scenario in which the child is asked about the beliefs of 
someone (a protagonist) who has been exposed to different conditions from those of the child 
themselves. The aim of the test is to assess the child’s capacity to take the perspective of the 
other.  
A  classic example of this is the following: 'Child X  places some chocolate in a 
particular location and then leaves the room; in his absence the chocolate is moved to another 
location. The child is then asked where child X  will look for the chocolate on his return’ 
(Winner & Perner, 1983, as cited in Schlinger, 2009). Children who have developed a ToM will 
understand that upon his return child X  will still look for the chocolate in the same location 
where it was left, hence comprehending that child X  has a false-belief. Children who have 
acquired this understanding are aware of their own minds, the mind of others, as well as the 
connection/disconnection between the two. They seem to appreciate that the mind does not 
reflect reality as such, but rather that it is a representational system and that what we are aware 
of depends on the information we have been exposed to. As the reader will learn later, these 
points seem to be problematic for people who present with ED and SH. 
The compelling relationship amongst the concepts described so far is confirmed by 
empirical evidence that suggests that 84% of securely attached children pass the “false belief 
test at age 4, compared to 33% of insecurely attached ones (Meins, Ferryhough, Russel & 
Clark-Carter, 1998 as cited in Fonagy & Target, 1997). Furthermore, 82% of securely attached 
children tested in the Strange Situation procedure passed the belief-desire task compared to 46% 
of insecurely attached (Fonagy et al., 1997).  Many other examples of such links between 
attachment quality, cognitive, symbolic and mentalising functions are given in Fonagy et al. 
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(2002), A llen and Fonagy (2007), Fonagy (2008), Busch (2008), and Allen et al.’s (2008) 
studies. Due to space restrictions, no further evidence will be discussed here, but the reader can 
refer to the above references for a more detailed account of other empirical evidence. 
Nevertheless, evidence so far clearly demonstrates a significant correlation between the above 
and a crucial role of the attachment system in the development or hindrance of these functions 
and subsequent psychopathology.   
In particular, there is general agreement amongst researchers and clinicians that the 
quality of the secure attachment is paramount for allowing the child the freedom to engage in 
symbolic, as well as in cognitive exploratory activity (Fonagy et al., 2002). Conversely, when 
the quality of the relationship is poor and the infant’s emotional states are not appropriately 
held, or there is over-involvement and over-stepping of boundaries, the infant’s exploratory 
skills are suppressed as they attempt to make sense of their own affective experiences.  
The journey through the history of mentalising has finally taken us to the most recent 
origin of the concept of reflective functioning. The latest advancements are attributed to a 
developmental theory of the “self” (Fonagy, 1991) and the empirical work carried out by 
Fonagy and Target (1997), amongst other clinicians (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy et al., 
2002; Sharp, Fonagy & Goodyer, 2006). These researchers expanded the cognitive notion of the 
ToM to include several other facets, amongst which the relational, emotional and affect 
regulative aspects, characteristic of mentalising. The theory builds on a model that suggests that 
the attachment relationship is not only fundamental for the survival of the infant, but also for the 
development of the “self” and the ability to experience and conceive of mental states. Hence, 
Fonagy suggests that the ability to mentalise develops in the context of an early secure 
relationship in which the primary caregiver is able to accurately mirror the infant’s states of 
mind.  
It has further been argued that this mirroring, provided it has specific characteristics that 
will be discussed later in the course of this thesis, will eventually create the basis for the child’s 
symbolic capacity and affect regulation (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007), which are the foundations 
for the ability to synthesise conflicting emotions. This, in turn, will lead to an integrated “self” 
experience (Skarderud, 2009). The latter point is poignant for the research question as it can be 
argued that the absence of a reliable internal self-regulation might cause some vulnerable 
individuals to feel out of control internally, hence to concentrate all their energies towards 
developing extreme forms of body control. It has further been argued that an inability to 
regulate overwhelming affect might make some individuals intensely vulnerable to alienation 
between the “psyche” and “soma” leaving the body to carry the burden of emotional expression 
(Lane, 2002).  
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Overview of T heories of the Development of Mentalising
5
 
Before reviewing the developmental theory of the self, it seems helpful to have an 
overview of the controversy surrounding the reasons for the development of the precursor for 
the ability to mentalise in human beings. Although there is a general agreement as to the stages 
of development of this function, and the ability to experience and conceive of mental states 
seems to emerge hand in hand with “self-organisation”, disagreement still reigns as to how and 
why a ToM emerges. It seems important to explore this at this stage because, as was discussed 
above in relation to the development of the concept of mentalising in history, trends also seem 
to move away from more intra-psychic explanations, which favour biological and cognitive 
mechanisms in which the child is an isolated organism, whose development happens from 
within.  
Baron-Cohen and Swettenham (1996, as cited in Fonagy & Target, 1997) ask “how on 
earth can young children master such abstract concepts as beliefs (and false beliefs) with such 
ease and roughly at the same time the world over?”. The researchers put forward a Modularity 
theory: reflective function is an innate ability which is located— in the form of separate 
modules— in a specific part of the brain and that gets automatically activated by the 
environment. According to this model, one of the child’s first achievements is the understanding 
that others are able to move on their own (Theory of Body; Flavell, 1999, as cited in Sandquist, 
2010) whereas subsequent modules range from awareness of intentionality to goal-oriented 
actions. The paradigm claims that when all modules are activated, the ability to mentalise is 
acquired through a process that goes hand in hand with age. 
Another example of a hypothesis that suggests an innate predisposition to the 
acquisition of the ToM is the Theory-Theory (Gopnik, Meltzoff & K uhl, 2000). This, however, 
despite suggesting an inborn aptitude as the Modularity paradigm, presents several differences 
from the former. For example, in the first instance the Theory-Theory emphasises a more 
cognitive aspect and views the processes that underlie the reflective function as applicable to all 
knowledge, rather than just applicable to specific features that characterise the ToM. In other 
words, the Modularity theory claims that the innate processes that determine the essential 
character of the ToM are part of our genetic endowment; yet those processes do not apply to 
other cognitive domains. Instead, the model suggests that those processes only apply to the 
                                                     
 
5
 The reader is reminded that for most of the 80s and 90s, empirical research on mentalising was carried out under the 
broader term of Theory of Mind. Hence, the literature reviewed in this section primarily uses the broader term to 
describe an awareness of others’ mental states. The writer will use mentalising, reflective function and Theory of 
Mind interchangeably for this section of the thesis only. More details as to why it is now generally agreed that 
mentalising and Theory of Mind are not equivalent will be discussed later on in the course of this paper. 
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specific procedures underlying reflective functioning. On the contrary, Theory-Theory suggests 
that these processes are identical to the processes which underlie scientific reasoning and that 
are used by children to learn about the world (Scholl & Leslie, 1999).  
 According to the latter model, children actively experiment and explore the world and 
develop scientist-like theories that allow them to make predictions and to assess evidence. The 
researcher suggests that skills like joint attention, imitation and memory help the child to 
develop theories, which are then assessed as new information is acquired. However, it has been 
argued that initially children have a bias for counter-evidence, which is distorted and re-
interpreted in terms of the child’s schemas. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that as counter-
evidence accumulates, eventually children will seek alternative explanations and theories which 
ultimately replace the original ones (Gopnik et al., 2000). According to the researcher, these 
theories foster mentalising through a continuous series of reorganization of the child’s thoughts 
based on the input from other individuals and the environment, which again, seems to have a 
crucial role.  
Whereas it is understandable how this theory has successfully been applied to children’s 
understanding of the physical and the biological world (Gopnik et al., 2000), it seems that it 
lacks a deeper exploration of emotional content. Fonagy et al. (2002) argued that both the 
Modularity and the Theory-Theory paradigms focus on mechanisms rather than on content and 
that whilst those theories provide an explanation of how and when the child acquires knowledge 
of others’ minds, they do not explore how the child feels about these mental states. Y et, the 
researchers argue that knowledge and emotional content cannot easily be separated, as is evident 
in clinical cases of individuals with extreme anti-social tendencies where the individual might 
know what the other person feels, but lacks empathy, or indeed even interest.  
Another cognitive theoretical standpoint that attempts to describe how the ToM 
develops is the Executive Function Hypothesis (Carlson, Moses & Brenton, 2002, as cited in 
Sandquist, 2010). This theory emphasises how the ability to mentalise seems to be correlated 
with executive functioning and suggests that general executive functions are responsible for the 
development of an awareness of others’ perspectives and other non-verbal faculties. Sandquist 
(2010) reminds us not to overlook the role of language in the development of mentalising and 
encourages us to consider a bi-directional relationship between general language skills and 
reflective function. A lthough there is agreement that language is the vehicle for communication 
of mentalising interactions, it has been argued that in order for language to function accordingly, 
the subjective world has to have developed an internal structure and organisation. Internal states 
need to have a meaning in order to be expressed through language (Fonagy et al., 2002).  
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Despite acknowledging the role of the external environment for the development of a 
ToM, all of the above-referenced paradigms appear to neglect the bulk of empirical evidence 
that, instead, emphasises the crucial role of the caregiver and the quality of the attachment 
relationship to the principal caregiver. This is also the limitation of the Simulation theory, that 
nevertheless takes a slightly different perspective and suggests that the ToM emerges when the 
child mentally simulates what he or she thinks the other person might feel, think or do (Harris, 
1991, as cited in Sandquist, 2010) or what he would do in the imagined circumstances 
(Goldman, 1993, as cited in Fonagy & Target, 1997). However, despite this approach linking 
reflective function to social interaction in that it is argued that the skill in question flourishes 
inter-personally, nevertheless it still does not give enough recognition to the universally-
acknowledged exclusiveness and the quality of the emotional bond with the caregiver. This last 
point, instead, is emphasised in developmental psychology’s new paradigms and in particular, in 
the developmental theory of the “self”.  
Developmental T heory of the “Self”  
The developmental theory of the “self” positions itself in a very controversial philosophical, as 
well as psychological debate: that of the relationship between the mind and the body, crucial in 
both ED and SH. Ever since Descartes argued for the existence of the mind separate and distinct 
from the body, the question of whether the mind and the material body can interact whilst being 
ontologically different has often been in the forefront of social sciences’ controversy.  
The precursor for the theory of the “self” is unanimously recognised as J ames’s (1890, 
1892, as cited in Fonagy & Target, 1997), who proposes a distinction between different aspects 
of the “self”: the “I”, regarded as the subjective “self” (the knower), and the “me”, considered as 
the object “self” (the known-self). The former is believed to be the one responsible for 
organising and making sense of the “me”, which is instead the mental representation. A  similar 
notion appears to be echoed by Gergely and Unoka (2008, as cited in K arterud & Bateman, 
2011) who, nevertheless, focus on how the core “self” develops into the reflective “self”. 
However, whereas it appears that early notions of the acquisition of a sense of “self” favour 
intra-psychic processes, subsequent models become more inter-personal in nature. In particular, 
Gergely and Watson (1996) put forward a “Social Biofeedback Theory of Parental Affect 
Mirroring” that deems representational loops between the infant and the caregiver responsible to 
achieve second-order representations. 
According to this model, newborns come to this world with a rich innate set of emotions 
and perceptual and learning capacity. The paradigm argues that the infant's perceptual system is 
innately predisposed to attend to external stimuli and to build representations on the basis of 
such stimuli (Fonagy et al., 2002). However, according to the researchers, there is no empirical 
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evidence to support the Theory-Theory model. The latter relies on the Cartesian assumption that 
mental states are accessed through introspection, that these affect states automatically activate 
conscious feelings in the infant and that the child automatically attributes emotional states to 
others. Instead, Fonagy and colleagues suggestthat the infant gradually learns the emotional 
content of their innate emotions through observing their own affect states being mirrored back 
by the caregiver. This is a point, together with the empirical evidence on the social background 
of individuals who present with ED and SH, that seems to shed some light on some of the 
difficulties that this ED/SH groups display in recognising their own emotions. 
Fonagy et al. (2002) describe how in healthy development the parent approaches the 
infant as if it had mental states. This was clearly illustrated in the first example discussed at the 
beginning of this thesis when the mother-described regarded her daughter’s tantrum as an 
expression of internal states of mind. The child’s behaviour was not seen as a physical reaction 
to a physical world, but as an expression of intentionality (Fonagy et al., 2002). Unconsciously 
regarding the infant as an intentional agent instantly places the little one and the caregiver in a 
perpetual, non-conscious set of affective and communicative exchanges whereby the principal 
attachment figure non-consciously recognises, reflects upon, contains, metabolises and mirrors 
back the infant’s mental states (V erheugt-Pleiter, Zevalkink, & Schmeets, 2008). The authors, 
agreeing with the “Social-Biofeedback Theory of Parental Affect Mirroring" described this 
process as representation loops that start with the baby as the unaware subject of first-order 
representations.  
These representations are reportedly recognised by the caregiver and given back to the 
child in the form of secondary representations, which will eventually allow the baby to 
understand their own feelings and develop second-order representations (V erheugt-Pleiter et al., 
2008). Furthermore, it has been hypothesised that it is this repetitive and consistent mirroring 
that will eventually allow the child to recognise their own affective states and to map those onto 
the 'correct' cognitive understanding of the emotion (K im et al., 2014). However, the nature and 
quality of this mirroring has been argued to be crucial for this process to happen. In particular, it 
has been suggested that for mirroring to constitute the basis for the development of a safe and 
contained affect representational framework, it has to possess two fundamental features: 1) 
contingency and 2) markedness. In other words, the mirroring has to be accurate (contingent) 
enough to display the child’s own affect, but it also has to incorporate some contrasting features 
(markedness), which allow the child to recognise that this is not how the caregiver feels.  
For example, in the event that the young child’s fear is recognised and mirrored by the 
attachment figure, the reflection of the affect state ought to be accurately representing the 
primary emotion, in this case, fear. The repetition and consistency of this action will eventually 
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organise the child’s emotional experience and allow the little one to understand how and what 
they feel. However, the “good-enough” caregiver’s representation of the child’s fear also ought 
to exhibit some kind of markedness and incongruence in order for the child to realise that this is 
not the caregiver’s affect and, hence, not to feel overwhelmed. It has been argued that it is the 
attachment figure’s reaction, which is accurate enough, yet different enough from the child’s 
own, that creates the basis for symbolic second order representations (Fonagy, 2001). It is 
arguably the “difference that makes the difference” (Bateson, 1972, as cited in Dallos & Draper, 
2005). 
If the mirroring is marked, but not contingent, such as in cases in which the caregiver 
represents their own affective state, rather than the child's, the baby will experience a 
categorically incongruent representation. For example, the case of a mother who misrepresents 
the child's excited behaviour for naughtiness. In that case, the mother will try to make sense of 
the child’s affect according to her own internal state and might possibly attempt to modulate the 
child’s affect with a stern and harsh response. Due to the strong markedness, the affect might be 
separated from the parent and attributed by the baby to themselves, ascribing it to their first 
order representation. However, if the mirroring does not match the child’s internal state, the 
establishment of second-order representations will be problematic and might result in distorted 
secondary and “self” representations. Subsequent affect regulation will also be based on 
distorted second-order representations which, however, have little connection to the first-order 
ones; hence, emotional experiences might be perceived as not “real” and words might fail to 
describe and connect to feelings. Winnicott (1960a, as cited in Fonagy, 2001) described this 
process as the emergence of a “false” self; Fonagy et al. (2002) coined the term “alien self”.  
When non-contingent mirroring predominates, the connection between the infant’s 
internal state and external reality, and cognitive development may be characterised a “pretend 
mode” in which there is little perceived connection between internal and external reality 
(Weinberg, 2006). Empirical evidence currently suggests that mentalising-failure is linked to 
childhood attachment trauma (Fonagy, 1989; Leuzinger-Bohlerber, Canestri & Target, 2010), 
that traumatised children cannot learn words for feelings (Beeghley & Cicchetti, 1994) and that 
traumatised adults struggle more to assess intentions behind facial expressions (Fonagy et al., 
2003). These last points are crucial for the present research as it is widely documented that 
people who present with ED and SH might report inner experiences as being disconnected from 
outer reality, struggle to put their distress into words, lack an emotional vocabulary for their 
inner states (alexithymia) and use, instead, their body as a substitute (Bruch, 1978, 2001; 
Skarderud, 2007).  
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Instead, in the eventuality that the mirroring does not display the necessary 
“markedness” that allows the infant to decouple the affect from the attachment figure, the child 
will assume that the representation is the caregiver’s real emotion. In this instance, the 
caregiver’s affect appears magically to mirror the infant’s internal experience (Weinberg, 2006). 
Hence, the little one will not be able to attribute the affect state to themselves and, as a result, 
they will not be able to develop second-order representations. Weiberg (2006) argues that this 
experience underlies the functioning of the “psychic equivalence” mode, in which internal 
reality is assumed to be identical with external reality. Furthermore, due to the child reling on 
the caregiver for affect regulation, the infant’s negative emotional state will escalate even 
further and it will result in the child feeling overwhelmed. This will result in deficiency in both 
self-perception and self-control of affect (Fonagy et al., 2002) and the child will seek alternative 
ways of making sense and containing a psychological world in which his affective states are 
poorly represented. In this regard, some researchers have suggested that a categorically 
congruent, but unmarked affect mirroring might play a role in the development of defensive 
mechanisms such as “projective identification” (Fonagy et al., 2002) whereby the child 
externalises the overwhelming parts of the “self” and relocates those persecutory experiences in 
the object.  
The literature suggests how, in both cases, ordinary psychic developmental phases can 
persist and how incongruently contingent or unmarked mirroring can create a vulnerability for 
later distortions of subjectivity (Weinberg, 2006). Evidence confirms this as there is agreement 
that, although the infant has some very basic skills to self-regulate one's own affect by either 
turning away from over-arousing stimuli or thumb-sucking (Demos, 1986; Malatesta et al., 
1989, as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002), the principal caregiver plays a crucial role in affect-
regulation. In this regard, Malatesta et al. (1989), amongst others cited in Fonagy et al. (2002), 
present evidence that sensitive mothers are skilled readers of their babies' affect and that they 
tend to attune their own affective response to modulate that of child. This process seems not to 
have happened for individuals who later develop ED and/or SH. 
Hence, Fonagy’s developmental theory of the “self” (Fonagy et al., 2002) rejects the 
Cartesian assumption that mental states are understood by introspection and argues instead that 
a sense of “self” develops from experiencing oneself being perceived by others as thinking and 
feeling. However, it is understandable how, in order for the child to be able to conceive of 
themselves and others as having a mind, the baby has to have developed a symbolic 
representational system of mental states; what Bouchard and Lecours (2008) described as stable 
mental images. Furthermore, in order for the child to be able to reflect upon the “self” and the 
object, these representations must not only be present, but also accessible, coherent in the 
child’s IWM and also linked in time (K arterud & Bateman, 2011). This function, which 
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connects representations, is what Bouchard and Lecours called “symbolisation". Again, the 
researcher turns to Fonagy et al. to describe the necessary steps a child undergoes in order to 
achieve this symbolic capacity. 
T he origins of the ability to mentalise 
Fonagy and colleagues (2002) suggest that in healthy development an infant goes through five 
levels of developmental tasks of “agency of the self”. These phases include: 1) a physical; 2) a 
social; 3) a teleological; 4) an intentional and 5) a representational or symbolic phase. There is 
now widespread agreement that the organisation of the “self” starts with the physical domain. It 
has been suggested that through the perception of one’s own body and bodily-related 
experiences, the infant gradually learns to appreciate the boundaries between the “self” and the 
world. Numerous studies reported that infants are attuned to contingent relationships between 
stimuli and physical responses (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Field, 1989; Papousek & Papousek, 
1974 as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002; Watson 1994, 1995, as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002). The 
researchers suggested that the main function of the contingency-detection mechanism is that of 
the detection of the "self" as separate from the environment. Interestingly, research suggests that 
whereas initially infants prefer perfectly contingent stimuli, as their development continues, 
non-perfectly contingent stimuli are preferred, suggesting an awareness of boundaries between 
the "self" and the outside environment. 
 Several empirical examples further report that around the age of three months a shift 
happens; by consistently interacting with an attentive caregiver, it appears that the baby 
gradually develops an awareness of themselves as social “agents”. Aristotle (as cited in Owen, 
1965c) described human beings as 'social animals' and indeed empirical evidence confirms this 
hypothesis as it has been reported that as infants start developing a preference for non-perfectly 
contingent stimuli, they move away from self-exploration towards the “other” and the social 
world. Studies report that, already from the first few months of life, babies actively seek 
interactions with significant others, and that the facial expressions of either one is predictive of 
the facial expressions of the other (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988; Beebe, Lachmann & Jaffe, 1997, 
as cited in V erheugt-Pleiter et al., 2008). Further evidence suggests that infants have a natural 
predisposition towards facial features and familiar voices and that they automatically engage in 
'prototypical conversational turn-taking' (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Fonagy and colleagues (2002) emphasise how interactions at this stage are pre-symbolic 
and non-mentalised in that the infant does not hold a representation of the caregiver's states of 
mind and although the baby's actions might have reference to future goals, their ability to 
modify their behaviour to reach a goal is not yet developed (Piaget, 1936, as cited in Fonagy et 
al., 2002). The researchers report that infants younger than six to eight months would repeat 
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behaviours that had previously been successful in reaching an objective, without modifying 
their behaviour to take into consideration new obstacles. Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
the child's capacity to influence the caregiver's affect at this early stage of development is also 
severely limited. 
However, it has been noted that as the “social self” develops and babies start to interact 
more with the external environment, a new shift occurs. Around the ninth month of life it seems 
that a child’s understanding of themselves as active agent takes a leap: the child gradually learns 
to modify his/her actions in response to changes in the environment and becomes able to adapt 
his/her behaviour to reach a specific goal. For example, it has been shown that only children 
over the age of eight months remove an obstacle placed between themselves and a desired 
object (Piaget, 1936), whereas younger children would give up, or change the desired objective. 
In addition, other changes have been reported in the child's ability to communicate with others. 
In this regard, an increased capacity for joint attention actions has been shown, such as 
following adult gazes and child-led actions such as object-pointing (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
Tommasello (1999, as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002) described this stage as a social-cognitive 
revolution and coined the term 'intentional stance' to refer to this newly developed ability to 
initiate goal-directed actions. 
The former authors, instead, describe this as a 'teleological stance' in that the child's 
understanding of the world happens in the context of the outcome that follows the action, rather 
than in the context of a causal inference. They suggest that outcomes only appear to be 
conceived when they bring about physical changes. This feature, characteristic of a pre-
mentalistic state of mind, is a prominent feature of the population the current study is focusing 
on and represents an inability to symbolise, to conceive of mental states as representations. 
More will be discussed in the course of this thesis regarding this feature in ED and SH. 
Nevertheless, in normal development, the teleological stance seems to bring about an 
understanding of goals as separate from the means to reach them.  
The difference between Tommasello (1999) and Fonagy's (2002) conceptualisation of 
the shift that happens in the child at around the age of nine months is based on three main 
assumptions: 1) the role of simulation in understanding others as goal-directed agents; 2) 
understanding of the “self” versus the “other”; 3) the origins of mentalising. These differences 
will not be discussed here in detail and the reader is referred to Fonagy et al. (2002) for a full 
account. However, the main difference relates to the researchers' stance in relation to the origins 
of an awareness of causal intentional mental states, and whereas Tommasello suggests that joint 
attention skills seem to imply an awareness of others' mental states, Gergerly rejects this claim.  
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Fonagy's developmental theory of the “self” suggests, on the contrary, that an initial 
awareness that actions are preceded by prior intentional states emerges around the second year 
of life and that this is the time when the emerging “self” seems to start developing the ability to 
think in terms of some mental causation. Around this time, which seems to represent the 
beginning of the “intentional mental agent position”, it appears that children develop a “naïve 
theory of mind”, a basic understanding that people have wishes that might be different from 
their own and that others can have desires and wishes without necessarily acting on them. 
Children now appear to be able to engage in comforting behaviours towards others and they 
appear to act on others’ preferences. For example, research reports that 18 month olds were able 
to differentiate between their favourite food and the one of the experiment’s co-participant; a 
finding that was clearly shown by their feeding the co-participant with the food for which they 
had previously expressed a preference. This result was not replicated in 14 month olds who, 
instead, gave the food they themselves preferred (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997 as cited in Fonagy 
et al., 2002).  
Research also suggests that children at this age begin to conceptualise actions in terms 
of rationality and coherence and they start generalising their knowledge, expecting more 
predictable outcomes and stable attributes. Some argue that this is the emergence of J ames’ 
concept of “me, the known-self, the self-reflecting actor”; actions, thoughts and feelings appear 
to become more and more “mine” (K arterud & Bateman, 2011), as displayed by an increasing 
use of the pronoun ‘I’. Indeed, developmental psychology has long argued that this is a time of 
great changes, when self-awareness emerges, as demonstrated by the Rouge test (Amsterdam, 
1972; Gullup, 1991, as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002). The Rouge test is an experiment in which a 
red dot is drawn on the child’s nose in an attempt to observe whether the little one will try to 
wipe it off when placed in front of a mirror. Empirical evidence shows that by 18 months of 
age, 50% of children can recognize themselves in the mirror and by 24 months of age, most 
children will touch their noses. Interestingly, it also appears that there is a connection between 
self-awareness and emotions as it has been reported that most children will act shy if increased 
attentions is paid to the dot on their nose.   
Whereas it seems that the above might be sufficient evidence to suggest an initial 
mentalistic stance at this age, some researchers have observed that self-recognition is also 
present in chimpanzees and children with autism, both of which seem to lack a ToM (Fonagy et 
al., 2002). Furthermore, children do not comprehend the rationale underlying the “false-belief 
test” until much later which suggests that a mature understanding of different mental states and 
diverse perspectives is still lacking (hence the term “naïve theory of mind”). In particular, it 
seems that although at this stage, children have developed an awareness that others might have 
different wishes and desires, they still lack symbolic capacity. In other words, it appears that 
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children at this age still lack the capacity to think in abstract terms, to play with and to 
conceptualise of reality and mental states as representations. Difficulties which have been 
extensively reported in the adult population on which the study focuses on. 
The task of developing abstract thinking and mental representations seems to be the last 
stage of the maturity of the “self”, which is the most complex and sophisticated stages of all in 
that it implies the integration of all the concepts described so far. Fonagy and colleagues (2002) 
speak of this step as the understanding of the “self and others as representational agents” and 
they place this phase between the ages of four and five. Around this time, it appears that the 
toddler, provided that they have been nurtured by most of the necessary conditions described so 
far, reaches a more advanced appreciation of mental causality which allows them to move away 
from the physical to the more abstract realm of reality. This seems to be the time when children 
learn to play with their inner world and reality, and conceptualise of mental states as being 
about reality, rather than reality itself. This marks the difference between attributing the fear 
that monsters might be hiding under the bed to one’s own emotional state and attributing the 
fear to the fact that monsters might be under the bed.  
Perner (1991b, 2000b as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002, p. 244) speaks of mental 
representations “as the understanding that mental states are about some— real or hypothetical—
state of affairs that can be evaluated as true or false in relation to such a state of affair”. He 
further claims that this is a necessary prerequisite for the understanding that actions are caused 
by representations of reality, rather than reality itself. Crucial to the emergence of this ability, 
together with a “good-enough environment and a good-enough mother” seems to be playing. It 
can be argued that it is through play that the child learns to “have fun” with reality, to adopt 
different perspectives and to imagine that others are different from what they normally are in a 
safe and contained way. It can further be suggested that it is during play that the child learns to 
separate between inner and outer worlds, fantasy and reality, whilst still being able to hold both 
in mind. As the reader will learn, these are crucial points for the population in question. 
It is the ability to conceive of oneself as a representational agent, to have a symbolic 
capacity for reality and to have the ability to hold several representations in mind that marks this 
phase of development and that differentiate it from the previous stage in which the child was 
only able to hold one representation of themselves in mind. Indeed, in the pre-representational 
stage of the “self”, the child, still existing in pre-mentalistic states of mind, was unable to 
differentiate between inner and outer reality. Around the second year of life, the toddler was 
only able to hold one representation of the “self” at the time (Pvinelli, 1999 as cited in Fonagy 
et al., 2002) which they could then compare to a previously held representation. This included 
the ‘self’s” physical features and actions. Instead, it appears that this newly acquired skill allows 
72 
 
the child to pretend to be a super-hero whilst “knowing” they are still their usual “self”. In this 
regard, Bateman and Fonagy (2008) relate the curious anecdote of a three year old boy who, 
when looking at himself in a mirror, wearing an extremely realistic Batman fancy-dress that the 
boy himself had asked as a gift, became frightened. Reportedly, the little boy refused to wear 
the costume again and resorted back to using his mother’s skirt as his Batman cloak.  
Instead, it appears that around the fourth year of life, the child whose growing 
environment was good enough, becomes more able to simultaneously hold several 
representations of themselves and others in mind without feeling threatened: the child can be 
both a realistic Batman and his usual “self” without fearing disintegration. It appears that the 
ability to hold and connect several representations at the same time fosters the capacity to link 
different representations into a temporal coherent narrative. Hence, an autobiographical self is 
said to emerge, able to put together events in chronological order and to make sense of them. 
This skill, which is shown to develop around the sixth year of life, seems to demarcate the 
switch between procedural to declarative memory and, it is argued, to epitomise the goal of the 
developmental course (K arterud & Bateman, 2011), the establishment of a strong sense of 
autobiographical “self”, able to sustain different “selves” representations into an organised, 
coherent and meaningful narrative.  
To conclude, the Cartesian doctrine of "cogito, ergo sum" has traditionally fostered the 
illusion that individuals have direct and infallible access to their own mental states through 
introspection. This has prompted some researchers to suggest that knowledge of the "self" as a 
putative being is innate and that infants are naturally pre-wired to recognise their own inner 
states. However, more recent advances in the field of cognitive, developmental and attachment 
domains have reported a more complex and inter-subjective process in action that sees both the 
infant and the principal attachment figure engaged in perpetual communicative and emotional 
feedback loops. Provided that the quality of the attachment relationship is good-enough, it is the 
caregiver who, by constantly and consistently interpreting and mirroring the infant’s mental 
states, facilitates the child’s understanding of their own affect. However, in order for this to be 
possible, it is necessary that the baby has mental representations of the “self” and of others, and 
that these are retrievable in the child’s IWM in a coherent time sequence in which there is a 
“principal self agent”.  
It has been argued that mentalising, which is acquired through being the subject of a 
mentalising other, integrates J ames’ notion of the “I” as an active agent and the “me” as the 
representational “self” (as cited in Fonagy et al., 2002). This appears to provide the “self” with a 
sense of cohesion by giving meaning to changing “selves” and putting them in the perspective 
of one’s own life (K arterud & Bateman, 2011). Indeed, mentalising has been argued to tap into 
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levels of personality organisation (K atznelson, 2014). Without a mentalising stance, it can be 
argued, an individual might feel totally out of control internally and feel at the mercy of one’s 
own changing states and inner and outer events (K arterud & Bateman, 2011). Living in pre-
mentalistic states of mind, that imply a teleological and concrete stance, with a lack of symbolic 
capacity and ability to think in abstract terms, might drive such individuals to seek more 
tangible substitutes to control overwhelming states. The body being one of those substitutes.  
Furthermore, the development of a mentalising function is considered a separate issue 
from the ability to mentalise and research has shown that the latter can be context specific 
(Allen et al., 2008). Just as mentalising capacity need an optimal level of arousal to develop, 
findings have suggested that mentalising failure tends to happen in the context of an aroused 
attachment system, particularly when conflicts and strong emotions develop, as well as with 
little emotional arousal. In order to mentalise, the level of arousal needs to be optimal. In this 
regard, images studies report that the activation of the areas of the brain that mediate attachment 
simultaneously deactivates brain parts that foster social judgment and mentalising (Bartel & 
Zeki, 2000, as cited in Lenzinger-Bohleber et. al., 2010).  
Domains, Dimensions of Mentalising and R elated Concepts 
The above section described the healthy development of a mentalistic “self”, which, if the 
necessary conditions are present, ought to develop as a coherent autobiographical narrative, 
grounded in a temporal sequence and mainly able to self-regulate affect by the age of six. This 
mentalistic “self” has been argued to include a sense that “there is something that it feels like to 
be me” (Searle, 2004, as cited in Allen & Fonagy, 2007), a sense of agency— a feeling of doing 
(Marcel, 2003, as cited in A llen & Fonagy, 2007) and it has been suggested that it is anchored in 
emotional states (Damasio, 1999 as cited in A llen & Fonagy, 2007). Mentalising encapsulates 
all these aspects and, indeed, it allows individuals to be aware of what’s going on in their own 
or someone else’s mind. However, as previously discussed, the detection, decoding and 
reasoning about mental states, is also the function of the ToM. 
However, although mentalising and ToM— and especially eToM— might seem similar, 
and are often used interchangeably, they do not have identical status in “the body” (Debbane et 
al., 2016) and in explaining mental distress (Gorska & Marzsal, 2014). Whilst the literature on 
ToM addresses the cognitive development of mentalising, it appears to fail to encapsulate the 
relational and affect regulative aspects of interpreting behaviour (Allen & Fonagy, 2007); it also 
focuses primarily on others, rather than on the self. Further, mentalising sets itself apart for its 
inherent attention to four dimensions: modes (implicit/explicit), subjects (self/others), aspects 
(cognitive/affective), focus (internal/external) (Fonagy & Bateman, 2012; Fonagy & Luyten, 
2009). In addition, mentalising sets itself apart because, besides understanding one’s own and 
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others’ mental states, it entails the regulation and transformation of one’s own emotions, 
through understanding others’ intentions, feelings, and beliefs (Gorska & Marzsal, 2014). 
Ultimately, mentalising is elaborated on the basis of physiological arousal and emphasises 
interdependency between the mind and the body (Debbane et al., 2016), requiring the activation 
of relational and emotional representations, as well as the processing of emotional experience. 
Instead, e-ToM refers to “cold” knowledge (Gorska & Marzal, 2014). 
It can be suggested that the emotional aspect of mentalising is somehow covered by the 
concept of empathy, defined as an “awareness and appropriate emotional response to a 
representation of another’s internal state” (A llen et al., 2008). Nevertheless, as in the case of 
ToM, the domain of empathy is narrower compared to the concept of mentalisation: empathy 
often entails empathy for others, rather than for the self. Indeed, this attention for the cognitive 
and emotional aspect of psychological states is encapsulated in the term “mindfulness”, defined 
in the Buddhist literature as “keeping one’s consciousness alive to the present reality” (Hahn, 
1975, as cited in Allen & Fonagy, 2007).  
In more specific terms, the concept of mindfulness refers to a non-judgmental, 
emotionally detached awareness of current experiences, as well as present reality (A llen et al., 
2008) and implies a calm attentiveness to one's bodily functions, feelings, and thoughts, as well 
as to consciousness itself, an awareness that mentalising incorporates and expands. Mentalising 
further directs this attentiveness not only towards the present, as in mindfulness, but also 
towards the past and the future. Hence it appears that mentalising sets itself apart for being a 
multi-dimensional concept which embraces a number of overlapping concepts that make up its 
topography, although none shares the exact same boundaries (A llen et al., 2008). Some of these 
concepts (ToM, mindfulness, empathy and alexithymia) are strictly relevant to the current study 
and the researcher has made a pragmatic decision, for reasons that will be later discussed in the 
Method section, also to evaluate these adjacent concepts.  
Whereas empirical findings on the relationship between mentalising function and 
empathy, mindfulness and alexithymia seem more unanimous, findings on the relationship 
between RF and ToM and are, to-date, more ambiguous. For example, evidence suggests that 
ToM, and especially eToM, is a core issue for individuals presenting with EDs (Schmidt, 
Oldershaw, & V an Elburg, 2011). However, whereas Perkins (2009) found a significant 
correlation between RF and ToM, other studies suggested the opposite. Both Taylor, Target and 
Charman (2008), and Rogoff (2011) reported no correlation between RF and ToM. In addition, 
Moulton-Perkins and Rogoff (2011) also reported inconclusive results when investigating 
convergent construct validity between the RFQ-54 and the RMET (the ToM measure) and 
suggested that the RMET might be correlated with external mentalising, rather than internal. 
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This claim might also explain Fertuck et al. (2009) findings when measuring the accuracy of 
facial emotion recognition in individuals who present with features of BDP. A lthough the 
mentioned client group reportedly struggle with mentalising functions, it reported significantly 
high scores in RMET performance after controlling for gender and depression.  
It has been suggested that whereas the RFQ assesses mentalising by considering internal 
processes, the RMET measures the external dimension of this ability (Perkins, 2009).  Due to 
individuals who present with BPD features potentially using judgments based on a characteristic 
thinking pattern that places an extreme focus upon physical appearances and actions (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2004), they might be better skilled at reading physical cues. Given that similar 
thinking patterns have recently been reported in individuals presenting with ED, if the current 
study finds a non-significant correlation between mentalising and ToM, one might wonder 
whether similar processes might operate.  
Of worth mentioning is the few studies to-date which have explored whether eToM is 
impaired in ED; these studies mainly concentrate on AN (Medina-Pradas, Blas Navarro, 
Á lvarez-Moya, Grau & Obiols, 2012). Current research suggests eToM is impaired in 
individuals presenting with AN compared to control groups (Harrison, Sullivan, Tchanturia, & 
Treasure, 2009; Russell, Schmidt, Doherty, Y oung & Tchanturia, 2009). This finding was 
independent of illness severity (Russell et al., 2009) and slightly correlated to global 
functioning, prompting Medinas-Pradas et al. (2009) to wonder whether the results might 
represent a global cognitive deficit rather than a specific deficit in eToM. Nevertheless, 
Harrison et al. (2010) reported a negative correlation between ED and eToM ability, suggesting 
perhaps a specific link between eating psychopathology and ToM. In addition, although 
Oldershaw, Hambrook, Tchanturia, Treasure, and Schmidt (2010) reported difficulties in 
reading emotions from others’ voices or film clips in AN sympotomatology compared to 
control, they found no group differences when inferring complex emotions from others’ eyes.  
Given that the RMET uses eyes’ clues to infer a subject’s emotion, this last finding 
might perhaps shed some light on some of the negative results found on the correlation between 
mentalising and eToM when using the RMET to measure the latter. In addition, when emotional 
valence was taken into consideration, Oldershaw et al. (2010) concluded that individuals with 
AN displayed more difficulties than a control group at reading positive or negative emotions 
(i.e., relieved, worried), but did not display any deficiencies on neutral emotions (i.e., 
suspicious). In contrast, Medinas-Pradas et al. (2009) reported difficulties in overall accuracy 
and emotionally neutral cognitive states. In particular, the latter study suggested that the BN 
group had more difficulties in reading positive emotions, whereas the mixed ED group did not 
differ from a control when reading negative emotions. Lastly, the researchers reported no 
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differences in the RMET (overall or valence accuracy) in the AN group in relation to the 
control. Ultimately, although results on emotional valence might shed some light on the 
complexity of the relationship between mentalising and eToM, by suggesting perhaps that some 
presentations might struggle more with specific emotions, there is scarce literature about the 
eToM ability of ED patients and the results of the studies are contradictory (Gorska & Marzsal, 
2014). 
 Another conceptual term related to mentalising is alexithymia, which was briefly 
mentioned at the beginning of this thesis. Regarded as a core feature of mentalising, alexithymia 
was originally defined as a multi-faceted concept including four distinct characteristics: (a) 
difficulty with identifying and describing feelings, (b) difficulty distinguishing feelings from 
bodily sensations, (c) diminution of fantasy, and (d) concrete and poorly introspective thinking. 
More recent definitions have omitted the intra-psychic conflicts and emphasised, instead, 
deficits in the cognitive processing and regulation of emotions (de Berardis et al., 2007). 
Despite constant gender-differences that lead some researchers to advance a “Normative Male 
A lexithymia” hypothesis (Levant et al., 2009), it is evident that low alexithymia is a necessary 
and essential pillar for the ability to mentalise. Explaining behaviours according to mental states 
presume that one has a vocabulary for such emotional states.   
Other related concepts include: mindblindness, emotional intelligence, psychological 
mindedness, rationality, imagination, reflexivity, verbalisation, symbolisation, representation, 
metabolisation, insight, introspection and awareness. Despite acknowledging the importance of 
explicitly differentiating these notions from the core concept of the study, the researcher is 
aware that some of the above have indirectly been discussed before and that some others will 
further be considered in the course of this project. Hence, due to space constriction, a pragmatic 
decision has been made to avoid making obsessive distinctions (Allen & Fonagy, 2007). 
The information discussed above has broadly highlighted some of the proposed 
dimensions of mentalising: the cognitive/affective and the self/other oriented. A  recent factor 
analysis on the RFQ-46 and 54 confirmed the existence of an “internal self/internal other” 
subscale (Moulton-Perkins & Rogoff, 2011; Perkins, 2009). In addition, as previously 
mentioned, the literature suggests the existence of two more polarities: an implicit-
automatic/explicit-controlled and an internally/externally based one (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). 
Whereas most mentalising in everyday interactions happens implicitly, psychotherapeutic 
interventions are an example of explicit mentalising in that clinicians specifically focus and try 
to foster explicit mentalising. This attention can target inner states (internally based), or visible 
cues such as, for example, one’s observable tiredness (externally based). Furthermore, Fonagy 
et al. (2002) highlighted a special feature that relates to the affective dimension of mentalising 
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and that further distinguishes it from the other related concepts. This feature, called “mentalised 
affectivity”, seems paramount for the understanding of some of the difficulties individuals with 
ED and SH present with and is defined as the capacity to connect the emotional experience to 
the meaning of the emotion whilst remaining in the affective state, rather than from a distance.  
Fonagy et al. (2002) identified three elements of mentalised affectivity. The first has 
been argued to be the recognition of the emotion, which includes labelling, something which the 
population of the study appear to struggle with. A lthough this might seem a basic skill, it is not 
uncommon for people to experience “aporetic feelings” (Jurist, 2005, as cited in Allen et al., 
2008), vague and confused emotional states that are initially difficult to distinguish. 
Furthermore, communication within individuals and within families varies considerably and it is 
not uncommon for families to avoid, or even ban, negative emotions in particular. There comes 
to mind a lovely client of mine who was brought up in an environment that emphasised 
selflessness and self-sacrifice towards others, in particular towards one’s own parents and 
relatives. Growing up, this kind and considerate young lady was subjected and later subjected 
herself to extreme self-neglecting behaviours in order to prioritise and meet others’ needs: she 
had always been told that she could not be angry because being a carer was her duty as a 
woman.  
Once affective states are recognised, it is possible to modulate them (second element). 
This includes toning them down or up in order to reach the optimal level of emotions that 
fosters additional mentalising and that prompts these states to be further revaluated. Evidence 
suggests that mentalising shuts down in the face of intense emotions (Allen et al., 2008; 
Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy et al., 2002) Lastly, the third element of mentalising appears 
to be the capacity to express affect, either outwardly or inwardly, when the former is not 
feasible. These three elements have so far been discussed almost in a temporal sequence so that 
one precedes the other. For example, it seems reasonable to consider that there cannot be 
modulation, or expression of emotions without having first identified what the emotion is and 
there cannot be efficient expression if the emotion is not moderated first (Allen et al., 2008). 
However, the researchers remind us not to assume that the concepts are fixed in this sequence 
and they speak of a continual alternation between the elements. For example, recognising that 
one is angry, modulating the affect and communicating it might help the individual to further 
revaluate their affect, which in turn might have an impact on the identification of the new 
emotion, which might have an effect on its communication.  
It is apparent that mentalising is an extremely complex function that incorporates 
several other related functions and roles and that is responsible for numerous tasks. As can be 
imaginable, then, its precise biological make-up is difficult to outline, just as the specific 
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location of concepts such as the “self” is virtually impossible to pin down. Fonagy (1995, as 
cited in Busch, 2008) suggests that a number of areas in the brain are involved in the 
development and successful functioning of mentalising. These regions include a part of the 
brain that processes social stimuli, parts such as the amygdala and the hypothalamus that are 
responsible for affect regulation and a third area that controls cognitive functions. Ultimately, 
the author argues that the biology of mentalising lies with a number of neuronal structures and 
the dynamic processes between them.  
Pre-mentalistic states of mind in eating disorders and self-harm  
It has been suggested that the early “self” is characterised by primitive forms of thinking 
with virtually no capacity for mental elaboration. Inner and outer experiences seem 
conceptualised primarily in concrete thinking styles and causality seems to be only understood 
if it produces tangible changes to the environment. The child appears to be able only to take into 
account their own perspective and boundaries between the “self” and the outside world are 
blurred. Hence, whereas pre-mentalistic states of mind are universal developmental stages in all 
human beings and not necessarily an indicator of psychopathology, they become an issue when 
the child/adult resort to those as the primary, inflexible “default setting” (Fonagy, Y EAR, as 
cited in Weinberg, 2006). A lready, early psychoanalysts had identified some of these features in 
individuals with psycho-somatic difficulties (Marty & De M’Uzan, 1963 as cited in Busch, 
2008) and linked these difficulties to a lack of a mentalising stance.  
This seems in keeping with the theory of a development of the “self” prior to the 
emergence of the “representational or symbolic stance”. At the same time, this also appears to 
be in keeping with more recent literature and empirical findings concerning people who appear 
to use the body as a vehicle of communication (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2007, 2010; Busch, 
1962; Skarderud 2007).  
The latest discoveries suggest that a failure in mentalising capacity precipitates a 
thinking and a representational pattern typical of developmental modes that precede the 
awareness that thoughts, feelings and wishes are part of the mind (Busch, 2008). Impaired 
mentalisation causes individuals to exist in “pre-mentalistic modes of functioning” (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2004, 2012, 2013; Fonagy et al., 2002; Luyten, Mays, Fonagy, Target & Blatt, 2015; 
Weinberg, 2006; Widiger, 2012). This seems to be particularly evident in individuals presenting 
with ED and SH, who display difficulties in understanding their own feelings and emotions, a 
concrete style of thinking, as well as a lack of reference to internal states when explaining 
behaviour (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007; Bruch, 1962; Skarderud, 2007). It has been argued that 
these attributes contribute to an alienation between the “psyche” and the “soma” (Farber, 1995), 
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with the consequent embodiment and concretisation of inner life (Skarderud, 2009) and the 
body left to carry the burden of emotional expression (Lane, 2002).  
In this respect, Skarderud (2009, p. 72) warns that “when mentalising is impaired, the 
body may take on an excessively central role for the continuity of the sense of ‘self’, literally 
being a body of evidence”. Individuals who engage in SH and/or who present with ED cannot 
put their distress into words and use, instead, their body as a substitute. The concept of 
embodiment introduces the reader to one of the pre-mentalistic states of mind, the Teleological 
stance, already discussed it in the context of the origins of the “self”. When functioning in this 
mode, expectations concerning one’s own and others’ agency and change cannot be conceived 
unless it is in physical terms (Fonagy et al., 2001). As previously discussed, whereas this can be 
an ordinary developmental stage, it is problematic when it becomes an inflexible way of 
functioning. One’s own fear of not being in control of the inner and the outer world becomes 
displaced into fear of not being in control of one’s own eating/body. Rejecting food becomes a 
metaphor for rejecting closeness (Steiger & Israel, 1999) and asserting one’s own independence 
from an environment in which boundaries might be disregarded (Thompson-Brenner, 2015). 
Starving oneself, binging, cutting, burning, physical pain become the only conceivable ways in 
which psychological distress can be expressed. 
It has been reported that people who present with ED experience low levels of self-
esteem, high feelings of inadequacy and unrealistic degrees of perfectionism (Daley et al., 2008; 
V ohs et al., 1999). Similar findings have been reported in people who engage in SH in respect 
to dissatisfaction and a sense of ineffectiveness (Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000, 2002). It can be 
argued that, unsatisfied with their life and with themselves, they strive hard to change and to 
reach what are often unattainable goals. At the same time, functioning in the teleological mode 
means that changes are conceived only in terms of physical changes, hence, changes to the 
body. Freud (1962) had suggested that it was through body-control that the Ego achieved a 
sense of mastery.Therefore, it can be argued that having complete power over one’s own body 
becomes, for people who engage in ED/SH, a defence against feelings of inadequacy and lack 
of control. 
Similar issues have been reported in the therapeutic encounter whereby individuals 
functioning in the teleological mode often request extra protocol actions such as more sessions, 
telephone check-in in between meetings or even physical affection as a contingent proof that the 
therapist cares (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2007; Skarderud, 2009). Far from considering this a 
manipulation on the behalf of the client towards the therapist, or indeed a weakness on the part 
of the therapist who might sympathetically offer appropriate extra support, Bateman and Fonagy 
(2007) encourage professionals to understand this from the perspective of the individual with 
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limited mentalising capacity. The notorious clinicians argue that people who function in the 
teleological mode are “forced to provoke visible evidence of concern from others because of 
their limited capacity to experience concern in circumstances in which others whose mentalising 
capacity was intact would not find any reasons to doubt it” (p. 24). At the same time, the authors 
encourage clinicians to reflect on process issues.  
Whereas the teleological mode represents the most developmentally primitive of all pre-
mentalistic states of mind in that it is temporarily positioned before the acquisition of language, 
it is by no means the only one. For example, the young toddler mentioned by Bateman and 
Fonagy (2004) who became frightened because his Batman fancy-dress was too realistic, or the 
child who is terrified because convinced that there is a monster under their bed are all, at times 
too painful, anecdotes. Whereas in these two vignettes the examples reported might be 
developmentally appropriate, in some of the population seen by many clinicians, these states of 
mind represent a painful barrier to change. J ust as seen in the two examples, individuals 
presenting with ED and SH seem to equate the internal with the external: internal reality is 
projected onto external reality which, as a result of the projection, becomes the only possible 
reality (Psychic Equivalence Mode of functioning). Fantasy and reality become one: the “as-if” 
attribute of experience is inconceivable.  
This mode of functioning, which can be equated with the concept of magical thinking 
mentioned in the portfolio case study, can be utterly terrifying. To cite the case study that 
follows, to a child who employs magical thinking, a furious and murderous wish of retaliation 
towards the parent potentially makes them their parent’s killer, leaving them feeling utterly 
guilty and terrified that their internal world has been capable of so much. The product of poorly 
marked mirroring, psychic equivalence means that the child’s fear that “there is a monster under 
my bed” becomes reality. Equally, the traumatised and abused individual who has experienced 
malevolence from others and who has been told that it is their fault and that they are bad, who 
feels undeserving of love, knows that others are evil, that the world is dangerous and that they 
themselves are bad and worthless. No other alternative explanation is possible. Flashbacks and 
traumatic memories also become unthinkable because to think about them would mean to re-
live them in the strictest sense of the word.  
In the therapeutic alliance, as well as in general interpersonal interactions, the Psychic 
Equivalence Mode usually translates into inflexible and rigid thinking patterns in which the 
individual claims that they know what the other person feels/thinks. Internal reality, as perceived 
by clients who live in the Psychic Equivalent Mode, becomes the only possible way to 
understand external reality. Bateman and Fonagy (2007) describe 'inappropriate convictions of 
being right, extravagant claims of knowing what is in someone else' s mind, or why certain 
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actions were performed [...]  no information can be provided that would shift or dislodge that 
attitude. The affective tone [ ...]  is commonly characterised by paranoid hostility, [...]  genuine 
grandiosity [...]  and idealisation/denigration. Zanarini, Gunderson, Frankenberg and Chauncey 
(1990) portrayed the typical vividness and peculiarity of these experiences as “quasi-psychotic 
symptoms”.  
 Considering Holmes' claim— already mentioned at the beginning of this thesis—
namely that at the foundation of psychotherapy’s process of change is the ability to balance 
“story-making and story-breaking” (Holmes, 1999), it seems now clearer how these tasks 
appear to be practically impossible for people who operate in the Psychic Equivalence Mode. 
Fantasy becomes reality: the only possible and conceivable reality. The capacity to form 
representational images of ideas and feelings is severely compromised and a direct relationship 
between the self and the outside world is assumed. Whereas operating in this mode is 
developmentally appropriate in young children, as understanding desires precedes 
understanding beliefs (Wellman & Cross, 2001, cited in A llen & Fonagy, 2007), this mode of 
functioning becomes problematic when both desires and beliefs are referential, but not 
representational (A llen & Fonagy, 2007). Both desires and beliefs are about 
something/someone, but are conceived as strictly connected to the object. 
An opposite mode of functioning to the Psychic Equivalence has been observed in 
individuals with low mentalising functions in general, in individuals with psycho-somatic 
difficulties (Bouchard & Lecours, 2008; Fonagy et al., 2004) and more recently in people 
presenting with features of BPD, ED and SH (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2007; Skarderud, 
2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). This contrasting “modus operandi” is called the Pretend Mode. 
Whereas inner and outer reality were equated in the former, the reverse is true for the latter. In 
the pretend mode, the sense of pretend has stretched to the extreme and the mental world is 
disconnected from external reality, an idea that had been introduced when discussing marked, 
but non-contingent mirroring. Ideas form no bridge between inner and outer reality and 
emptiness and meaninglessness are characteristic reported features of this state of mind.  
When operating in this mode, individuals’ experiences feel dissociated from outer 
reality, and thoughts and fantasies seem to have no connection to feelings. Whereas developing 
a sense of pretend in respect to mental states has been described as being essential in freeing 
someone from the vividness of the Psychic Equivalence Mode (Allen & Fonagy, 2007), the 
radical and excessive stance of the Pretend mode means that mental representations are so 
disconnected from the outer world that internal experiences are perceived not to be grounded in 
reality. In this respect, it has been argued that it is this lack of reality of internal experiences that 
is behind people starving themselves or committing acts of self-mutilation/suicide, because the 
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continued existence of the “self” is perceived not to be dependent on the existence of the body 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). 
Search for meaning becomes compelling for these individuals as their lives are 
perceived to be meaningless. It has been suggested that the intrinsic dissociation between inner 
and outer reality characteristic of the Pretend mode can give an indication of why individuals 
presenting with ED and/or SH report feeling so confused about their feelings and their physical 
sensations (Skarderud, 2009). As a consequence, in therapeutic encounters, operating under the 
Pretend mode often implies meaningless conversations, whereby clients might engage in 
lengthy discussions about their mental states and their experiences without any actual emotional 
involvement. This, if not appropriately addressed, can lead to ineffective and stagnant clinical 
encounters.  
The aim of the above discussion was to give an indication of how difficulties around 
food can be explained in terms of pre-mentalistic states of mind. The terms, which stemmed as 
part of a particular theory of “self” development, provide insight and clarity and have widely 
been accepted in the literature (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2012, 2013; Fonagy et al., 2002; 
J imenez, & Moguillansky, 2011; Luyten et al., 2015; Lysaker, Dimaggio, & Brune, 2014; 
Tandon, 2008; Weinberg, 2006; Widiger, 2012; Williams, 2010). However, it is recognised that 
these terms are derived from clinical practice rather than from psychometric measures, hence 
remain to be subjected to empirical tests of their construct validity.  
The literature has so far suggested that individuals tend to oscillate between states, 
alternating modes (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). This is particularly true when the attachment 
system is activated (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). So, if on the one hand vulnerable individuals 
might be able to mentalise normally when not emotionally aroused, this function seems to 
collapse severely when the attachment system is stimulated. As a consequence, the teleological 
stance forces individuals to conceive of change only in concrete terms and the negative self 
esteem characteristic of this client group urges them to make concrete and physical changes, for 
example to target the body. On the other hand, the psychic equivalence mode can explain how 
individuals might experience intense and overwhelming negative emotional states, often 
associated with ED and SH, as literally getting bigger and expanding. Y et again, functioning in 
the pretend mode might mean that one’s own experience of one’s own body might be 
incongruent (Skarderud, 2009).  
The same can be argued for individuals presenting with SH. Releasing blood by cutting 
might be perceived as the only way to release some of the overwhelming feelings of anger and 
hate. Self-harm is like a scream without words, painful, distraught, unbearable, which can only 
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find expression through body-suffering. Cutting, burning, purging or starving, as a consequence, 
becomes compelling, almost addictive, in order to displace mental pain and to give it a meaning.  
Nevertheless, regardless of which specific mode of functioning is activated, it can be 
argued that the mind with impaired mentalising capacity struggles to comprehend itself, let 
alone someone else’s frame of reference. This would have serious implications for the 
individuals’ capacity to engage in meaningful therapeutic exchanges, for traditional 
psychotherapy’s focus of treatment on the enactment (Levitt et al., 2004), for the therapist’s 
stance (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007) and for current common practices such as “no-harm 
contracts” (Rudd et al., 2006). Indeed, if it is possible that individuals with low mentalising 
capacity struggle more to engage and benefit from traditional psychotherapy which takes for 
granted people’s capacity to mentalise, certainly this needs to be explored in order for more 
effective treatments to be developed. This is partly the aim of the current study.   
Critical Review of the L iterature  
The present research is, to my knowledge, the first study that attempts to outline the relationship 
between mentalising ability, ED and SH in a clinical population. As part of this journey, several 
related theoretical concepts and unrelated, but potential contributing and mediating factors were 
reviewed. In particular, the current thesis hypothesised a link between attachment, the 
development of mentalising and the aetiology of teleological symptoms such as ED and SH 
behaviours. This is the literature that this section aims to critically appraise.  
In order to do this, I will initially reflect on the role of the early, primary caregiving 
relationship and its alleged part in the development of mentalising and ED/SH symptomatology. 
I will also take into consideration mediating factors as the present study described and endorsed 
the literature that suggested that a lack of congruent and marked mirroring might make some 
individuals vulnerable to the development of teleological symptoms via the inhibition of the 
capacity to mentalise (Fonagy et al., 2002). Eventually, Fonagy’s mentalising theory and the 
four proposed dimensions (Fonagy, Bateman & Luyten, 2012) of mentalising will be reviewed, 
paying attention to aspects that need clarifying.  
Intriguingly, both attachment and mentalising have recently become a focus of research 
(Caglar-Nazali et al., 2014; K uipers & Bekker, 2012; Tasca, & Balfour, 2014) and have been 
deemed to be relevant in the understanding of adult eating disorder symptomatology either as 
causal explanatory factors, or as maintaining factors (Caglar-Nazali et al., 2014; Connan, 
Campbell, K atzman, L ightman & Treasure, 2003). However, whilst attachment theory seems to 
be an important framework used to understand the possible factors involved in the aetiology of 
ED  and a strong empirical relationship has been found between insecure attachment and the 
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development of EDs (Cole-Detke & K obak, 1996; Orzolek-Cronner, 2002; Ringer, & 
Crittenden, 2007;; Sharpe et al., 1998; Ward et al., 2000) and SH (Hallab & Covic, 2010; 
Fergusson, Woodward, & Horwood, 2000; Glazebrook, Townsend & Sayal, 2015), the exact 
nature of this relationship is still elusive (Ward et al., 2000).  
The same can be said for the relationship between attachment and mentalising ability, 
whose dynamics still seem to be unclear (Liljenfors & Ludh, 2014) and affected by several 
factors (Fonagy et al., 2012). As far as the SH literature goes, it seems to echo the above 
findings with the majority of studies associating insecure attachment, and in particular relational 
avoidance, to aggressive behaviours towards the self (Critchfield, Levy & K ernerberg, 2008; 
Farber, 2008; Glazebrook, Townsend & Sayal, 2015; Hallab & Covic, 2010) and mentalising-
failure to SH (Badoud et al., 2015; Cucchi, 2016; Grandclerc, De Labrouhe, Spodenkiewicz, 
Lachal & Moro, 2016; Remaschi, Cecchini & Meringolo, 2015). 
In the field of ED, Sharpe et al. (1998) found that insecurely-attached individuals 
reported higher weight concerns than their securely attached counterparts. As the reader might 
be aware, weight/shape concerns are consistently the most replicated and most potent risk 
factors for developing an ED (J acobi et al. 2004b). In addition, Mallinkcrodt, McCreary and 
Robertson (1995) reported a strong correlational support for a model which explained how 
attachment-trauma can contribute to the later development of eating disorder pathology due to 
dysfunctional attachment’s interference with the development of critical social competencies. 
Furthermore, Tereno, Soares, Martins, Celani and Sampaio (2008) also found that mothers of 
control groups reported more secure attachment than mothers of individuals who presented with 
ED. Conversely, K enny and Hart (1992) found that securely-attached women reported lower 
levels of weight preoccupation and ED behaviours than their ED counterpart. Whilst 
correlations are by no means a proof of causation, these findings— together with a recent review 
of the literature between attachment and ED symptomatology (J ewell et al., 2016)— confirm the 
link between insecure attachment and ED in adults. 
It can be argued that the above mentioned studies use cross-sectional study designs to 
examine associations between attachment security and eating pathology and that, despite 
providing valuable information, cross-sectional study designs do not arguably provide strong 
evidence about the role of attachment in the aetiology of ED (Jewell et al., 2016), or indeed SH. 
Indeed, when prospective, longitudinal studies are taken into consideration, this relationship 
appears more complex. Some studies confirmed a prospective association between attachment 
and eating pathology by reporting insecure attachment toward mother to be significantly 
predictive of increases in dietary restraint and eating, weight and shape concerns in the children 
at one year follow up (Goossens, Braet, V an Durme, Decaluwe & Bosmans, 2012). A similar 
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result was confirmed by Colton, Olmsted, Daneman, Rydall and Rodin (2012) who reported 
attachment to be predictive of new ED symptomatology one year later.  
L ikewise, insecure attachment was shown to be predictive of increased rates of SH in a 
longitudinal study of adolescents (Glazebrook et al., 2015), confirming cross-sectional studies 
that link the two (Critchfield et al., Farber, 2008; Hallab & Covic, 2010; Levy & K ernerberg, 
2008). 
On the contrary, Milan and Acker (2014) reported no evidence of a direct association 
between attachment and disordered eating attitudes and behaviours, but discovered that 
attachment style moderated the relationship between adolescent ED risk factors (such as BMI) 
and ED behaviours. The lack of an association between attachment and ED symptomatology 
was also confirmed by Burge et al. (1997) and Le Grange, et al. (2014). In addition, although 
several studies investigated whether and which potential mediating factors might be influencing 
the relationship between attachment and ED (Tasca & Balfour, 2014) and SH (Cuenca, 2013), at 
present no clear answers have been found. For example, both Tasca and Balfour (2014) and Ty 
and Francis (2013) identified affect regulation as one such mediator of the relationship between 
attachment and ED and attachment and SH (K imball & Diddms, 2007), whereas Illing, Tasca, 
Balfour and Bissada (2010) found that attachment anxiety was signiﬁcantly related to greater 
severity of eating disorder symptoms. The current research endorsed the idea that the concept of 
mentalising might provide a helpful concept to understand this relationship although this must 
be subjected to further research.  
At present, the claim that the quality of the attachment style determines an individual’s 
mentalising ability is confirmed in a longitudinal study in which securely-attached children 
were found to have superior mentalising capacity, but no better cognitive abilities at age five 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Russell & Clark-Carter, 1998; Symons & Clark, 2000), suggesting that 
there is something specific about attachment and mentalising per se. In addition, the evidence 
that links attachment to reflective functioning skills and the latter to ED/SH was discussed in the 
literature section. In particular, this evidence seems to be inextricably intertwined with several 
related concepts amongst which the concept of theory of mind (both c-ToM and e-ToM), 
alexithymia and emotion-recognition and it seems unfeasible to separate them. The evidence 
that links attachment and ToM, ToM to ED and attachment trauma to mentalising-failure 
(Fonagy, 1989; Leuzinger-Bohlerber et al., 2010) has already been discussed in the above 
sections and will not be repeated here. In addition to the above-mentioned studies that confirm a 
link between attachment, mentalising and ED symptomatology in adults, a recent 
child/adolescent review also found some evidence of an association between mentalising 
difficulties and ED symptomatology in children/adolescents (Jewell et al., 2016).  
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It can be argued that the targeted population in this latest review does not lend itself 
well to measuring mentalising and, to some extent, attachment capacities. In fact, whereas 
childhood is a time in which mentalising is still in development, hence not amenable to a 
thorough exploration of its full capacities, adolescence is a time of constant and often intense 
changes. Jewell et al. (2016) themselves argue that both attachment and mentalising are in flux 
during adolescence, which makes interpreting the results complicated. Nevertheless, whilst 
these findings ought to be treated with caution, they are worth bearing in mind. For example, 
Cate, K hademi, Judd and Miller (2013) investigated the relationship between attachment, 
mentalising and ED in a sample of young girls and concluded that there is a significant positive 
relationship between attachment and mentalising capacities. In addition, the authors discovered 
a significant negative relationship between mentalising capacities and eating disorder risk, 
hence arguably substantiating the literature discussed so far.  
Further evidence in this respect comes from Rothschild-Y akar, Waniel and Stein (2013) 
who found that individuals with ED presented with a signiﬁcantly lower level of symbolic 
representation and with more malevolent representations of their parents in comparison to 
controls. This indeed seem to provide evidence for the link between ED and a teleological 
stance as a lack of symbolic representation is likely to be associated with a concretisation of 
inner life and related symptoms. In addition, the authors also reported that a more benevolent 
parental representation, combined with better mentalising abilities, was found to indirectly 
predict lower eating disorder symptoms. Lastly, Schulte-Ruther, Mainz, Fink, Herpertz-
Dahlmann and K onrad (2012) indicated that medial prefrontal cortex hypoactivation in a group 
of adolescents admitted to hospital with AN was correlated with poor clinical outcome at one -
year follow-up. The medial prefrontal cortex is known to be a region of the brain that is 
activated during mentalising tasks. 
Hence, the available evidence seems to endorse the thesis’ proposed association 
between insecure attachment and mentalising deficits and the proposed association between 
mentalising difﬁculties and eating disordered symptomatology. At the same time, further 
research needs to be carried out before conclusions can be drawn as the generalisability of 
results from adolescent studies ought to be carefully considered given the changeable state of 
this developmental phase. As recently confirmed in a meta-analysis of the literature, insecure 
attachment in adolescence or adulthood cannot be taken as evidence of insecure attachment in 
infancy (Pinquart, Feussner & Ahnert, 2013). In addition, Gergely and Unoka (2008) argue that 
the notion that mentalising develops as a result of attachment needs to be treated with caution 
and suggest, instead, the idea of an innate, biological predisposition for the development of this 
function. The authors still highlight the upmost importance of the quality of the attachment for 
the child’s future ability to make use of this ability.   
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Whereas Gergely and Unoka’s (2008)  claim seems to be refuted by a recent 
longitudinal twin study that suggested that mentalising is a developmental achievement, rather 
than a genetic factor (Hughes et al., 2005), further research ought to be carried out given that 
attention to such issues has only matured in the last couple of decades.   
On the whole, these results suggest that mentalising is a very complex and multi-faceted 
concept that encompasses a variety of related concepts which cannot totally be separated from it 
and that might contribute, to some extent, to the complex relationship that the current thesis is 
trying to delineate. Furthermore, as already discussed, mentalising ability is not a static, or 
unitary skill or trait (Fonagy et al., 2012) but rather a dynamic skill which fluctuates and is 
particularly affected by stress and arousal, especially attachment-related stress (Allen et al., 
2008). The “switch-off point” in which mentalising failure happens is intrinsically subjective 
although Lule et al. (2014) warn that the ability to tolerate strong negative affects is an indicator 
for secure attachment. This prompts J ewell et al. (2016) to support the thesis’ claim that 
individuals with insecure attachment are more likely to experience mentalising failures, 
especially in the context of attachment stress.  
Ultimately, the above findings need to be gauged against a further drawback: a 
drawback which is proving poignant for the current thesis. The choice of available measures of 
mentalising in the above-mentioned projects meant that poorly validated measures of reflective 
function were a limitation (Jewell et al., 2016). This last point exemplifies the utmost need and 
value of consolidating not only a fully validated measure of mentalising, but also the utmost 
importance of consolidating the mentalising theory, to which the present appraisal will soon 
turn.  
It can be argued that the ED literature might not necessarily be transferable to the 
understanding of the aetiology and factors involved in SH. Nevertheless, this claim can be 
countered by the two clinical presentations which share significant demographic and 
phenomenological characteristics (Cucchi et al., 2016; Favaro & Santonastaso, 2000) findings 
that confirm a significant comorbidity between the two symptoms. Currently, however, these 
claims are only speculative as the literature on mentalising and SH is complicated by the 
individuals who have been recruited for clinical trials who have presented with a diagnosis of 
BPD. This makes it impossible to draw on this literature although the available evidence 
suggests that mentalising-enhancing treatment approaches may be effective in reducing SH in 
adolescents (Rossouw & Fonagy, 2012). 
To conclude, the reviewed literature suggests promising evidence as there seems to be 
some initial support for a relationship between attachment, mentalising and teleological 
symptoms as discussed by Fonagy et al. (2012). At the same time, this appraisal also indicates 
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the need for further research in order to elucidate this relationship. Hence, the possibility of 
mediating factors such as impulsivity (Perkins, 2009), affect regulation (Tasca & Balfour, 2014; 
Ty & Francis, 2013) and other risk factors such as depression and perfectionism and their 
relationship with mentalising and ED/SH ought to be investigated further. Ideally, these factors 
ought to be examined in prospective, longitudinal studies that use fully valid and robust 
measures of variables.   
As L iljenfors and Lundh (2015) warn us, the theoretical framework that surrounds the 
development of mentalising is still developing and should not be expected as complete and free 
from inconsistencies. In particular, the authors reflect on the four proposed dimensions to 
mentalising (Fonagy et al., 2012) and argue that some points remain unclear to date.  
One such point relates to the implicit versus explicit aspect of mentalising as discussed 
in the course of this thesis. Whereas from a developmental perspective the implicit/explicit 
distinction might make sense, in terms of cognitive processes this division might be more 
appropriate for the mentalising of others’ cognitive processes, rather than to the child’s 
mentalising of their own cognitive processes (L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). In addition, whereas 
Fonagy et al. (2002) suggested that the infant moves from implicit to explicit mentalising of 
their own feelings by employing a process of “social biofeedback” (Gergely & Watson, 1996—
see page 65) that sees both the infant and the caregiver engaged in representational loops, there 
is no mention of whether there is also a switch between implicit and explicit mentalising of 
others’ emotions (L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). 
The mentalising theory is silent on this point and although it can be argued that a 
“switching point” might be when children start developing the ToM, many points remain 
unclear. For example, there are suggestions that the understanding of false-belief and the 
understanding of emotion may be distinct aspects of a child’s development (Cutting & Dunn, 
1999). In addition, in respect to the understanding of emotions, Fonagy’s (2002) 
“developmental theory of the self” argues that the infant’s subjective sense of differential 
emotions develops through a consistent marked and contingent mirroring that allows the 
progression from primary to secondary order representations. Fonagy et al. (2002) rejects the 
idea that the infant has an awareness of the caregiver’s and their own affect states. However, it 
is not clear how the infant can experience a sense of “contingency” and “markedness” if they do 
not have a perception and awareness of the caregiver’s own affect (L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). 
Finally, it is contentious how the distinction between internal and external mentalising 
relates to cognitive processes. Whilst it is understandable that an individual might use external 
cues (i.e., facial expressions) to figure out someone else’s internal emotional states, it is not 
clear how external cues could be used to decipher cognitions. Indeed, the mentalising of 
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cognitive processes lacks the bodily qualities that are instead characteristic of emotional states 
(L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). Similarly, although the internal/external dimension might seem 
more appropriate to the mental states of others, internally focused mentalising might seem more 
relevant to one’s own mental states, rather than that of others (L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). 
To conclude, over the past twenty years, the theoretical notion of a “developmental 
theory of the self” and mentalising have expanded and come to the forefront of psychoanalytic 
theory and practice. At the same time, tracing the development and current status of the concept 
of mentalising entails interdisciplinary thinking as this notion combines ideas from several 
disciplines. For example, mentalising theory invites contributions from neuroscientific research 
about the brain and the link between the brain and mind. It also draws and calls on attachment 
theory and research about the quality of early (and potentially later therapeutic) relationships 
that arguably promote, or hinder, the capacity for mentalising. Lastly, it focuses and borrows 
from the theory of mind. Hence, while it can be argued that mentalising theory provides a 
unique arena for fertile, mutually enriching collaboration between several disciplines (Berger, 
2008), it has also been argued that as a construct mentalising encompasses phenomena too 
varied to be useful theoretically (A llen & Fonagy, 2006).  
Indeed, its theoretical underpinnings also need further clarification as some parts of the 
theory view mentalising-failure as the result of a developmental impairment caused by a lack of 
an appropriate mirroring, whereas other parts of the theory borrow from the psychodynamic 
literature in more strategic and active ways, and suggest that mentalising-failure might be the 
result of a defense mechanism (Choi-K ain & Gunderson, 2008). The relationship between these 
more passive deficits and the more active unconscious strategies that view mentalising-failure as 
a self-protective way to avoid considering the malicious intents of an abusive or neglectful 
figure and whether those opposite processes might affect mentalising in different ways has, to 
date, not been addressed.  
Importance of the current study. The findings from this research have the potential to 
impact upon several areas. Among those, a number of theoretical issues such as whether 
mentalising might be a core difficulty in ED and, more specifically, in ED and SH, whether 
impaired reflective function can explain the specific relationship between ED and SH, and 
whether a stronger need to control the body, displayed by resorting to both ED and SH 
symptomatology, is linked to lower mentalising capacity. At the same time, however, this study 
has the potential to be relevant to clinical practice. This is a crucial and distinctive feature of 
Doctorate theses which arguably differentiate themselves from other PhD projects on the basis 
of their applicability to the “real” world (K asket, 2012). In this regard, a number of issues come 
to mind.  
90 
 
First of all, the results from this thesis could be relevant to ongoing discussions around 
the available interventions in the NHS that routinely target ED and/or SH separately. Currently 
available interventions include psychodynamic approaches, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy-
CBT (Beck & Beck, 1995), Cognitive Analytic Therapy- CAT (Ryle, 1990), Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy (DBT) (Linehan, 1993a), but also less popular enterprises recently devised 
to specifically target the lack of psychotherapeutic approaches that focus on ED and SH 
concurrently. The latter comprise Integrative Cognitive Therapy (ICT; Wonderlich et al., 2002) 
and the Self Regulatory Approach (SRA; Levitt et al., 2004). Despite varied philosophical 
underpinnings and arguably different focus of therapy, all of the above-mentioned approaches 
take for granted individuals’ capacity to access and reflect upon their mental-states. In addition, 
all of the above approaches seem to prioritise stopping the enactments, rather than a focus on 
the embodied mind as advocated in newer enterprises that specifically advocate the 
rehabilitation of mentalising (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 2007, 2012; Fonagy et al., n.d; 
Skarderud, 2007).  
Concerning this, the results from the current study could inform clinicians about the 
recommended focus of therapy and the advisable therapeutic stance. Furthermore, given the 
literature on the inter-personal nature of ED and SH difficulties and the bulk of empirical 
evidence on the role of significant others for the long-term recovery of ED and SH (Adrian, 
Zeman, Erdley, L isa & Sim, 2011; Carr, 2014; Cottrell & Boston, 2002; Leff & V aughn, 1985), 
it can be argued that the findings from the present study might also be relevant to newer 
psychotherapeutic developments that combine elements of mentalising theory and systemic 
principles (Dallos & Draper, 2005) trans-diagnostically. These psychotherapeutic developments 
include the more formal Mentalization based therapy for families MBT-F (Asen & Fonagy, 
2011; Fonagy et al., n.d) that combines intra-personal and inter-personal elements by adopting 
an essentially systemic stance and viewing this through a mentalising lens (Asen & Fonagy, 
2011). They also include mentalising-based interventions for children, young people and their 
families (Midgley & V rouva, 2012) but also MBT’s “not-knowing stance” (Anderson & 
Goolishian, 1992) and other suggestions that encourage a more systemic outlook in respect to 
pertinent issues when working with individuals presenting with ED (Boscolo & Bertrando, 
2002).  
Ultimately, should the present study reveal a specific relationship between ED, SH and 
mentalising, this might suggest the need to address the lack of unified assessment tools for 
concurrent ED and SH. This last point has more recently prompted some researchers to devise 
the Self-Injury Self-Report Inventory (SISRI; Levitt et al., 2004) in order to encourage and 
augment a bio-psycho-social (Engel, 1980) assessment of concurrent ED and SH 
symptomatology. 
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R elevance to Counselling Psychology. The current research finds support in recent 
studies from the field of Counselling Psychology. Those have confirmed an association between 
SH and alexithymia (Polk & L iss, 2007, 2009), to the extent that scores on alexithymia were 
able to predict self-harmers (Borril et al., 2009). It is argued that, as counselling psychologists, 
we have just begun to understand the context of individuals who engage in SH and that much 
needs to be done on elaborating theories better understanding the immediate context that 
surrounds the individual when they are imminently self-destructive (Silverman, 2000, p. 547). 
The present study aims to add to that understanding by exploring new hypotheses. Similarly, 
following relative silence around ED in the field of counselling psychology, The Counseling 
Psychologist (2001, vol. 5) published a special issue on the subject and concluded that a 
working knowledge of ED is paramount for all counselling psychologists (K ashubeck-West & 
Mintz, 2001). K ashubeck-West and Mintz (2001) emphasised the cultural roots of ED and 
suggested that the study of ED integrates science and practice. This is consistent with 
counselling psychology’s attention to cultural meaning and its commitment to a scientist-
practitioner model (K ashubeck-West & Mintz, 2001). 
Furthermore, counselling psychology emphasises the importance of genuineness and 
congruence (Rogers, 1951) both for the client’s well-being, but also for the therapeutic alliance. 
Indeed, genuineness and congruence to one’s own emotions can only be reached if both the 
client and the therapist are aware of their own mental/emotional states. It is arguable that a focus 
on mentalising and related-concepts in therapy would foster the development of a greater 
awareness of one’s mental states, therefore, promoting genuineness. This, in turn, would nurture 
a stronger therapeutic relationship.  
An Original/distinctive contribution to the discipline. The aim of this study, determining 
the role and the extent of mentalising-differences in individuals presenting with ED 
with/without concurrent SH, has important clinical implications for counselling psychology. 
Primarily, it responds to specific demands from the field of counselling psychology for the 
development of better screening and diagnostic tools, as well as therapeutic interventions, to 
identify and intervene with individuals at potential risk for the expression of self-destructive 
behaviours (Silverman, 2000). This, in turn, would allow clinicians to develop specific 
treatment approaches for groups with different levels of mentalising ability. Lastly, it would 
demonstrate the need for further, methodologically diverse research in this area. 
 In terms of practice, establishing mentalising capacity in individuals presenting with or 
without concurrent ED and SH aims to determine whether treatment should focus, as Skarderud 
(2007) claimed, on the rehabilitation of mentalising capacity. Indeed, current treatments such as 
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those described above, despite offering important contributions, fail to take into consideration 
the pre-mentalistic states of mind characteristic of this population. A  focus on mentalising-
function would translate in a particular attention to current mental states, on helping clients 
identify feelings, thoughts and impulses and on accurately representing and conveying a 
discrepancy between the client and therapist’s internal representations, rather than on specific 
therapeutic techniques. Indeed, counselling psychology emphasises the prime importance of the 
therapeutic relationship and of empathy, considered to promote change irrespective of 
techniques (Gilbert & Leahy, 2007). Lastly, it is argued that counselling psychologists are 
uniquely devoted to the application of preventive interventions within a conceptual framework 
of growth and development (Silverman & Felner, 1995b). Hence, building on the gap in the 
literature and identifying core processes underlying ED and SH seems to be a distinctive 
contribution to the discipline due to being a key-feature to devise effective preventive 
therapeutic interventions.  
Conclusions. The literature over the past few decades has documented a significant 
increase of psycho-somatic difficulties such as ED and SH. This has been accompanied by a 
growing body of evidence that suggests that such difficulties represent a particular challenge for 
baffled professionals who struggle to understand why someone would target one’s own body. 
At the same time, research seems to have reported a specific link between ED and SH with 
individuals appearing to display specific difficulties in identifying, describing emotions and 
interpreting people’s behaviours according to such mental states. These difficulties seem to 
respond little to traditional psychotherapy and they seem to arise specifically when the 
attachment system is activated. The latter factor is a crucial one and is mirrored in the intensity 
of the therapeutic alliance. Hence, more specific claims have recently been advanced, 
suggesting that these affect-related difficulties might hinder the level of engagement in therapy 
if not properly addressed.  
Given that there is evidence to suggest that individuals who present with ED and 
concurrent SH show more severe and treatment-resistant psychopathology and that the 
relationship between ED and SH is still obscure, the current study aims to address whether a 
recently discovered concept, namely mentalising, might contribute to some of these difficulties. 
Shedding light on this aims to increase clinicians’ knowledge about this client group, to improve 
our understanding of the role of emotions in concurrent ED and SH, and to encourage further 
research. This will hopefully help to enhance specific treatment protocols. In addition to these 
indirect wishes, the main research aim is to develop a better understanding of the difference in 
mentalising capacity in individuals presenting with ED with/without concurrent SH. The 
researcher will do this by exploring dissimilarities in mentalising ability in different groups 
(ED_SH and ED_noSH) that have been contrasted on the basis of their supposedly different 
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mentalising abilities. A  control group has also been included to give an indication of 
mentalising in the general population.  
However, given the ongoing research on the validation of the RFQ, the researcher will 
also initially report on the construct validity of the RFQ-54 (part one) before exploring these 
group differences using the newer version of the RFQ, the RFQ-c/u (part two). Eventually, 
measures of mentalising ability will be correlated to established measures of allied concepts to 
mentalising in order to test construct validity (part three).  
Method  
As mentioned on page 12, at the beginning of this research project the validation of the 
RFQ was ongoing. Hence, I initially administered the RFQ-54, a collection of items that were in 
development, to a group of participants who presented with ED difficulties with and without 
SH. However, in 2015, the RFQ scale was re-defined and I was able to retrospectively re-
analyse the data according to the new subscales.  
Conceptual theoretical and epistemological framework.  
The choice of a quantitative analysis suggests a positivist theoretical and epistemological 
position. The current study borrows from the positivist approach a scientific, empirical, 
evidence-based, deductive method, which strives to be nomothetic. A  positivist approach 
endorses science as the tool to explore “reality” and it highlights the necessity for research to be 
bias-free; it sanctions the use of inductive reasoning to postulate theories that can be tested and, 
when fallible, corrected. 
As a Counselling Psychologist in training, I am committed to place greatest emphasis on 
individuals’ experiences and cultural meanings and I am committed to avoid the temptation of 
trying to “fit” people into models. Nevertheless, I am also aware of counselling psychology’s 
commitment to a scientist-practitioner framework which strives to bridge the gap between the 
scientific method and its clinical applicability. Being able to provide practitioners with adequate 
data to corroborate whether individuals who present with ED and concurrent SH have less 
mentalising capacity is a priority in determining whether current treatments are effective. This, 
congruent to Counselling Psychology’s endeavour and bearing in mind issues of ecological 
validity of controlled clinical trials, would allow clinicians to attend to the welfare of the 
persona. My standpoint is to respect science and the scientific method, despite their limitations, 
as avenues to explore people’s internal world and to attempt to use the empirical method within 
counselling psychology’s frame of thinking.  
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Design. 
The design was quasi-experimental, cross-sectional questionnaire-based: a measure of 
mentalising (RFQ scale) was compared in individuals presenting with ED and SH (ED_SH), 
individuals presenting with ED without SH (ED_noSH) and a control group. The quasi-
experimental independent variable (IV ) was group-type (ED_SH; ED_noSH; control group) and 
the dependent variables (DV ) were reflective function, theory of mind, empathy, mindfulness 
and alexithymia. The primary interest was in reflective function, with the remaining DV s 
providing validation and context to this new variable. 
Sample size, participants and setting.  
Power calculations. A  G* power a priori analysis 3.12.10 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) indicated that a minimum of 207 participants were needed if a medium effect 
size (f = .25) was expected. This is the total sample size required for 90% power when using an 
ANOV A to test three groups. After exclusion criteria were applied the final sample to be 
analysed contained 229 individuals. 
Participants. The sampling was purposive. Inclusion criteria were: ED 
symptomatology, engage in SH, age between 16-65, English-speaker. Exclusion criteria were: 
individuals under 18, individuals highly distressed/suicidal, in-patients, presence of cognitive 
impairments/psychotic illnesses. The non-clinical control group was recruited through word of 
mouth, online advertisement and social networks; 116 people started the questionnaire but only 
83 people completed it. Exclusion criteria for this group were the presence of current 
psychological difficulties and those under 18 years of age. Out of the ED group, a total of 186 
individuals started the online survey; 115 completed it. An additional 55 people were recruited 
through the NHS. This brought the number of the ED group with/without concurrent SH to 170. 
After further exclusion of participants owing to missing data (see results section below), the 
numbers in each group were Control: 74 (48 female), ED with SH 58 (40 female) and ED 
without SH 97 (80 female).  
It was planned to share the data with Prof. Fonagy for him to include in a wider study to 
assess the psychometric properties of the Reflective Function Questionnaire RFQ-54
6
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Setting. Recruitment initially took place through a specialist NHS Eating Disorder 
Service and with the collaboration of two professionals who worked privately. The ED unit 
accepts referrals for anyone above the age of sixteen years old who presents with a primary 
                                                     
 
6
 The data was shared with Prof. Fonagy on 30/01/15. No further communication has been received. 
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diagnosis of an ED. In addition, recruitment also took place online through UK  and USA 
associations offering support and information to people with ED.  
Measures. 
Demographic details. Self-reported details were collected for each participant on 
gender, age, relationship status, ethnicity, employment status, level of education and occupation 
using a bespoke questionnaire. The reader is referred to Table 4 in the Results section (p. 107) 
for demographic details. 
Questionnaires. The researcher administered the following questionnaires: “Reflective 
Function Questionnaire” (Fonagy & Ghinai, personal communication), SCOFF (Morgan, Reid, 
& Lacey, 1999), the Empathy: Perspective-Taking Subscale (PTS) of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), K entucky Inventory of Mindfulness Scale (K IMS; Baer, Smith, 
& Allen, 2004), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) and 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Since the study specifically 
looked at differences in mentalisation between participants who SH and those who do not, a 
single question to that effect was added to page 5 of the questionnaire, “During the past week 
have you deliberately hurt yourself without meaning to kill yourself (e.g., cut yourself, burned 
yourself, punched yourself, put your hand through windows, punched walls, banged your 
head?). The above questionnaires, together with demographic questions, were compiled together 
in a unique document (Appendix 1). 
Reflective F unction Questionnaire (RF Q). The history of the development of the RFQ is 
as follows. Initial developments of the RFQ led to 101 questions on a 6 point Likert scale. Some 
items were polarised  (i.e. 1 or 7 indicated high mentalising) and other items were median 
scored (i.e. 4 indicated high mentalising). Thirty-one items were subsequently rejected due to 
poor inter-rater reliability and 24 items were rejected for not meeting face and content validity. 
The 46 remaining items formed the initial version of the RFQ, of which the factor analysis 
found two factors representing “internal-self” and “internal-other” (Ha, Sharp, Ensink, Fonagy, 
& Cirino, 2013; Perkins, 2009). Available evidence on the RFQ-46 confirmed reasonably good 
internal reliability in a non-clinical population (Cronbach’s α  =. 0.77) and in a mixed sample of 
clinical/non-clinical individuals, amongst which ED (Perkins, 2009). Furthermore, the 
questionnaire was shown to relate positively to ToM, mindfulness and empathy, and to relate 
inversely to depression, multi-impulsivity, disordered eating, and borderline symptoms (Perkins, 
2009).  
Since the factor on ‘internal-other’ appeared a weaker factor in the RFQ-46 (Perkins, 
2009), 8 more items were added relating to this dimension. This resulted in the version of the 
RFQ-54 as seen on pages 3, 4 and 5 of the questionnaire pack (see Appendix 1). The RFQ-54 
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consists of 2 main subscales on a 7 point Likert scale: the RFQ-A and the RFQ-B. The RFQ-A 
uses median scoring and has 32 items. The RFQ-B is made up of two subsidiary scales: HL  and 
LH and uses polar scoring. The RFQ-B/HL comprises 8 reversed score/polarised items 
(1=highest score), whereas the RFQ-B/LH has 14 normally polarised items (7=highest score). 
Initial data screening and factor analysis on the RFQ-54 suggested a reduced scale of 18 items 
(RFQ18) that loaded onto the subscales: ‘Self’ (Cronbach’s α  = 0.75) and ‘Other’ (Cronbach’s α  
= 0.76) (Moulton-Perkins & Rogoff, 2011). However, this has since been superseded (see 
below). 
Findings suggested that the RFQ has good construct validity in that it relates positively to 
empathy and mindfulness, and relates negatively to alexithymia, BPD psychopathology, general 
psychopathology and ED psychopathology (Moulton-Perkins & Rogoff, 2011; Perkins, 2009; 
Rogoff, 2011; Wilshere, 2011) as measured on the SCOFF (Morgan, Reid & Lacey, 1999). It 
also has strong overall internal reliability (Cronbach’s α  = 0.82; Moulton-Perkins & Rogoff, 
2011).  
In 2015, following ongoing work on the psychometric qualities of the RFQ, new advances 
led to the development of a shorter 12 item scale. The new version of the RFQ (Fonagy et al., 
2016) measures the level of certainty (RFQc) and uncertainty (RFQu) about mental states; both 
subscales consist of 6 items. The Certainty scale picks up on people who clearly disagree with 
the first six items. On the other hand, the Uncertainty scale picks up on people who clearly 
agree with the first four items, and item 27 but disagree with item 8. A ll items are rated by 
participants on a 7-point L ikert type scale, ranging from completely disagree to completely 
agree. The scales are then recoded using a non-linear scoring to identify participants who give 
strongly polarised responses. The table shows how this is achieved. It can be seen from the table 
how four items contributed to both scales by focussing on either extreme high or extreme low 
ratings. 
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Table 1 
 Recoding of RFQc/u 
# Item Coding for RFQc Coding for RFQu 
17 I don’t always know why I do what I do 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
29 When I get angry I say things that I later regret 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
35 If I feel insecure I can behave in ways that put others’ backs up 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
36 Sometimes I do things without really knowing why 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
1 People’s thoughts are a mystery to me 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 NOT USED 
22 When I get angry I say things without really knowing why I am 1=3, 2=2, 3=1; else = 0 NOT USED 
27 Strong feelings often cloud my thinking NOT USED 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
8 I always know what I feel. NOT USED 7=3, 6=2, 5=1, else = 0 
 
 
E ating Disorder. The SCOFF questionnaire is a 5-item yes/no test devised for use by 
non-specialists to detect the possible presence of an eating disorder when scores exceed the cut-
off point of 2 yes and above. It was chosen because it is simple, easily-applied and scored. 
Furthermore, despite it being designed to suggest a likely case rather than a diagnosis, its 
statistical validity is sufficient for it to be used routinely in all individuals considered at risk 
(Morgan et al., 1999). Based on the reported false positive figures of 12.5% (Morgan et al., 
1999), 14 out of the ED internet sample might have been wrongly included. This equates to only 
8% of the total sample size, which seemed an acceptable trade off. In addition, a recent meta-
analysis carried out to establish the diagnostic accuracy of the SCOFF concluded that the use of 
the measure is highly recommended for screening purposes (Botella, Sepúlveda, Huang & 
Gambara, 2013). 
Empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), a multidimensional 
measure of empathy, was chosen because it was hypothesised that one of its sub-scales, namely 
the 7-item Perspective Taking Subscale (PTS), would correlate well with the RFQ. The PTS 
measures cognitive aspects of empathy; in particular, the reported tendency to spontaneously 
adopt the psychological viewpoint of others. It was speculated that someone with good 
mentalising of others would score highly on perspective-taking. The PTS uses a 5-point L ikert 
scale with two anchor-points and it comprises 2 reversed score/polarised items (1=highest 
score) and 5 normally polarised items (7=highest score). It has shown good construct, predictive 
criterion and divergent construct validity (Davis, 1983). Its internal reliability has been reported 
as Cronbach’s α  = .83 (Rogoff, 2011).  
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Mindfulness. The K IMS questionnaire was chosen because of its greater flexibility 
compared to other measures and because it has subscales that more closely approximate to 
reflective function. In addition, both this measure and the PTS were chosen because of their 
focus on the relevant concepts as conceptualized by a few features, rather than as one global 
concept. The K IMS measures moment-to-moment mindfulness experience and it targets 4 
aspects of mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with awareness and accepting without 
judgement. The questionnaire shows good construct, convergent and divergent validity (Baer et 
al., 2004) and very good internal reliability (Rogoff, 2011).  
For the purpose of this research, two subscales were used in order to capture those 
aspects of mindfulness that appear to be more closely related to mentalising: describing and 
acting with awareness. These subscales consisted of 18 statements (9 reversed score/polarised 
items and 9 normally polarised items) on a 5-point L ikert scale with a maximum score of 90. 
Research reported good internal consistency for the subscales (Cronbach’s α  = .84 and 
Cronbach’s α  = .83 respectively; Baer et al., 2004).  
Alexithymia. Being one of the most widely used measure of alexithymia, the TAS-20 
(Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) measures alexithymia in 3 factors including difficulty 
identifying feelings and distinguishing them from bodily sensations, difficulty describing 
feelings and externally-oriented thinking. The scale comprises of 20 items, 5 of which reversed, 
which are scored using a 5-point L ikert scale. The total alexithymia score is the sum of all the 
20 items. The TAS-20 uses cut-off scoring: equal to or less than 51 = non-alexithymia, equal to 
or greater than 61 = alexithymia. Scores of 52 to 60 = possible alexithymia. Research suggests 
that the scale has good internal consistency, test-retest reliability and construct validity. Rogoff 
(2001) reported that its internal reliability is Cronbach’s α  = .90. 
Theory of mind. The choice to use the RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) test was 
dictated by the measure, originally devised to assess theory of mind in people with autism, 
having recently been used to successfully differentiate mentalising skills in BPD (Frick et al., 
2013). The test has 36 items and participants are asked to interpret 36 photographs of the eye 
region of faces by choosing from four words describing emotional states. The test is scored by 
summing all the correct answers; the average score is in the range of 22 to 30 correct responses. 
If a person scores below 22, they may struggle to understand a person’s mental state based on 
their appearance. V ellante et al. (2012) reported a Cronbach alpha of .605. However, Fernández-
Abascal, Cabello, Fernández-Berrocal and Baron-Cohen (2013) acknowledged that the RMET 
test, like tests explicitly designed to test emotion recognition, has psychometric properties that 
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prevent straightforward calculation of Cronbach’s alpha. Hence many studies that employ the 
RMET do not include Cronbach’s alpha (Fernández-Abascal et al., 2013).  
 
Potential confounding variables. Given that some researchers suggested that good 
psychotherapy is mentalising at its best (A llen et al., 2008), and that good psychotherapy 
nurtures the latter (Stedmon & Dallos, 2009), it seems important to take into consideration the 
possible impact that psychotherapy might have on RF. Muller, K anfhold, Overbeck and 
Grabhorn (2006) reported a significant correlation between mentalising and improvement in 
mental health condition, a finding that was partially replicated by Tabner, White, Zimmerrmann, 
Fonagy and Nolte (2011). In addition, a recent study reported a significant difference in 
mentalising ability in therapists who as a result of training requirements undergo ongoing 
therapy versus a control group (Rogoff, 2011). Hence, it seems feasible to believe that being in 
personal therapy may affect a person’s ability to mentalise, although several studies suggest that 
this also depends on the psychotherapeutic model used (K atznelson, 2014).  
Research suggested that in order for psychotherapy to be mentalising-enhancing it has to 
be of a certain length, psychodynamically oriented and focused on specifically enhancing 
insight and on specifically integrating split off mental states (K atznelson, 2014). As a result, 
participants on the current study were asked to state whether they had any previous experience 
of psychological therapy and if so, for how long.  
Procedures.   
Recruitment through the NHS. Information on the study (see Appendix 2) was sent out 
in written format alongside the appointment-time, so that participants could make an informed 
choice about whether to participate. Individuals who opted to partake in the study were 
subsequently given the questionnaire (Appendix 1), aconsent form (Appendix 3), a list of 
support numbers (Appendix 4) and a self addressed envelop during their appointment at the 
clinic. The cooperation of clinicians was crucial to allow the researcher to select participants 
according to the criteria set by the study. In addition, the consultant’s clinical judgment ensured 
that individuals who presented with severe risk issues were not approached for the study.  
Private practice. Contact had been made with two professionals who worked privately 
with individuals presenting with ED. At appointments, clients were given the information pack 
and asked whether they wished to participate. If they wished, the same procedure as above 
applied.  
Recruitment through E D Associations and online. The ED administrator e-mailed the 
information sheet to individuals who had registered with the charities as being willing to 
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volunteer for research studies. V olunteers could either request a questionnaire pack or they 
could complete the questionnaire online.  
An online version of the survey was set up on Qualtrics
7
. The research was advertised on 
the ED associations website and, when applicable, a flyer was posted on charities’ Facebook 
pages (social network website) (Appendix 5). When participants were recruited online, it was 
not feasible to screen for level of distress and/or suicidality. However, an online 
recommendation featured the following message: "The following questionnaire covers topics 
which some people might find upsetting. If you are feeling very vulnerable, or have thoughts of 
hurting yourself, we recommend that you contact your GP or emergency services. Please DO 
take care and wait until you feel better before filling in this questionnaire. By filling in the 
questionnaire you consent to your data being used for research purposes”. A list of support 
organisations was supplied.  
Table 2: 
Eating disorder’s group: Participants’ recruitment breakdown according to settings (before 
exclusion criteria applied) 
  NHS ED clinic Private clinicians 
ED associations-online 
recruitment 
Number 55 6 168 
 
 
Table 3: 
 
Eating disorder’s group: Participants’ recruitment breakdown according to settings (following 
exclusion criteria applied) 
  NHS ED clinic Private clinicians 
ED associations-online 
recruitment 
Number 55 6 94 
 
                                                     
 
7
 Qualtrics is a private research software which enables users to collect online data.  
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E thical Considerations. The role of a counselling psychologist is to adopt a scientist-
practitioner approach. This is particularly true when considering ethical issues for research. On 
the one hand, the researcher must be extremely sensitive to the well-being of the participants; on 
the other, she needs to be aware that research might increase knowledge and, hence, improve 
therapeutic care. Both these aspects have been taken into consideration when planning this 
study. In particular, the researcher adhered to the Beauchamp and Childress’ (2001) ethical 
framework for dealing with individuals presenting with ED. Central to this framework are 
beneficence and non-maleficence. The former involves ensuring the safety of the individual and 
the latter the avoidance of harm. Those have been addressed by balancing the need for 
knowledge, which might lead to the development of new therapeutic enterprises, with attention 
to the prevention of adverse consequences that might arise as a result of taking part in the 
research.  
The current research only included participants over 18 years of age. Potential participants 
were informed of the nature and goals of this research beforehand (Appendix 2). Attention was 
given to ensure that informed consent was given, either by filling in the consent form (Appendix 
3) or by putting a notice on the online version emphasising that consent was implied from filling 
in the questionnaire. Participants were reminded of their right to withdraw at any stage of the 
process and were advised to raise any issues with the researcher or the associated clinician, 
when applicable. Anonymised data is kept on a password-protected electronic database and will 
be destroyed after use; signed consent forms are kept separately in a locked compartment.  
Due to the nature of the topics to be examined and the vulnerability of the population in 
question, very vulnerable people, individuals under 18, those highly distressed/suicidal and in-
patients were not approached. Nevertheless, it was important to bear in mind the possibility that 
participants might become distressed or, indeed, tired as a result of filling in the questionnaire. 
Initial piloting of the questionnaires with fellow students and non service-users, revealed that it 
took 20 minutes to complete. It was felt, therefore, that allowing 30 minutes to service-users 
was sufficient, and would not create an undue burden on participants. Furthermore, the 
information pack and the questionnaire were also given to a service user who routinely works 
with renowned clinicians on ED/BPD research matters. Feedback on wording, format and 
length was received. In addition, a list of help-lines was provided to participants (Appendix 4).  
As already mentioned on page 12, the proposed research was included in Prof. Fonagy 
and Dr. A lesia Perkins’ ethical application form (Appendix 6). Nevertheless, the two studies 
were independent and the only point of contact was that the trainee researcher shared the results 
collected; hence, no conflict of interest was present. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
National Research Ethics Service (NRES; see Appendix 7) and individual organisations. Since 
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the original ethical approval expired in August 2012, a minor amendment notification was sent 
to the NRES to request an extension of study timelines (Appendix 8). In addition, the researcher 
obtained ethical approval from City University’s Ethics Committee (Appendix 9).  
Benefits of the study. By feeding back the results to individual associations at the end of 
the study, and hearing about how this research could contribute to better understanding and 
future treatment for individuals presenting with ED with/without concurrent SH, participants 
may experience some indirect benefit. The process might encourage some participants to 
become more active agents in their own recovery and this might foster a sense of satisfaction 
and achievement that they have contributed to this process.  
 R esearch hypotheses. 
Part 1: Comparing 3 groups on mentalising ability on the RF Q-54. 
1. HI There will be significant differences in mentalising ability between individuals who 
present with ED_no self-harm, individuals who present with ED and concurrent SH and 
a control group.  
 
2. HII Individuals who present with ED with, or without SH will display lower levels of 
mentalising ability compared to the non-clinical control group. 
 
3. HIII Individuals who present with comorbid ED and SH will display lower levels of 
mentalising ability than individuals with ED and no concurrent SH. 
Part 2: Comparing 3 groups on mentalising ability on the RF Qc/u. 
4. HIV  There will be significant differences in mentalising ability between individuals who 
present with ED_no self-harm, individuals who present with ED and concurrent SH and 
a control group.  
 
5. HV  Individuals who present with ED with or without SH will display lower levels of 
mentalising ability compared to the non-clinical control group. 
 
6. HV I Individuals who present with comorbid ED and SH will display lower levels of 
mentalising ability than individuals with ED and no concurrent SH.  
 
Part 3: E xploring the relationship between mentalising ability and other scales and 
measures of related constructs within the whole sample. 
7. HV II There is a positive correlation between mentalising and mindfulness.  
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8. HV III There is a positive correlation between mentalising and empathy. 
 
9. HIX  There is a positive correlation between mentalising and ToM. 
 
10. HX  There is a negative correlation between mentalising and alexithymia. 
Statistical analysis. The data were analysed using SPSS Statistics for Windows, release 
version 21.0 (SPSS IBM, 2012).  
Data was screened for anomalous entries, consistency with inclusion/exclusion criteria 
and missing values. After a thorough review of the control group data, 2 participants were 
excluded from the analysis due to a positive answer on the SH question. A further 7 participants 
were excluded due to scores on the SCOFF (<2). This brought the total number of the control 
group from 83 to 74. Out of the 170 participants in the mixed sample group (ED no_SH and 
ED_SH), 15 did not meet the SCOFF baseline, hence they were excluded from the analysis. Out 
of those there were 4 with comorbid SH and 11 with ED no SH. This brought the total number 
from 170 to 155, of which 97 with ED no SH and 58 with ED and concurrent SH.  
The database was further screened. Where more than 5% of the data on a particular 
scale were missing, the participant’s data were excluded from analyses involving that scale; 
where less than 5% missing, the missing values were replaced with the sample mean score for 
that item. Assumptions of normality and linearity were tested for all major variables and each 
case was examined by calculating and inspecting z-scores. Furthermore, in order to check the 
normality of the distribution within each group, z-scores for skewness and kurtosis were also 
calculated by dividing the skewness/kurtosis value by their standard errors. In group samples 
with a number of participants inferior to 100, Z-scores with a value greater than 1.96 were 
assumed to be non-normally distributed. In samples with a number of participants between 100 
and 300 this number was raised to 3.29 (Field, 2005; Fife-Shaw, 2011).  
Outliers were examined by calculating and inspecting z-scores for each case with regard 
to group mean and standard deviation. It was decided to deal with extreme cases by changing 
the extreme score to the mean +/- two times the standard deviation (Field, 2005). 
An a priori assumption was that length of therapy would be correlated to mentalising. 
Upon inspection, this variable was heavily positively skewed, hence it was decided to log 
transform it before assessing the relationship between the 2 above-mentioned variables. In 
addition, correlations between the RFQ and the other demographic variables were also explored 
using non-parametric tests. This was done with the aim of identifying potential covariates, as 
per Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). The authors suggest that assessing correlations with 
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dependent variables is a suitable method to identify covariates when performing analysis of 
variance. At the same time, any variable that was found to be significantly different between 
groups was excluded as a potential covariate in (M)ANCOV A (Field, 2005).  
Group differences in terms of demographic variables were explored using several 
methods. For example, Chi-square tests were used for categorical variables (e.g. gender), 
whereas non-parametric tests (e.g., K ruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon) were employed for ordinal 
data (i.e., Educational Attainment) or data non-normally distributed within groups (i.e., age). 
 
Part One: Comparing 3 groups on mentalising ability on the RF Q-54.  In order to 
explore the research aim, it was first necessary to assess the internal reliability and the construct 
validity of the RFQ-54. Hence, a Cronbach’s alpha was computed and Maximum L ikelihood 
Factor Analysis (MLFA) was carried out. Subsequently, 3 MANOV As were run comparing the 
3 groups first, the two ED groups to the control and the ED_SH to the ED_noSH group. The 
decision to run a MANOV A, rather than a MANCOV A was made taking in consideration the 
literature that discusses the appropriateness of controlling for covariates (Field, 2005; Miller & 
Chapman, 2001).  
Based on the demographic findings, it initially seemed appropriate to control for age and 
educational attainment. However, research of the literature revealed that “the only legitimate use 
of covariance is for reducing the variability of scores in groups that vary randomly” (Miller & 
Chapman, 2001, p. 43). In this respect, it can be argued that age and educational attainment did 
not differ across groups randomly, but rather are a difference inherently connected to the group 
of belonging. This point prompted a more informed decision to run a MANOV A instead. 
 
Part Two: E xploring mentalising differences in the three groups using the RF Qc/u. As 
discussed above, the structure of the RFQc/u was initially investigated using a Maximum 
L ikelihood Factor Analysis (MLFA). Differences in mentalising ability between the 3 groups 
were investigated using 3 MANOV As as described above. In addition, the MANOV As were 
followed up by a discriminant analysis.  
Part Three: E xploring relationships between mentalising and related concepts. The 
relationship between mentalising and related concepts was explored using correlations. In order 
to have a more robust measure (i.e., less prone to be influenced by outliers) Spearman’s r non-
parametric correlations were employed. 
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R esults  
As discussed in the statement on page 12, the RFQ has undergone a series of changes 
over the past few years in order to optimise its psychometric qualities. The current section 
reflects these alterations. For example, the current section will take the reader through the 
findings of the current study starting from data cleaning. The first three parts of the results 
report the analysis of the data examining the reliability and factor structure of the RFQ-54 and 
comparing groups on mentalising abilities using the RFQ54 (Part 1). The last three parts of the 
results section (Part 2) will consider group differences according to the RFQc/u. As part of this 
section, the researcher will also explore whether the RFQc/u is able to discriminate SH. Lastly, 
the relationship between mentalising and allied concepts will be explored using the RFQc/u.   
   Data cleaning.  Where a participant had more than 5% scores missing on any 
particular scale, they were excluded from analyses involving that scale. This applied to 5 and 13 
participants respectively excluded from the ED_SH and ED_noSH groups in respect to the PTS; 
4, 5 and 13 participants respectively excluded from the Control, ED_SH and ED_noSH groups 
in relation to the K IMS, and 4, 7, and 15 excluded from the Control, ED_SH and ED_noSH 
groups in relation to the TAS. Lastly, 4, 8 and 17 participants were respectively excluded from 
the Control, ED_SH and ED_noSH groups in relation to the REMT (Appendix 10). 
In addition, where less than 5% of scores were missing, they were replaced by mean 
substitution (Appendix 10). Mean substitution followed Field’s (2005) guidelines: the missing 
score was estimated by calculating the mean sample score for that particular item across the 3 
groups. Based on this criterion, 3 and 6 participants in the ED_SH and ED_noSH respectively 
were subject to mean substitution in relation to the RFQ. Two participants in the ED_noSH in 
relation to the PTS, 1 and 2 respectively in the ED_SH and ED_noSH for the K IMS, 2 and 2 
respectively for the control and the ED_SH group in regards to the TAS and 4, 2, and 3 
respectively in the control, ED_SH and ED_noSH for the REMT.  
Furthermore, inspection of scores revealed the presence of some outliers, which were 
dealt with by changing the extreme score to the mean +/- two times the standard deviation, as 
suggested by Field (2005). Three, 4 and 4 outliers were recoded for the ED_SH, the ED_noSH 
and the Control group respectively in respect to the RFQ-54; 1, 3 and 5 outliers were recoded 
for the ED_SH, the ED_noSH and the Control group respectively in respect to the PTS; 3, 1 and 
5 outliers were recoded for the ED_SH, the ED_noSH and the Control group respectively in 
respect to the K IMS; 2 and 2 outliers were recoded for the ED_noSH and the Control group 
respectively in respect to the TAS and 3 outliers were recoded for the Control group in respect 
to the RMET. 
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In addition, exploration of z-scores for skewness and kurtosis (Appendix 11) indicated 
that some outcome variables were above the 1.96 criterion set to ascertain normality of 
distribution (Field, 2005; Fife-Shaw, 2011). However, after outliers re-coding, normality was 
checked again and all variables were found to be normal, except the K IMS in the ED_SH group 
that showed a skewness Z-score of 2.2 (Appendix 11). After careful consideration, it was 
decided to continue the analysis with parametric tests. It is generally agreed that t-tests and 
(M)ANOV As are robust against mild violations of assumptions in many situations. As a result, 
some researchers in the literature have argued that parametric tests can be employed even when 
the data is not-normally distributed (Glass et al., 1972; Shinohara et al., 2012). The latter 
researchers confidently state that parametric model-based tests preserve nonparametric validity 
of testing the null hypothesis even when the models are incorrect and that they increase power 
compared to the non- or semi-parametric counterpart when the models are close to correct 
(Shinohara et al., 2012).  
Before addressing the main research hypotheses, the demographic data for the groups 
was explored.  
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Table 4 
Demographic details 
Category Sub category E D_SH   E D_noSH   CG 
  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Age (in years) 28.4 10.6   33.3 12.4   37.8 9.7 
          
    N %    N %    N %  
Gender Female 40 69  80 82.5  48 64.9 
 Male 18 31  17 17.5  26 35.1 
          
Relationship 
status 
In a long-term relationship 20 34.5   34 35.1   47 63.5 
Not in a long-term relationship 38 65.5  63 64.9  27 36.5 
          
Ethnicity 
White British 44 15.9   69 71.1   24 33.3 
Any other white background 6 10.3  2 2  26 36.1 
White mixed background 3 5.1  21 21.6  4 5.4 
Non-white background 5 8.6  1 1  18 23.6 
          
Employment 
Employed 22 37.9   46 47.4   45 60.8 
Self-employed 3 5.2  12 12.4  7 9.7 
Unemployed 16 27.6  11 11.3  5 6.9 
Studying 16 27.6  25 25.8  14 19.4 
Retired 0   1 1  3 4.2 
Homemaker 0   0   0  
          
Education 
Secondary school to age 16 4 6.9   2 2.1   4 5.6 
Secondary school to age 18 19 32.8  24 24.7  11 15.3 
Non-degree vocational work based training 9 15.5  15.5 15.5  7 9.5 
University degree 15 29.9  36 37.1  21 27.8 
University postgraduate degree 8 13.8  16 16.5  20 28.4 
University doctoral level 2 3.4   4 4.1   11 15.3 
 
 
Results showed significant group differences in terms of ethnicity (χ2 (6) = 43.73, p < 
.001), gender (χ2 (2) = 7.43, p =  .024), age K ruskall Wallis (H(2) = 27.40, p < .001), 
educational attainment (H(2) = 13.21, p = .001), relationship status (χ2 (2) = 16.71, p <  .001) 
and length of therapy (H (2) = 37.61, p < .001. The clinical groups were more likely to describe 
themselves as White (95% and 91% against the 68% of the control group), to consist of more 
women and to be younger than the Control group. In terms of age, the group presenting with 
ED_SH comprised the youngest participants. The clinical groups were also significantly more 
likely to be in therapy (H(2) = 37.61, p < .001, to have lower educational attainment (H(2) 
= 13.21, p = .001), to be unemployed (χ2 (2) = 12.93, p = .002) and they were less likely to be 
in a relationship (χ2 (2) = 16.71, p <  .001). 
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Findings suggested that only age and educational attainment significantly correlated 
with the RFQ-54 (Spearman’s rho > .186, p < .02; Spearman’s rho = .27, p  < .001 
respectively). 
Part 1: Group comparison using the RFQ54   
R eliabilities analysis. Internal reliabilities of scales were checked with Cronbach’s 
alpha and were acceptable.  Reliabilities were as follows: PTS = .87, K IMS = .80, TAS = .86, 
RMET = .55. The reliability of the RFQ54 was = 0.815 based on all the items. The reliability of 
the subscales was as follows: Subscale RFQ-A (lhl) = 0.866 based on 32 median scoring; 
subscale RFQ-B(hl) = 0.682 based on 8 reversed scoring items and subscale RFQ-B(lh) = 0.711 
based on 14 directly scored items (unchanged).  
Construct validity. The construct validity of the RFQ-54 was assessed by conducting a 
Maximum L ikelihood Factor Analysis (MLFA) on the whole sample and on each of the 3 
groups. The choice to perform a Factor Analysis was dictated by the literature that shows that 
FA is more appropriate than Principal Components Analysis for confirmatory analysis of 
underlying scales (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Ferguson & Cox, 1993). A  similar factor structure 
was obtained in each case; hence only the analysis of the whole group is reported.  
Bartlett’s test reached significance (c²(1431) = 3777.648, p < .001) and K aiser-Meyer-
Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy reached a good value (0.74). Eighteen factors with 
Eigenvalues >1 were initially extracted (K aiser, 1960 as cited in Field, 2005). However, an 
exploration of the scree plot (below) indicated that 4 factors gave the most interpretable 
solution.  
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F igure 1: E FA scree plot for all groups 
A V arimax rotation was performed in order to improve the interpretability of the results. 
For the unrotated solution, the first factor was robust, with an Eigenvalue of 6.92 and it 
accounted for 12.8% of the variance in the data. Factor 2 had an Eigenvalue 4.15 and explained 
a further 7.69% of the variance whereas the Eigenvalue for factor 3 was 3.52 and accounted for 
extra 3.52% of the total variance. Lastly, factor 4 had an Eigenvalue of 2.51 and justified 6.56% 
of the total variance. Together the factors accounted for 31.7% of the total variance.  
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Table 5 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Rotated Factor Matrix 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
RFQlhl34: I normally have a good idea of what is on someone’s mind 
 
.718    
RFQlhl47: My gut feeling about what someone else is thinking is usually very 
accurate 
 
.664    
RFQlhl2: It is easy for me to figure out what someone else is thinking or feeling  
 .659 
   
RFQlhl18: It’s really hard for me to figure out what goes on in other people’s 
minds .628   
 
RFQlhl27: I can mostly predict what someone else will do .608    
RFQlhl30: My intuition about a person is hardly ever wrong .606    
     
RFQlhl16: I don’t always know why I do what I do  .608   
RFQlhl44: Sometimes I do things without really knowing why 
 
 .561   
RFQlhl20: When I get angry I say things without really knowing why I am saying 
them  .557 
  
RFQlhl12: I often get confused about what I am feeling 
 
 .549   
RFQlhl40: If I feel insecure I can behave in ways that put others’ backs up 
 .499   
RFQlhl8: I always know what I feel  .471   
     
RFQhl41: I find it difficult to other peoples’ point of view   .598  
RFQhl37: I get confused when people talk about their feelings 
 
  .581  
RFQhl32: Sometimes I find myself saying things and I have no idea why I said 
them 
 
  .574  
RFQhl23: I often have to force people to do what I want them to do  
  .501  
RFQhl24: Those close to me often find it difficult to understand why I things 
  .480 -.311 
RFQhl39: I frequently feel that my mind is empty   .393  
 
    
RFQ31: I believe that people can see a situation very differently based on their 
own beliefs and experiences 
 
   .587 
RFQ5: I pay attention to the impact of my actions on others’ feelings 
 
  .504 .535 
RFQ9: How I feel can easily affect how I understand someone else's behaviour 
  
  .485 
RFQ17: I have noticed that people often give me advice to others that they 
actually wish to follow themselves 
 
   .458 
RFQ48: Understanding the reasons for people's actions helps me to forgive them 
 
   .427 
RFQ21: I'm often curious about the meaning behind others' actions 
   .421 
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Note. Items with lhl after RFQ used median scoring. Items with hl were reverse scored, while items with plain numbers were 
directly scored 
The table above shows the first 6 items of each component after rotation. Loadings with 
an absolute value below .3 have been omitted. Further exploration of the structure suggested 
that Factor 1 and Factor 2 mapped onto the RFQ-A scale, which required a midpoint score in 
order to denote high mentalising. Factor 3 mapped onto the RFQ-B(hl) and Factor 4 onto the 
RFQ-B(lh); the former requiring a reverse scoring and the latter a direct scoring in order to 
convey high mentalising. Given that the factors respectively loaded onto the RFQ-A and the 2 
subscales of the RFQ-B, construct validity of the RFQ-54 scale can be inferred.  
Hypotheses T esting 
Part One: Comparing 3 groups on mentalising ability using the RFQ-54. A  one 
way MANOV A was run with the 3 groups as the Independent V ariable and the 3 subscales of 
the RFQ-54 as the Dependent V ariables. This test sought evidence that the 3 groups differ on 
the 3 subscales. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the Dependent V ariables. Subscales 
RFQ-A and RFQ-B(hl) produced a trend in the hypothesised direction with individuals 
presenting with ED and SH scoring lower than individuals with ED without SH, who in turn 
scored lower than control. Results from the RFQB(lh) showed individuals with ED_SH scoring 
highest, followed by the control group and the ED_noSH scoring lowest on the scale.  
Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviation for the RFQ54 subscales 
 Group    Means  Standard deviation 
RFQ-A ED_no SH 127.29 24.10 
Control 135.18 24.98 
 
RFQ-B(hl) 
 
 
ED_SH 34.05 8.79 
ED_no SH 37.46 7.45 
Control 
 
42.60 6.47 
 
RFQ-B(lh) 
 
ED_SH 72.22 10.56 
ED_no SH 70.61 10.05 
Control 71.62 9.89 
    
The MANOV A revealed a significant multivariate main effect of groups, Pillai’s V  = 
0.209, F(6, 448) = 8.70, p < .001, ηp
2
= .104.  Having found that, two more MANOV As were run 
in order to explore whether – (a) ED groups differ from controls and (b) within the ED sample, 
do individuals who present with SH differ from those who present without SH? A one way 
MANOV A between ED (with/without SH) and the control group revealed a significant 
multivariate main effect of groups, Pillai’s V  = 0.165, F(3, 224) = 14.80, p <  .001, ηp
2 
 = .165. 
112 
 
A  one way MANOV A between ED_noSH and ED_SH also reported a significant multivariate 
main effect of groups, Pillai’s V = .062, F(3, 150) = 3.27, p <  .05, ηp
2
 = .062.  
A ll three of the MANOV A tests were statistically significant (p < .001 for the three 
groups and for the control versus the ED groups, p < .05 for the ED groups with/without self-
harm). This indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected in all cases. Univariate ANOV As 
on the outcome variables revealed a significant effect for subscales RFQ-A and RFQ-B(hl) in 
all groups together, in the EDs versus control and in the RFQ-B(hl) of the ED_noSH versus 
ED_SH group.  
Table 7  
Univariate ANOVAs for the RFQ-54 subscales   
 Group  F Hypothesis 
df 
Error df Sig Partial Eta 
Squared 
RFQ-A 
 
Three groups 5.26 2 225 p < .05 .045 
EDs vs Control 7.86 1 226 p < .05 .034 
ED+SH vs ED_no SH 2. 47 1 152 p > .05 .016 
       
RFQ-B(hl) 
 
Three groups 21.93 2 225  p < .001 .163 
EDs vs Control 35.14 1 226  p < .001 .135 
ED+SH vs ED_no SH 6.62 1 152 p < .05 .042 
       
RFQ-B(lh) 
 
Three groups .49 2 225 p > .05 .004 
EDs vs Control .078 1 226 p > .05 .000 
ED+SH vs ED_no SH .89 1 152 p > .05 .006 
 
 
 The results show that the RFQ-A differentiated between the three groups overall, with 
individuals who present with ED showing lower scores on mentalising ability. The RFQ-A, 
however, did not differentiate those with or without SH. The trend was in the same direction, 
but there was greater variability in the ED_SH group, leading to no significant effect. In terms 
of the RFQ-B(hl), statistical tests showed an overall difference between the three groups and 
was significant for both of the planned contrasts. Individuals presenting with ED displayed 
lower mentalising abilities than controls, and within that group those with SH were lower than 
those without. The RFQ-B(lh) did not differentiate significantly between the three groups. To 
summarise, the RFQ54 showed good reliability and scale structure. There is evidence that it can 
also differentiate eating disorder and SH groups.  Since it has been superseded with the RFQc/u 
it is to this that we now turn. 
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Part two: Group comparison using the RFQc/u version.  
Part 1 analysed the data based on the original RFQ-54, with which the project began. In 
the next part, the data were analysed again using the RFQc/u. The reader is referred to the 
method section if they wish to remind themselves on how the RFQc/u was constructed.  
Reliabilities analysis. Internal consistency was deemed satisfactory for both the RFQc 
(certainty) (Cronbach’s alpha =.0.67) and the RFQu (uncertainty) subscale (Cronbach’s alpha=. 
68).  
Construct validity. The structure of the RFQc and RFQu scales was checked using 
Maximum L ikelihood Factor Analysis (MLFA) with V arimax rotation (Costello & Osborne, 
2005). As seen from the scree plot below the elbow indicated 2 factors, which is in line with the 
authors’ reports (Fonagy et al2016). The first factor had an Eigenvalue of 4.17 and accounted 
for 34.7% of the variance in the data. Factor 2 had an Eigenvalue of 1.81 and explained a further 
15.11% of the variance. Together the factors accounted for 49.8% of the total variance.  
 
F igure 2: E FA scree plot for the R FQc/u 
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Note. Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  Rotation Method: V arimax with K aiser Normalization.a. 
Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
The table shows the rotated factor matrix; values with absolute value less than .1 have  
been omitted. It can be seen that with the exception of one item (c36) all the c items load on 
Factor 1, and for the exception of few items (u29, u36 and u35) all of the u items load on Factor 
2.  A  factor plot was also performed and this showed that the c items are all near zero for Factor 
2, while the u items tend to be near zero for Factor 1.   
  
Table 8 
Rotated Factor Matrix
a
 
RFQc/u 
Factor 
1 2 
LRFc36 .973 -.230 
LRFc29 .943  
LRFc22 .526  
LRFc35 .384  
LRFc17 .240  
LRFc1 .136  
LRFu29 -.259 .923 
LRFu36 -.415 .909 
LRFu35 -.173 .308 
LRFu17  .282 
LRFu27  .232 
LRFu8  .141 
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F igure 3: R otated factor plot for the R FQc/u. 
The analysis confirmed that the two factor subscale structure reported for the scale was 
also to be found in the present sample.  
 
Hypothesis T esting 
Part Two: Comparing 3 groups on mentalising ability using the RFQc/u. Exploring 
differences in mentalising ability in the 3 groups using the RFQc/u showed the following 
findings. For RFQc, individuals presenting with ED and concurrent SH (ED_SH) scored lower 
than individuals with ED no SH, who in turn scored lower than controls.  
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F igure 4: R FQc mean scores across the three groups.  E rror bars are 95%  CI. 
For RFQu, individuals with ED and concurrent SH (ED_SH) scored highest, followed 
by the ED_noSH group, who, in turn, scored higher than the control group  
 
 
 
 
F igure 5: R FQu mean scores across the three groups. E rror bars are 95%  CI. 
A one-way MANOV A with the 3 groups as Independent V ariable and the two subscales 
as Dependent V ariables revealed a significant multivariate main effect of groups,  Pillai’s V  = 
.29, F(4, 452) = 19.64, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14. In addition, separate univariate ANOV As on the 
outcome variables revealed two significant effects: RFQc F(2,226) = 12.06,  p < .001, ηp
2  =  
.09 
and RFQu F(2, 226) = 47.23, p < .001 ηp
2  = 
.29. Pairwise comparison suggested that the control 
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group differed significantly from both the ED_no SH and from the ED_SH (respectively p < 
.05; p < .001) on the RFQc scale. Similar results were replicated for the RFQu scale (p < .001) 
for both the ED_no SH and the ED_SH group. This was confirmed by a one-way MANOV A 
between the control group and the ED with/without SH: Pillai’s V  =.26, F(2, 226) =  41.64, p <  
.001, ηp
2 = 
.26. Furthermore, separate univariate ANOV As on the RFQu and the RFQc gave the 
following results: RFQu F(1,227) = 83.54, p < .001; RFQc F(1,227) = 22.03, p < .001. 
When the SH group was compared to the ED_no SH group, a one way MANOV A 
revealed a significant effect Pillai’s V  = .04 F (2,152) = 3, 58, p < .05, ηp
2 = 
.45. In addition, 
separate univariate ANOV As on the outcome variables revealed significant results for the RFQu 
F (1, 153) = 7.07, p < .05, but not for the RFQc F (1, 153) =  1.54, p > .05. These last results are 
nicely summarized by the Homogenous Subset tables below:   
Table 9 
Homogenous Subset for the RFQu 
 
N 
                Subset 
Three groups in the design 
1 2 3 
Scheffe
a,b,c
 Control 74 3.09   
ED alone 97  7.63  
ED+SH 58   9.55
     
 
 
    Table 10 
Homogenous Subset for the RFQc 
               Subset 
Three groups in the design 
N 1 2 
Scheffe
a,b,c
 ED+SH 58 3.22  
ED alone 97 3.91  
Control 74  6.17 
Sig.  .532  
     
Results from the MANOV As and the subsequent ANOV As show that the RFQc and the 
RFQu subscales differed between the 3 groups. However, in order to explore how strong this 
effect was, and whether it would enable a clinician to predict group membership, the MANOV A 
was followed up with a Discriminant Analysis, which looked specifically at differentiating SH  
from non-SH within the ED group. Results show that the discriminant function significantly 
differentiated amongst the groups, λ = .955, χ
2 
(2) = 6.99, p  <  .05.  
Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients revealed that the RFQu loaded highly on 
this function (b = 1.08) compared to RFQc (b = .16). Classification results showed how this 
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function does a good job in classifying ED_noSH. In order to have an unbiased estimate of 
classification success, results should be taken from the Cross-V alidated analysis in the table, 
where the function is calculated while omitting each case in turn and is then used to predict 
membership for that person. That makes the accuracy of predicting ED_noSH 89%. On the 
other hand, the ED_SH group was classified poorly (24%).  
 
Table 11 
Classification Results 
a,c
 
  
Three groups in the 
design 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
  
ED+SH ED alone 
Original Count ED_SH 14 44 58 
ED alone 8 89 97 
% ED_SH 24.1 75.9 100.0 
ED alone 8.2 91.8 100.0 
      
Cross-
validated
b
 
Count ED_SH 14 44 58 
ED alone 8 89 97 
% ED_SH 24.1 75.9 100.0 
ED alone 8.2 91.8 100.0 
Note a. 66.5% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
           b. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is 
classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
           c. 64.5% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified. 
 
 
The discriminant function discriminated the ED_no SH from the ED_SH group. To see 
if predictability could be improved with the addition of other information about a person, a 
Stepwise Discriminant Analysis was performed with several variables amongst which were age, 
gender, relationship status and personal therapy. It appeared that age was the second best 
predictor, λ = .91, χ
2
 (2) = 13.03, p = < .05. When age was included in the analysis, the 
predictive value of the scale for identifying self-harmers increased to 27.6%, or 25.9% on the 
cross-validated measure.  
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Table 12  
Classification Resultsa,c when age was included in the analysis  
  
Three groups in the 
design 
Predicted Group Membership 
Total 
  
ED+SH ED alone 
Original Count ED+SH 16 42 58 
ED alone 13 84 97 
% ED+SH 27.6 72.4 100.0 
ED alone 13.4 86.6 100.0 
      
Cross-validated
b
 Count ED+SH 15 43 58 
ED alone 13 84 97 
% ED+SH 25.9 74.1 100.0 
ED alone 13.4 86.6 100.0 
Note. a. 66.5% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
          b. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is 
classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
          c. 65.8% of cross-validated grouped cases correctly classified. 
  
 
Part three: E xploring convergent validity between the RFQ c/u and allied concepts 
(empathy, mindfulness, alexithymia, theory of mind). In order to explore the convergent 
validity of the RFQc/u, the subscales were correlated with a number of related measures of 
mentalising. Results from Spearman’s rho revealed a significant positive correlation between 
the RFQc and the PTS that measured empathy (r = .37, p < .001) and a significant negative 
correlation between the RFQu and the PTS (r = -.40, p < .001).  Similar results were reported 
for the correlation between the RFQ and mindfulness (K IMS): RFQc (r = .31, p < .001); RFQu 
(r = -.46, p < .001). Instead, when alexithymia was explored, the correlation produced the 
following significant results: RFQc (r = -.39, p < .001); RFQu (r = .58, p < .001). Lastly, the 
relationship between the RFQ and the theory of mind (RMET) displayed the following: RFQc (r 
= -.02, p > .05); RFQu (r = -.05, p > .05). 
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Table 13 
Correlations between the RFQ and related measure 
 
RFQu PTS K IMS TAS RMET 
RFQc -.599
**
 .373
**
 .313
**
 -.393
**
 -.029 
RFQu   -.408
**
 -.461
**
 .581
**
 -.057 
PTS   . .104
**
  -.297
**
 .136 
K IMS    -.598
**
 .050 
TAS     .073 
PTS= Empathy: perspective-taking subscale; K IMS= K entucky inventory mindfulness skills; TAS= Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale 
In terms of the rapport between mentalising and its allied constructs, Table 13 shows 
that the certainty/uncertainty subscales correlate to constructs in opposite directions. For 
example, results reveal that the RFQc measures a construct similar to the one captured in 
empathy and mindfulness. Results also reveal a negative correlation between mentalising and 
alexithymia, all as per our initial hypotheses. This suggests that having a solid emotional 
vocabulary is essential to the development of a reflective function as measured by the RFQc. 
Instead, contrary to the research’s hypothesis, mentalising as evaluated by the RFQc produces a 
significant negative correlation with the ToM. This could arguably be because the RFQc and the 
RMET tap into different aspects of the same construct; the former tapping into a more 
emotional aspect, and the latter tapping into a more physical aspect (reading physical features). 
Different results arise for the RFQu, which shows a significant negative relationship 
with the measures of empathy and mindfulness and a positive correlation with alexithymia. It 
could be hypothesised that the RFQu, whose higher scores measure hypomentalising, taps into 
individuals’ difficulty to adopt multiple perspectives and hence, to consider other people’s 
standpoints. A reduced capacity to reflect on mental states can also arguably make it more 
difficult to be mindful of internal experiences. Similarly, a lack of curiosity towards mental 
states can be arguably associated with a higher degree of alexithymia.  
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Discussion  
R esearch findings 
The current project was aimed at investigating mentalising capacities in three groups 
chosen according to different hypothesised reflective functioning abilities. These groups were as 
follows: 1) individuals presenting with ED and concurrent SH; 2) individuals presenting with 
ED only; 3) a control group.  
Part one of the analysis investigated whether there were significant differences in 
mentalising abilities on the 3 subscales of the RFQ-54 amongst the three groups. In order to 
better explore these differences, the research question was conceptualised into three main 
hypotheses. A  one-way MANOV A reported a significant difference between the groups. As 
visible from Table 2, data confirmed that individuals presenting with ED and concurrent SH 
reported less mentalising ability than individuals who present with ED_no concurrent SH, who 
in turn, displayed less mentalising capacity than the control group. This trend was picked up by 
the RFQ-A and by the RFQ-B (hl), but not by the RFQ-B (lh) subscale.   
Conclusions for hypotheses II and III (HII) Individuals who present with ED with or 
without SH will display lower levels of mentalising ability compared to the non-clinical control 
group; (HIII) individuals who present with comorbid ED and SH will display lower levels of 
mentalising ability than individuals with ED and no concurrent SH, and also reported significant 
differences, supporting the alternative hypotheses. Findings showed that individuals who 
presented with EDs displayed significantly lower levels of mentalising ability compared to the 
non clinical control group (hypothesis HII). Similarly, individuals who presented with ED and 
concurrent SH exhibited significantly lower levels of mentalising ability compared to 
participants who present with ED_no concurrent SH (hypothesis HIII). The discrepancies 
between the three RFQ-54 subscales in picking up mentalising group differences, as explored 
by subsequent Univariate ANOV As, have already been reported in the Results section and will 
not be repeated. However, findings suggest that the RFQ-B (hl) is the most appropriate subscale 
to identify mentalising variations amongst the 3groups.  
Part two of the analysis explored the same hypotheses using the RFQc/u. In order to 
better appreciate the results, the reader is reminded that the questionnaire’s subscales, namely 
the RFQc and the RFQu that tap into opposite dimensions of mentalising: hypermentalising and 
hypomentalising respectively. The reader is also reminded that the subscales share a number of 
questions scored in the opposite direction.  
Given what has just been mentioned, it seems understandable that the three groups 
scored on opposite trajectories on the two subscales, confirming low certainty and high 
uncertainty on mental states. For example, results suggest that the ED_SH group scored lowest 
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on mentalising capacity on the RFQc, implying the lowest certainty about mental states amongst 
the three groups. They were followed by the ED_noSH group that, in turn, scored lower than the 
control group. Correspondingly, results suggest that the ED_SH group scored highest on the 
RFQu, indicating the highest degree of uncertainty about mental states. The ED_SH group was 
followed by the ED_noSH group that scored higher than the control group.  
Given the different dimensions of hypermentalising and hypomentalising that the RFQc 
and the RFQu tap into; given the higher scores that individuals who present with ED_SH report 
on the RFQu, these findings suggest that individuals with ED_SH struggle mostly with 
hypomentalising. It can be argued that this conclusion is in line with current literature that 
describes concrete thinking styles in narratives of individuals who present with ED and SH alike 
(Skarderud, 2007). Indeed, hypomentalising has been defined as extreme difficulty in 
developing complex models of the mind of others and/or the self (Badoud et al., 2015), which 
might explain this client group’s lack of knowledge about mental states and extreme difficulty 
in describing others in terms of mental states. This is also confirmed by the RFQu positive 
correlation to the TAS, the alexithymia scale, implying a link between hypomentalising and 
alexithymia that has also been reported in other functional somatic disorders (FSS; Luyten, 
2011).  
In terms of mentalising dissimilarities, a one way MANOV A reported significant 
differences amongst the three groups. Subsequent statistical tests confirmed significant 
differences amongst the three groups on both the RFQc and the RFQu, therefore finding support 
for the alternative hypothesis HIV -There will be significant differences in mentalising ability 
between individuals who present with ED_no self-harm, individuals who present with ED and 
concurrent SH and a control group. Similarly, when hypothesis HV  was investigated with a 
MANOV A and subsequent univariate ANOV As, results showed support for this, confirming 
that the control group significantly differed on mentalising ability from the ED groups on both 
subscales. L ikewise, hypothesis HV I was supported, with a one way MANOV A reporting 
significant differences between individuals presenting with ED with/without SH. Interestingly, 
this difference was picked up by the RFQu, but not by the RFQc as far as this client group was 
concerned.  
The implications of these findings are substantial as they corroborate data published by 
Badoud et al. (2015) and K uipers, V an Loenhout, van der Ark and Bekker (2016) on the 
relationship between mentalising and SH. Badoud et al., K uipers et al. and the present study 
confirm an association between low mentalising capacity, in particular hypomentalising, and 
SH. Whereas this association was previously reported in a community-based study (Badoud et 
al., 2015), the current study validates K uipers et al.’s results by confirming the relationship 
between mentalising-deficits and SH in a group of individuals presenting with ED 
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symptomatology. The current research further confirms that a history of ED and concurrent 
SHis associated with the lowest levels of certainty and highest degrees of uncertainty about 
mental states, which confirms K uiper et al.’s results. It can be argued that these findings might 
explain the lack of reference to internal states present in narratives of individuals who engage in 
ED and SH behaviours (Skarderud, 2007).  
As discussed previously in the course of this thesis, an important indicator of good 
mentalising is an attitude of curiosity towards mental states, coupled with the awareness of the 
opaqueness of above (Allen & Fonagy, 2007). The literature further suggested that a certain 
degree of certainty on internal consciousness is adaptive (Allen & Fonagy, 2007; Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2007; Badoud et al., 2015). This is also demonstrated by correlations between the 
scores on the RFQc and measures of clinical and psychological variables (Badoud et al., 2015) 
which prompted the authors to argue that where this functional degree of certainty is absent, 
individuals might be more susceptible to SH behaviours. The current study confirms that where 
a functional degree of certainty is not present, individuals may be more likely to resort to ED, as 
well as SH behaviours. In addition, the current research highlights that the presence of both 
behaviours is linked to the deepest hypomentalising deficit.     
Badoud et al. (2015) suggested that the adaptive value of SH as a powerful self-
regulation strategy against overwhelming emotions might be the clue to explain the connection 
between hypomentalising and SH. The authors argued that hypomentalising might prevent 
individuals from engaging in less action-based coping strategies. The present study and the 
available literature on the development of mentalising as discussed in the Introduction section 
might help to shed more light on this point. It has been argued that the developmental tasks of 
agency of the “self” that lead to the emergence of the capacity to mentalise include a 
“teleological” phase in which children understand the world and outcomes only in physical 
terms (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 1997). It can be argued 
that hypomentalising is strictly connected to the teleological phase of development and the 
“teleological mode of functioning” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007), prompting individuals to 
conceive of change only in concrete and physical terms.  
Interestingly, whereas Badaud et al. (2015) reported a significant correlation between 
both the RFQc/RFQu and SH on a community-based sample, the present findings suggest that 
the RFQu only is able to pick up on mentalising differences between the ED_no SH and the 
ED_SH group. It is recognised that the two statistical tests are different. However, this might 
provide some future direction for research as it will be important to explore whether there are 
different factors in action in individuals presenting with ED and SH compared to community-
based individuals and whether the RFQu is a more suitable subscale to use with a clinical 
population.  
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A  further exploration of the RFQu through a discriminant analysis revealed that the 
subscale has a good predictive power as far as eating psychopathology is concerned, as it is able 
to accurately discriminate 89% of individuals who present with ED. This predictive power does 
not seem to be strong as far as predicting SH group membership, even when other variables 
were included in the analysis. These findings suggest that: (a) the RFQu is more discriminating 
than the RFQc in determining SH within the ED group, and (b) that the RFQu can quite reliably 
be used as a screening device to identify those who are not at risk of SH. Where an individual is 
indicated to be at risk by this screening, there is still only a 25 to 30% chance that they will 
engage in SH.  
The last part of the analysis (part 3) explored the relationship between the RFQ and its 
allied concepts. The interaction of the subscales has already been discussed, so it will not be 
repeated here, but the reader is reminded that the RFQc displayed a positive relationship with 
empathy and mindfulness and exhibited a negative relationship with alexithymia, whereas the 
RFQu displayed a positive correlation with alexithymia and a negative correlation with empathy 
and mindfulness. These findings, which confirm previous research conclusions (Badoud et al., 
2015), suggest that hypermentalising is a concept more akin to empathy and mindfulness and 
negatively correlated to alexithymia. It is arguable that in order to create more complex models 
of the mind, which characterises hypermentalising, an individual needs, first of all, to have an 
internal emotional vocabulary. This, in turn, will arguably enable them to recognise and be 
empathic towards others’ internal experiences as well as being mindful of their own.  
Instead, hypomentalising as measured by the RFQu mirrors a lack of attunement and/or 
knowledge of mental states that is linked to the inability to name, recognise and articulate 
mental states (alexithymia). Understandably, this way of being makes it impossible for 
individuals to be mindful of their own internal experiences and makes it very hard to be 
empathic towards others. Interestingly, contrary to initial speculations, none of the subscales 
reported a correlation with the ToM measure. This finding, which confirms previous results 
(Rogoff, 2011; Taylor et al., 2008), might indeed suggest that the RMET and the RFQ rely on 
different cues for understanding emotions. 
Of note, is also the RMET displaying a low internal reliability (Cronbach’s α  = .55). 
Hence, caution should be exercised when interpreting the results. It could be that 
methodological flaws related to the present study might have contributed to these findings. The 
RMET as administered by Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) was presented to participants with a set of 
eyes on each page and a glossary to clarify less commonly used words (i.e., aghast, 
despondent). Instead, the RMET as administered in the current study was the last of the five 
questionnaires and was presented with six set of eyes on each page. No glossary was provided. 
It can be speculated whether participants might have been tired, or might have lost interest, or 
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indeed might have been confused by the number of stimuli on one page, giving as a result less 
accurate answers. 
In order to reflect upon the implications arising from the results of this thesis, the 
Discussion will be divided into several sections. The researcher will consider the issues 
concerning mentalising differences between groups in terms of the theoretical background 
discussed so far. Reflections for this section will include consideration of the claim of 
mentalising being a core difficulty in ED with/without SH, reflections on the specific link 
between ED and SH, as well as contemplation of the possible influence of the wider context on 
the results of this research. Given that the RFQ-54 has now been superseded by the RFQc/u, the 
Discussion will focus only on the latter.  
As well as examining the theoretical implications of the current findings, it is crucial to 
reflect upon the practical implications that have emerged out of this thesis. In this regard, the 
results of this research will be discussed in relation to some contemporary approaches to the 
treatment of ED with/without SH. Eventually, the implications for psychotherapy will be 
considered, including the therapist’s stance, newer specifically-targeted interventions for this 
client group and combinations of older and newer concepts. Concerning the latter point, the 
researcher will reflect upon a suggested transdiagnostical model which places the literature 
discussed and the findings from the present study within a systemic framework (Asen & 
Fonagy, 2012). Ultimately, considerations about the limitations and strengths of the current 
thesis will be addressed, as well as recommendations for future studies. 
T heoretical Implications of Part one: E xploring Differences in Mentalising Ability 
Mentalising as a core difficulty. The results of this study seem to support theoretical 
paradigms that advance the hypothesis that impaired mentalising might be a core issue in EDs 
(Skarderud, 2007; Gillberg et al., 2010; K uipers et al., 2016 ; Rothschild-Y akar, Levy-Shiff, 
Fridman-Balaban, Gur, & Stein, 2010;). Indeed, both clinical groups presented with significant 
lower levels of mentalising ability compared to the general population, supporting Skarderud’s 
claim regarding the possible specific nature of difficulties in eating psychopathology. In 
addition, findings showed that the group with concurrent ED and SH presented with more 
hypomentalising difficulties compared to the ED_noSH group. This result suggests that 
impaired mentalising is an even greater core issue for EDs with concurrent SH.   
Given that mentalising deficits have traditionally been associated with specific 
interpersonal difficulties clustered under the term of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and 
that a diagnostic criterion for BPD is the presence of SH, it could be argued that the group with 
comorbid presentations might be over-represented by individuals who present with features of 
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BPD. Whereas this could have arguably been a confounding variable in the present study, it has 
also been observed that some professionals tend to label “borderline” virtually any client who is 
difficult to deal with and nearly all individuals who engage in self-cutting (L ilienfeld & 
Arkowitz, 2011). Instead, a 2006 study by Nock et al. of hospitalised adolescents who engaged 
in SH suggested that, contrary to widespread assumptions, 48% of the sample did not meet 
DSM criteria for a diagnosis of BPD. 
Furthermore, even though difficulties related to “borderline personality” might be 
present, it can be argued that exploring similarities between ED and BPD, rather than 
concentrating on differences, might enhance understanding of the crucial role that mentalising 
seems to have in both presentations. Indeed, in their conclusion of their review on attachment 
and mentalising in individuals presenting with ED, K uipers and Bekker (2012) recommended 
future research on ED and their relationship with personality disorders’ symptoms and 
diagnoses. Undeniably, more recent and current endevours seem to concentrate on both 
presentations together (K uipers et al., 2016; Marčinko, Jakšić, Skočić, & Franić, 2013; 
Robinson, 2015; Robinson et al., 2014). 
Additionally, the current research findings also appear to address the issue of whether 
clients with a stronger need to control the body, displayed by resorting to both ED and SH 
symptomatology, display lower mentalising capacity. As the reader might appreciate, this seems 
to be the case. The current thesis suggests that the deeper the inability to make sense of one’s 
own and others’ inner experiences and to interpret behaviour according to mental states, the 
more the focus on the body. More specifically, it seems that the more an individual presents 
with difficulties with symbolic representations and abstract thinking, characterised by lower 
mentalising abilities, the more they seem to concentrate their energies on their immediate 
physical world, (i.e. the body). This indeed appears to support Levens’ (2002) claims about a 
lack of a symbolic capacity being evident in this client’s group experience of their own bodies 
and the theoretical notion of the teleological stance of functioning (Fonagy et al., 2001).   
T heoretical implications: T he specific link between E D and SH. An additional 
theoretical implication originated from the current study relates to the recognised existence of a 
link between ED and SH which, as previously mentioned, some researchers had attempted to 
explain with impulse-control difficulties (Lacey & Evans, 1986) whereas others had related it to 
a “repetitive self-mutilation syndrome” (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1993). These theories had 
suggested that multi-impulsivity, characterised by engaging in more than one impulsive 
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behaviour
8
, was responsible for a more severe and treatment resistant symptomatology (Fitcher 
et al., 1994; Lacey & Evans, 1986).  
However, recent evidence suggests that a history of substance misuse, significantly 
predicted lower rather than higher occurrence of SH which seems to contradict the idea that SH 
and substance misuse belong to the same constellation of behaviours regarded as reflecting 
impaired impulse control (Cucchi et al., 2016). Indeed, whereas reflective function correlates 
separately with every impulsive behaviour as described in the literature, or whether the link is 
specific to SH is not known at present and such an issue was beyond the scope of this research. 
Undoubtedly, the relationship between impulsivity and mentalising has not been investigated 
sufficiently and further research on this topic appears to be crucial before conclusions can be 
drawn.  
However, it can be argued that the casting aside of SH as simply an “impulsive 
behaviour”, thrown together in a “melting pot” with several other acts not measured in their 
own right, seems to fail to encapsulate its complexity. For example, principal component and 
factor analyses of the relationship between EDs and SH from a dimensional point of view 
reported the existence of at least a two factors solution. SH loaded on a “compulsive”, as well as 
on an “impulsive” factor
9
 (Favaro & Santonastaso, 1998, 2000, 2002) and it appeared clear that 
not all acts of SH are impulsive; some are indeed more fixated and habitual (Favazza & Simeon, 
1995). Furthermore, it could be argued that “multi-impulsivity theories” fall short of answering 
the question of why the specific link between ED and SH exists.  
The present findings seem to suggest another explanation to account for this link: that 
mentalising might play a role in this relationship (K uipers et al., 2016; Perkins, 2009; 
Skarderud, 2007). Despite agreeing that impulsivity might be a contributing factor in the 
relationship between ED and SH, it can be argued that impulse control, together with the 
capacity to monitor and regulate one’s own emotions, is the product of the development and the 
organisation of the “self”, which in turn is the result of the development of the capacity to 
mentalise (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy et al., 2002).  
In regard to this, Taubner and Curth (2013) related that mentalising acted as a mediator 
between early traumatic experiences and aggression in adolescents. Moreover, Perkins (2009) 
                                                     
 
8
 DSM 5 examples of impulsive behaviours include: self-harm, binge eating, substance misuse, pathological 
gambling/compulsive spending, kleptomania, trichotillomania and compulsive sexual behaviour amongst others 
(APA, 2013).  
9
 Although highly interesting and arguably relevant, the researcher has reluctantly made a pragmatic decision not to 
expand upon this point due to space constriction. The reader is referred to the above references for further 
information.  
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reported that mentalising acted as a mediator of multi-impulsivity in EDs, although she stated 
that the direction of the mediation effect was not clear. Although beyond the scope of this 
project, the outcome of the present study seems to support these findings. Given that by 
definition the group with concurrent ED and SH difficulties engage in more than one impulsive 
behaviour, it is reasonable to suggest that this cohort might be the most impulsive of the three.  
Hence, it seems possible to deduce from the findings that the lower the mentalising function, the 
higher the impulsivity. Whether this negative correlation is relevant, or indeed significant, 
would be worth exploring in future studies.  
A  very important point was raised by Bateman and Fonagy (2007). The clinicians 
suggested that due to a lack of symbolic capacity, which is allegedly taken for granted in 
traditional psychotherapy, individuals with impaired mentalising functions did not benefit from 
traditional approaches. This claim was echoed by K atznelson (2014) who concluded that there is 
evidence to suggest that having an understanding of, and being able to think, in terms of mental 
states and how these affect behaviour, has an impact on people’s ability to engage in 
psychotherapy. In this respect, K atznelson (2014), who reviewed the role of RF as a predictor 
and mediator of change, concluded that that mentalising can change only through approaches 
that specifically focus on the integration of split mind states. Indeed, the current research results 
seem to validate these points by showing no correlation between mentalising and length of 
therapy. These results, which might seem puzzling to start with, become more meaningful if the 
economic and political climate is taken into consideration. 
MBT is a fairly new treatment rarely used for the therapy of individuals who present 
with ED (Balestrieri, Zuanon, Pellizzari, Zappoli-Thyrion, & Ciano, 2015) The relevance of 
mentalising and MBT to ED has only just recently been advanced in the literature, which means 
that MBT is not routinely been offered for eating-related difficulties, especially in the NHS. Of 
note is that, even at a renowned NHS ED centre such as the Maudsley, where MBT treatment 
for eating psychopathologies is allegedly available according to their website (SLaM National 
Services, n.d) the approach is not officially offered due to allocation of resources.  
As a result, it is feasible to presuppose that close to virtually none, or very few, of the 
individuals presenting with ED has had experience of MBT or specifically targeted mentalising-
enhancing treatments. This might help to explain the non significant correlation between 
mentalising and length of therapy and might give support to Skarderud’s (2007) and 
K atznelson’s (2007) claims that recommend that psychological interventions with individuals 
with compromised reflective functions should be specifically focused on the rehabilitation of 
this function. 
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Practical implications of the present study for the current approaches for the 
treatment of E D and SH. Given the current findings, it seems crucial that the presence of SH 
in the ED population is assessed at intake. The same can be argued for people who SH, for 
whom it seems important to assess whether they present with eating symptomatology. However, 
despite Sansone and Sansone (2002) had already emphasised the upmost importance of 
simultaneously assessing SH and ED pathologies, a review of the literature revealed that no 
ED’s assessment tools routinely used in clinical practice were specifically designed to tease out 
direct SH (Sansone & Sansone, 2002). In addition, it seemed that none assessed the combination 
and the complexity of concurrent ED and SH symptomatology (Levitt e al., 2004).  
The lack of a unified assessment tool is reflected in the current approaches offered to 
address the management of SH among individuals who present with ED symptomatology. 
Despite a variety of psychodynamic, interpersonal, dialectical and cognitive/behavioural 
interventions (Levitt et al., 2004), NICE guidelines recommend CBT as the treatment of choice 
for ED and separately for the management of SH. Nevertheless, a systematic review of 
behavioural interventions for BN reported non-significant differences when group CBT was 
compared to Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) (Shapiro et al., 2007). In addition, when individual 
CBT was compared to IPT, the long-term results were poorer for the former (Shapiro et al., 
2007) hence confirming that although CBT can be effective for BN, many still remain unwell 
(McIntosh, Carter, Bulik, Frampton & Joyce, 2011). Instead, when treatments for AN were 
compared across the adult population, a more recent review of clinical trials, practice guidelines 
and emerging interventions confirmed that no specific approach has shown superiority (Watson 
& Bulik, 2013). 
Success rates seem to increase when CBT-E is adopted as a therapeutic model. Fairburn 
et al. (2015) reported remission rates of 65.5% in a BN sample. In addition, Byrne, Fursland, 
A llen and Watson (2011) report a 66.7% success rate in a mix ED sample. However, rates fall to 
53% and 40% when dropouts are taken into consideration (Byrne et al., 2011; Fairburn et al., 
2015), hence confirming the need for further research.  
It is undeniably true that the above-mentioned approaches are diverse and that they 
target different aspects and different meanings of SH. Nevertheless, clinical drop-out rates and 
relapse/recovery percentages suggest that more research is needed. In particular, the present 
study indicates the need to address ED and SH simultaneously when the two presentations occur 
together and the need for the characteristic pre-mentalistic states of mind to be taken into 
consideration when devising interventions.  
More practical implications: T he focus of treatment. Another crucial implication 
derived by this study relates to the current approaches’ focus on reducing the act, reframing it as 
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ego-dystonic and, eventually, eradicating it. This was substantiated by Batemen and Fonagy 
(2004, 2007) who confirmed that in dealing with individuals who present with embodied minds 
and who tend to act, rather than feel, therapists feel compelled to attend to the behaviour, rather 
than to the mind. This attitude is further confirmed by Levitt et al. (2004) who claims that 
gradual exposure to situations and emotional triggers for the SH behaviour is necessary “the 
goal was to extinguish the self-harming reactions through habituation to threatening stimuli”.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that focusing on the act, or indeed, the enactment, can 
have profound negative implications if individuals lack reflective capacity. By moving away 
from a focus on the mind, clinicians might get into a power struggle with their client over the 
need to eat or stop cutting, for example. No-harm and anti-suicide contracts are all too 
unproductive examples of such struggles. Given that there is currently no empirical evidence, 
nor a theoretical or conceptual model to substantiate the use of the former (Drew, 2001; Hyldahl 
& Richardson, 2011), nor of the latter (McConnel-Lewis, 2007; Rudd et al., 2006), it can be 
speculated as to whether practitioners seek these explicit agreements in order to appease their 
own anxiety about risk and to protect themselves from malpractice litigation (McConnel-Lewis, 
2007).  
Hyldahl and Richardson (2011) further argue that clients may not be able to give up 
such an effective coping mechanism and that if these contracts are introduced without a strong 
alliance, they might do more harm than good. This lack of scientific evidence is corroborated by 
K roll’s (2000, as cited in Rudd, Mandrusiak & Joiner, 2006) findings that suggested that 41% of 
clinicians who used no-suicide contracts had clients who died by suicide or made very serious 
attempts while under contract. Additionally, Drew’s (2001) logistic regression analysis reveals 
that patients with no-suicide contracts and with higher levels of restriction had a significantly 
higher likelihood of SH behaviours. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that clients might feel pressurised into agreeing to 
endorse such contracts for fear of losing the support they desperately need. Concerning this, it 
seems essential to consider the implications of statements such as the following: “the patient 
must contract absolute containment of all suicidal impulses. If the patient is unable to do so, we 
supportively invite them to return for future evaluations when they are able to make this 
commitment” (Levitt et al., 2004. p. 127). It can be speculated that statements like these can be 
deleterious and, indeed, damaging to the therapeutic relationship, in that clients might see lying 
and a lack of transparency as the only option not lose the support. It can also be argued that such 
contracts may lead to further shame, secrecy and guilt should clients not be able to honour the 
agreement.  
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Hence, focusing on stopping the behaviour through the use of contracts does not always 
appear to have the desired effect. On the contrary, it can have profound negative implications 
especially if the thinking pattern of individuals who present with impaired mentalising ability is 
considered. It can be speculated whether to be denied the embodiment of emotions could feel 
almost as existential disintegration to people who exist in the teleological mode of functioning. 
Furthermore, to remove the only means that this population has to express their own emotions 
without providing a suitable “grounding”, cannot only be utterly terrifying— it also fails to 
recognise the utmost importance that such behaviours have for the person.  
Starving, bingeing, or indeed cutting is, in the mind of the person who engages in it, far 
from being self-destructive. It is, instead, a cherished and precious coping mechanism (Hyldahl 
& Richardson, 2011). These acts are in the majority of cases “a frantic attempt by someone with 
low coping skills to mother herself [...] a cold but available substitute for the embrace, kiss or 
loving touch she truly desires” (Conterio & Lader, 1998). Individuals are often very 
emotionally attached to such behaviours which are deeply rooted and relied upon. Hence some 
people can, understandably, be very ambivalent, when not overly reluctant to give them up.  
Extreme body control and/or enactment happen when the “self” is poorly integrated and 
mental existence is doubted (Fonagy et al., 2002). Physical pain becomes a way to remind 
oneself that they are alive and to fill in that existential void and emptiness (Gardener, 2001; 
Self-harm, 2008) that is characteristic of pre-mentalistic states of mind. It can be argued that 
withdrawing such a powerful coping mechanism from the person without replacing it with 
something else similarly powerful can place individuals at fear of existential death (Self-harm, 
2008). This can be understood if the reader takes into consideration individuals who exist in a 
teleological mode of functioning: concrete reality becomes the basis for their ability to perceive 
their mental existence. If the possibility of reinstating one’s own sense of self (as one knows it) 
is taken away without appropriate replacement coping skills, it can be argued that the self would 
be perceived to be at risk of complete disintegration. Lastly, it has been suggested that 
clinicians’ emphasis on establishing a causal link between the act and the behaviour can further 
alienate individuals whose capacity for mentalising is poor and whose sense of self-esteem is 
determined by their ability to feel some control over their bodies and their lives (Farber, 1997).  
Practical implications: A summary. It appears that there are several practical and 
clinical implications originating from the current study. For example, it seems imperative that 
clinicians become more aware of the significant relationship between ED and SH and more able 
to identify both difficulties at assessment and throughout treatment. In this regard, given the 
evidence-based political climate in which services are embedded, it might be useful to devise 
valid, specific assessment tools that screen for the presence and the types of concurrent ED and 
SH pathology. At present, the only available unified assessment tools, the Self-Injury Self-
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Report Inventory (SISRI; Levitt et al., 2004) lacks scientific validity and is not routinely used 
with this client-group. As a result, further studies on the validity and reliability of this tool 
should be carried out before drawing any conclusions. Further research should also concentrate 
on the development of alternative combined screening measures.  
A  further implication originating from this study relates to the need to address both 
difficulties concurrently. It can be argued that, being split between services and departments, 
only increases the risk that some of the symptoms might be missed or that clients might get 
caught into the “revolving door phenomenon”, or, indeed, “fall in between services”. From a 
philosophical and theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the separation between services 
mirrors the current underlying Cartesian Dualistic philosophy that permeates treatment 
approaches and interventions. With regards to clients, it can be claimed that being referred on 
and/or signposted to alternative facilities or, indeed, being split between services, can collude 
with the sense of fragmentation they seem to feel inside and that is externalised in the mind 
versus body split. Lastly, following the current findings, it also seems crucial to routinely assess 
mentalising ability, especially in populations considered at risk.  
 
T he Present F indings and T heir Impact on Current T reatment Approaches to the 
Management of SH Behaviour in Individuals Presenting with E D: Dialectical Behavioural 
T herapy (DBT ).  
The above section briefly touched upon some of the implications of the current findings 
upon existing psychotherapeutic approaches to the management of SH in clients presenting with 
ED. Hence, before discussing more in-depth the implications of the present research for 
psychotherapy in general, it might be helpful to consider what was mentioned above in the 
context of current therapeutic enterprises. Of note, is that a full, or even partial, description of 
all the current therapeutic approaches to the treatment of SH in ED is beyond the scope of this 
thesis and, thus, the present section will not expand upon the models. The theoretical concepts 
of the individual treatment-strategies will only be discussed as long as they are related to the 
findings of this project. For more comprehensive and exhaustive information, the reader will be 
referred to specific references. 
 Levitt et al. (2004) stated that DBT could be a useful way to address both ED and SH. 
Being devised for individuals who present with difficulties that have been categorised under the 
term of BPD, DBT has a specific focus on targeting SIB through the dialectic of balancing 
acceptance and change and extreme thoughts and behaviours. It can be argued that the various 
elements of DBT, amongst which individual therapy, skills training components, telephone 
check-in and team consultations, provide added value compared to some of the unidimensional 
approaches mentioned before.  
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Furthermore, given that the conceptual framework of this model, designed to target a 
multitude of complex difficulties, is based on a dialectical vision of the world, ambivalence and 
reluctance towards change and recovery are recognised and accepted as a matter-of-fact. The 
notion of dialectic itself inherently recognises that “reality” encompasses opposing, dynamic 
forces: a thesis and an antithesis. Hence, it is unanimously accepted that learning new skills that 
lead to recovery can feel a threat to one’s own identity and personal integrity, especially when 
these two are maintained by these difficulties (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). This is extremely 
relevant to the population in question, whereby the ED, “the thin-ideal” or, indeed, being a 
“cutter” become one’s own identity.  
This non-judgemental stance in relation to change can, in itself, be extremely powerful 
to abate possible power struggles that might arise in the therapeutic alliance as a result of an 
over-emphasis on stopping the enactment. Furthermore, this attitude appears to be crucial in 
order to foster a positive, compassionate and constructive environment towards change. Indeed, 
an accepting and compassionate standpoint is particularly relevant to the difficulties explored in 
this thesis, as ED and SH is often associated with shame and guilt feelings.  
By adopting an open, non-judgemental, dialectical stance that focuses both on 
ambivalence-validation, as well as behavioural change, clinicians convey the message that that 
ED and SH, for example, are significant, valuable and adaptive coping mechanisms for the 
individual. By combining techniques for emotional regulation, distress tolerance and 
mindfulness practices, DBT addresses one of the core difficulties associated with a lack of a 
mentalising stance, namely affect regulation. Hence, it appears that the model does not only 
concern itself with the elimination of the SH behaviour, but it also acknowledges that this is not 
possible unless other skills are first developed. This can be referred to as the “suitable 
grounding” mentioned in the previous section, whereby it was argued that in order to 
successfully target the means by which this client-group appears to express its own emotions, it 
is crucial to provide alternative ways to deal with overwhelming affect. 
Furthermore, the emphasis and explicit use of the therapeutic alliance as the basis of 
treatment and vehicle of change in its own right addresses another important aspect of the 
client-group taken into consideration: the lack of a “secure base from which to explore the 
world” (Bowlby, 1960). It is arguable that, by highlighting the great importance of the 
therapeutic relationship, DBT somehow attempts to address the early life environment’s failings 
characteristic of these client-groups. Lastly, the use of mindfulness as a core skill endeavours to 
help individuals to balance states of mind and achieve a better synthesis of conflicting emotions.  
Undoubtedly, there are several innovative and effective aspects of this model. However, 
it has been claimed that its underlying philosophical position and view of the world is inherently 
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different from the developmental view of the mentalising theory, which is, instead, informed by 
empirical attachment research (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). The extensive literature reviewed so 
far suggests that in the context of significant mentalising failure and lack of second-order 
representations of internal states, such as those found in the ED and SH population, emotional 
dysregulation comes from an inability to experience a sense of “self” as agentive (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2007; Slade, 2005), rather than by skill deficit.  
More specifically, DBT views the characteristic difficulties with affect regulation as 
arising from mismatches between internal experiences and external responses (the invalidating 
environment). This arguably prevents the child from developing affect-regulation skills. Instead, 
the bulk of research discussed so far argues that affect-regulation difficulties appear to originate 
from a failure in mirroring which causes a breakdown in the progression from primary to 
secondary order representations (Gergely & Unoka, 2008; Fonagy & Target, 1997; Slade, 
2005). Bateman and Fonagy (2007) speak of the inaccessibility of the experience of feeling 
regulated (p. 122), rather than a deficit of regulation. In conclusion, despite the philosophical 
framework of DBT being appealing and, indeed, compassionate and accepting, it can be argued 
that its conceptual basis are less grounded in evidence base compared to the roots of mentalising 
theory. 
A lthough it can be argued that the differences outlined above are more theoretical in 
nature, these consequently translate into practical implications in terms of treatment. The DBT 
philosophy converts into interventions that focus on dialectics, motivational issues and skills-
development. Instead, the current findings suggest that interventions ought to concentrate on the 
exploration of the “self-structure”, on the development of second-order representations 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2007) and on the rehabilitation of the mentalising function (Skarderud, 
2007). Interestingly, current trends in the field of DBT suggest that MBT might provide some 
new and effective moves to DBT (Swenson & Choi-K ain, 2015) which might make it a 
meaningful addition to DBT (Brune, DiMaggio & Edel, 2013).  
Whereas the DBT model concentrated on skills training and behavioural change, the 
present findings suggest the need for more emphasis on interpersonal processes and how these 
might reflect underlying internal processes (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). Indeed, a significant 
lack of a mentalising stance in the population in question arguably advocates the need to 
understand one’s own mind, and one’s own mind in relation to others before practical skills can 
be acquired. It can be speculated that the mechanical application of new coping skills will 
eventually fail if the core issues behind this lack is not addressed appropriately. In addition to 
this, it can be argued that the customary use of contracts, reinforcements and adverse 
contingencies in DBT goes against the understanding of the implications that come from 
functioning in the teleological mode. 
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The literature has emphasised how, lacking an internal emotional vocabulary, 
enactments appear to be the only way this client-group is able to communicate their inner states. 
Hence, it can be imagined how helpful it might be to “punish” someone by discharging them 
from treatment for, for example, failing to maintain the agreed weight, or struggling to stop 
binging, or indeed for engaging in SH. The current findings suggest, instead, that reflecting on 
the message and meaning that the act conveys might be a more compassionate and constructive 
approach.  
Furthermore, it has been argued that severe impairments in mentalising capacity, such 
as those found in the client groups of this research, result in an inability to access one’s own 
mind, especially in times of distress (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). This means both an inability to 
project oneself onto the future and to imagine and reflect on one’s own emotional state in 
different contexts at any given time. Fluctuating mentalising capacity means that an individual 
who agrees to a contract at one point might not have the same competence in a different 
situation. As a result, they might hastily and casually agree without really understanding the 
implications (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). Bateman and Fonagy (2007) warn against draconian 
contracts and they claim that confronting behaviour with behaviour is likely at times to be 
traumatic, rather than therapeutic and the very problems that are the focus of treatment can 
become the same ones that result in discharge.  
Of note, is also the a common underlying phenomenological issue in both individuals 
who present with ED and SH is sensitivity to rejection and fear of abandonment (Bateman & 
Fonagy 2007; Farber, 2007; ; Skarderud, 2007; Steiger & Israel, 1995). It has been largely 
documented in the literature how this client group enters the therapeutic encounter with 
expectations and extreme anxiety that they will be rejected. This was also exemplified in the 
“youtube” video clip (Mentalization Based Treatement- Dr. Bateman, 2012) mentioned in the 
Introduction section of this thesis in which Alice anxiously relates her terror about being “fired” 
by the people who she deems significant. Hence, it appears crucial to reflect on how discharging 
clients for the very problems that they are seeking help might collude with their expectations 
that they will be rejected.  
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Specific T reatment Approaches. Specific T reatment Approaches for the Management of 
Concurrent E D and SH: Integrative Cognitive T herapy (ICT ) and Self-Regulatory 
Approach (SR A).  
In order to address the lack of development of accessible psychological approaches for 
concurrent difficulties, Wonderlich et al. (2002) devised a specific treatment for individuals who 
present with BN and concurrent SH. This model, named ICT, combines elements of CBT in 
regards to the development of core beliefs about the “self” and “others” with the idea that the 
extent of the discrepancies between one’s own cognitions and experience of the “actual self” 
versus the “ideal self” determine the degree of negative affect towards the self, which arguably 
often translates into appearance-related concerns. The model further claims that, in order to 
cope with negative feelings, the person develops dysfunctional coping strategies. Amongst 
those: ED and SH.  
ICT emphasises the role of interpersonal patterns and schemas, emotional reactions and 
cultural factors, which are deemed central by the mentalising theory. Additionally, similarly to 
the literature on reflective function, ICT acknowledges core difficulties around one’s own 
conception of the “self”, albeit not in respect to its development as the other counter-part. In this 
regard, it is significant to note that Phase Three of ICT treatment focuses on affect regulation. 
The ICT approach suggests that, given the strong, often overwhelming emotional reactions that 
this client-group presents with, therapists ought to help clients identify and label confusing 
emotions. This is arguably a highly mentalising stance as evident in current MBT approaches 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2007).  
Furthermore, in the last stages of ICT treatment, the model concentrates on helping 
clients develop an awareness of unhelpful patterns, modify the underlying unconstructive 
beliefs and create new, more functional patterns of relating. This is also partly congruent with a 
mentalising stance and with a mentalising-based focus of treatment. It has been pointed out that 
individuals with poor mentalising capacity tend to show distinctive relationship-patterns which 
are usually repeated in the therapeutic alliance (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). Indeed, an important 
aspect when working with individuals who present with impaired reflective functioning is to 
highlight these patterns as the likely relational context in which difficulties with mentalising 
will occur more predominantly.  
Following what was discussed above, it appears that ICT has some valuable features. At 
the same time though, it can be argued that the model is quite broad. It can be claimed that, 
although it offers an explanation of how the symptoms might arise, it does not address the issue 
of why some individuals develop these particular symptoms, rather than different ones. The 
question of why some people develop ED and/or SH, rather than depression or schizophrenia, is 
137 
 
unanswered. Above all, this treatment is at an early stage of research and currently no evaluative 
studies are available.  
The last enterprise that ought to be reviewed in respect to the current findings is that of 
Levitt et al.’s (2004) study, Self-Regulatory Approach (SRA) to the treatment of concurrent ED 
and SH. A lthough it can be argued that the list of effective approaches has by no means been 
exhausted, the reader is reminded that only treatments that had a direct connection to the 
findings of the current project have been considered. The SRA was chosen because, as 
extensively discussed in the literature review, issues concerning the regulation of affect are 
central to both ED, SH and the literature on mentalising.  
The SRA model focuses on the function of both ED and SH symptoms alike so as to 
provide a sense of control and consistency through self-regulation of affect. Given that the 
approach acknowledges the adaptive value of the symptoms, their elimination is not SRA 
explicit focus of treatment. Instead, it is accepted that clients will make therapeutically 
unpopular decisions, including continuing to SH for extensive periods of time whist in treatment 
(Levitt et al., 2004). A key element of the interventions is, instead, the therapeutic relationship, 
which is seen as crucial in order for clients to experience a sense of empowerment, competency 
and mastery.  
The therapist ought to continuously empower the individual to make choices and to 
accept responsibilities, rather than to simply react to affective states. To this effect, the concept 
of “position” is employed. Similar to Cognitive Analytical Therapy’s (Ryle, 1990) notion of 
reciprocal roles, the notion of “position” encourages clients to become aware of whether they 
take up the role of a “victim” who has no control, or whether they behave as a “survivor”. The 
latter holds responsibility. Nevertheless, although attention for interpersonal dynamics is indeed 
a crucial aspect of any effective approach, the findings of the current project suggest that this 
might not be so straightforward with individuals who present with impaired mentalising ability. 
The concept of reciprocal roles entails that one has a symbolic representation of one’s 
own/someone else’s mind and that the individual has the ability to “play” with those concepts.  
Another critique of the SRA model relates to the concept of responsibility, which is 
reportedly clearly defined at the beginning of treatment for both client and therapist (Levitt et 
al., 2004). Despite acknowledging the importance of this point, it can be argued that the 
literature discussed so far seems to advocate that the notion of responsibility for one’s own 
actions cannot easily be conceived by people who operate in the pretend mode of functioning.  
Lastly, similar arguments to the ones advanced when discussing DBT’s skill training 
should also be considered. It is universally accepted that individuals who present with ED and 
SH struggle with affect regulation. However, it is arguable that teaching self-regulating skills 
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without truly addressing this deficit’s core issues would not have a long-term impact. So, 
although this model can be praised for its compassionate and de-pathologising stance, and for its 
perspective that the client is ultimately seen as the expert, it appears to overlook the core issues 
behind ED and SH.  
To summarise, it can be argued that the above approaches, although perhaps effective 
with individuals with a normal capacity to think and reflect on mental states, fail to take into 
consideration this client group’s difficulties with mentalising. The above approaches, and 
traditional psychotherapies at large, assume that individuals are able to hold symbolic 
representations of internal states, which is impossible for individuals who lack the ability to 
mentalise. This is clearly explained by the developmental theory of the “self”. In addition, the 
ability to contemplate upon and integrate both one’s own and the therapist’s (or others’) 
representation of reality is a key element of the above therapeutic approaches. However, the 
literature suggests that integration cannot be achieved without the capacity to mentalise.  
These speculations are corroborated by several studies that report virtually no increase 
in RF following DBT, supportive psychotherapy (Levy et al., 2006), CBT, brief psychodynamic 
psychotherapy (BPDT); K arlsson & K ermott, 2006) and psychodynamic treatment for BPD 
(V ermote et al., 2010). Shockingly, mentalising was even found to decrease in IPT (K arlsson & 
K ermott, 2006) and in short-term psychodynamic treatment SPT (Balestrieri et al., 2015). The 
only approach that seems to have a positive impact on mentalising is Transference-focused 
Psychotherapy (Levy et al., 2006), although it has been suggested that the positive results might 
be due to the latter study used the AAI as its instrument to measure mentalising. K atznelson 
(2014) argues that the AAI captures more stable-traits of RF, rather than the more state-sensitive 
aspects that are disrupted by the activation of the attachment system.   
Implications for Psychotherapy 
The current findings confirm that individuals with concurrent ED and SH difficulties 
report more severe impairments in mentalising ability, symbolic capacity and abstract thinking 
than individuals with ED only (K uipers et al., 2016) and control. It emerges that there are 
several implications for a lack of a reflective function, symbolisation and abstract thinking. One 
of these is the concretisation of inner life, exemplified by a rigid, often inflexible focus on the 
physical world and tangible, concrete acts (Levens, 2002).  
Lacking the capacity for symbolic representation and abstract thinking, emotional states 
become concretised, controlled and managed through the body. The body is not perceived as a 
metaphor, capable of symbolic communication, but rather as concrete reality (Levens, 2002; 
Skarderud, 2007). It follows that even intangible aspects of inner life such as mental states, 
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emotions, ideas, as well as relationships are de-symbolised and a direct link between those and 
the body is developed. As there is rigidity in terms of thinking processes, there is also rigidity 
and inflexibility in terms of tolerance for alternative perspectives (Fonagy et al., 2002) which 
translate into a deep struggle to conceive of others’ viewpoints as different from one’s own.  
The last core consequence for a lack of a reflective capacity is the tendency to regard of 
one’s own actions as inconsequential. Blair (1995) warns that “even when someone can 
intellectually conceive of the impact of his or her actions on another person, this may be felt as 
meaningless, empty of emotional conviction”. As already discussed in the section “Pre-
mentalistic states of mind in ED and SH”, these core implications seem to have profound 
implications for the therapeutic encounter and for the clients’ ability to engage in “story-making 
and story-breaking” (Holmes, 1999). It also appears to have crucial implications for people’s 
ability to experience mentalised affectivity and, hence, to truly benefit from the process of 
therapy. 
A lthough it has been argued that acceptance of this model does not imply a complete 
change in psychological approaches for the majority of clients, it has also been highlighted the 
importance of reappraising techniques for clients who show the developmental failures 
described in this thesis (Fonagy et al., 2002). It has been argued that the effectiveness of 
traditional psychotherapy depends on an individual’s ability to consider and appreciate the 
difference between their own mental and affective states and their representation by the 
therapist (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Hence, it appears that an initial specific focus on the 
rehabilitation of mentalising function is crucial in order to avoid the inherent iatrogenic effects 
of current practice and to allow clients to benefit from the therapeutic process.  
For example, one can also speculate on the usefulness of interventions that challenge 
maladaptive beliefs and cognitions with a population that often exists in the psychic mode of 
functioning. Similarly, one can wonder about the efficacy of interventions that conceptualise 
reciprocal roles, yet fail to consider the underlying reasons behind the struggle to develop 
cognitive, behavioural and affective flexibility. Or, yet again, the same can be said about routine 
interventions that focus on symptom-reduction. It is maintained that unless therapeutic 
approaches specifically target the lack of symbolisation and abstract thinking which is derived 
by the need for the development of stable mental representations and a stabilisation of the 
“self”, they might largely be ineffective or produce short lived, illusory changes (K arlsson & 
K ermott, 2006; Levy et al., 2006; V ermote et al., 2010). 
In addition to this, it has been argued that there are serious consequences if therapists 
assume that this client-group have cognitive capacities that they simply do not have (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2007). As a result, clinicians ought to be aware of the possible iatrogenic effects of the 
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use of metaphors, complex interpretations, focus on conflict and content when working with 
clients with impaired mentalising capacity (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). For example, it has been 
argued that a person who struggles to recognise their inner experiences cannot benefit from 
being told that they feel angry. Such a comment, which will not be recognised by the recipient, 
will possibly be perceived as persecutory and patronising and will only add to the person’s 
confusion and instability (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). 
In addition, it has been argued that all of the above techniques “assume the ability to 
hold different mental representations in different forms at the same time” (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2004)). More specifically, it has been argued that metaphors and interpretations might mislead 
clinicians whose clients function in the Pretend mode into erroneously believing that therapy is 
progressing well. Whilst apparently seeming receptive to the interpretations offered, individuals 
who function in the pretend mode will have stripped them off of any emotional connotation and 
involvement (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). In regard to this, evidence suggests that the 
therapeutic process appears to be productive only when there is mentalised affectivity (i.e. when 
the link between cognitions and emotional experiences is strong) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). 
Hence, it is arguable that the use of the above techniques with clients who operate in the Pretend 
mode will necessary fail to precipitate any meaningful progression in the therapeutic process 
and any meaningful change in the client’s life.  
Arguably, the opposite can also happen. Desperately searching for meaning and 
significance to a life that is experienced as meaningless, individuals who operate in the Pretend 
mode might unconditionally internalise the therapist’s suggestions even if they do not fit with 
their experiences (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). The results can be the further development of the 
alien “self” and the precipitation of more enactments and externalising behaviours in an attempt 
to project the incongruent and unwanted aspects of the alien “self”. A  similar unhelpful outcome 
has been argued to be fostered by the classical psychoanalytic stance of the “blank screen”, 
which might bring about more aggressiveness and paranoid anxiety. It can be argued that, as the 
therapist willingly withholds any reaction, the person with impaired mentalising capacity might 
interpret this as a cold, rejecting and unsympathetic attitude (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). 
Further Implications for Psychotherapy: the T herapist’s Stance 
 It is axiomatic to discuss about the therapeutic process in terms of non-specific factors 
common to all psychological models. Indeed, warmth, genuineness, unconditional acceptance 
and empathy are the core of any given healing clinical encounter. However, in order to fully 
appreciate the clinical implications of the current research for the client-group in question, it is 
important to reflect upon their early environment. Early life experiences of individuals 
presenting with impaired mentalising capacity appears, at the best of time, to be characterised 
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by the lack of a reliable other, capable of congruently representing the infant’s internal states. At 
worst, their background appears to be characterised by an upbringing in which thinking about 
feelings and intentions was not safe for the infant.  
As a result, it has been argued that a crucial, first step for clinicians working with 
individuals with impaired mentalising ability is to create a working environment in which 
thinking about emotions and mental states feels safe (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). Marcinko et 
al. (2015) echo this by stating that the optimal therapeuthic alliance ough to improve 
mentalising in a secure attachment relationship. Whereas this might appear simple and 
primitive, research discussed so far has suggested that the inherent difficulties of individuals 
who present with impaired mentalising abilities tend to cause them to distort their subjective 
experiences. Consequently, it can be very difficult for this client-group to find their own mind in 
the mind of someone else, if adjustments to therapists’ working styles are not made.  
Furthermore, in addition to this, it also appears that this client-group’s interpersonal 
difficulties make them intensely vulnerable to being drawn to and prone to promote social 
environments that reinforce the alien part of the “self” that they desperately wish to get rid of. 
Hence, if projective identifications and enactments are not understood and withstood by the 
therapist and unhelpful reciprocal roles are recognised, a safe and stimulating environment that 
fosters the development of a mentalising stance cannot be achieved. In this regard, Bateman and 
Fonagy (2007) suggested that it is the experience of being understood that fosters that sense of 
security that creates the necessary basis for affect exploration. The researchers claimed that it is 
the therapist’s role to encourage this by continuously trying to identify and label mental states. 
Using active questioning and constantly monitoring whether their observations are 
relevant and accurate to the client’s internal state, therapists ought to adopt a “not knowing 
stance” (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992). This position, which implies a curious, playful and 
naive attitude, ought to translate into open and genuine inquiring with the aim of learning from 
the client. A  not-knowing stance arguably communicates that mental states are blurred and 
ambiguous and that the therapist cannot know what is in the client’s mind anymore that they 
can. Ultimately a not knowing stance conveys humility on the part of the therapist whose initial, 
primary role is arguably to provide that congruent, yet marked mirroring that appears to have 
been missing from this client-group’s early years.  
It seems crucial that the clinician develops, constructs and deconstructs images of the 
client’s mind that are congruent enough to the client’s emotional states to be related by the 
client to their own experiences. At the same, it appears imperative that these representations are 
different enough from the client’s internal states to foster the understanding that these are 
tentative, alternative perspectives. It has been argued that by accepting the client’s enactments 
142 
 
whilst failing to collude with the client’s projective identifications, the mentalising therapist 
remains close to the client’s true mental states, which he consistently ought to try to recognise 
and verbalise (Fonagy et al., 2002). 
It is arguably through this process of “recognition”, during which the client might come 
to experience themselves as a thinking and feeling being for the first time ever, that they will 
eventually come to develop and, in time, to reinforce a secure IWM. It is also arguably through 
the therapist’s mirroring and mentalistic stance that continuously creates and recreates mental 
representations that, over time, the client will be able to consolidate a coherent sense of “self” 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2007; Gergely & Watson, 1996). The literature has further suggested that, 
as the person experiences themselves as a coherent putative being, their capacity for reflective 
function and their curiosity about the Other’s mind will also increase (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2007). 
As discussed before, it has been argued that a coherent sense of “self” is crucial for an 
individual’s ability to reflect upon the “self” and the object and for the development of a 
symbolic capacity. Indeed, it appears that it is the latter that allows the arrangement of different 
representations of “selves” into an organised, coherent and meaningful narrative (K arterud & 
Bateman, 2011).  
Given what has been considered so far, it can be argued that the more severe the 
mentalising impairment, the more important and through the focus on the rehabilitation of this 
function ought to be. It has been suggested that individuals with impaired mentalising capacity 
are particularly vulnerable to the iatrogenic effects of psychotherapy that activate the attachment 
system (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). In this regard, the reader is reminded that psychotherapy is 
inherently designed to stimulate the attachment system. Furthermore, although it is true that the 
majority of mental difficulties involve some sort of negative evaluation, it is also true that 
individuals with a compromised reflective function, who live in the psychic mode, experience 
those negative evaluations with the full force of reality (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004).  
Mentalization-Based-T herapy 
Skarderud (2007b) warns that it is only through the process of development of an 
interpretive capacity that concretised metaphors can progress into linguistic ones (Searles, 1962; 
Shaly, 1987, as cited in Skerderud, 2007b). Hence, it can be hypothesised that it is only through 
the symbolic growth of the capacity to conceive of mental states and to reflect upon those that 
enactments will cease to fulfil their function. Otherwise, it can be speculated that clinicians will 
only continue to see symptoms-substitution or short-term improvements. The correspondent 
mentalistic therapeutic stance has, more recently, been systematically organised around a 
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therapeutic approach called Mentalisation-based Therapy (MBT) (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, 
2007). A full description of the model is beyond the scope of this project and the reader is 
referred to the above authors for a comprehensive account of MBT’s features and treatment 
focus. However, for unanimous understanding, few core underlying elements will be 
highlighted.  
The model, whose primary goal is the exploration of the person’s mind, aims to increase 
an individual’s ability to understanding their own and others’ mental states. Although it is 
arguable that most psychotherapies do that, MBT differentiates itself for its specific focus on the 
enhancement of mentalising itself and for its attention to other’s mental states, as well as one’s 
own (Skarderud, 2007). Clinicians are encouraged to keep their focus on the affect at all times, 
rather than on the behaviour and to target the immediacy of the moment in a way that the client 
can connect to subjective “reality”. This would diminish the risk of operating in the pretend 
mode of functioning. The focus is on creating a dialogue, which identifies emotions and places 
them in context. Attention is given to the mental state and how the mind struggles to understand 
itself. In this context, the link between the affect and the action, although implied, is not 
explicitly addressed early in therapy. Had the individual been able to make this connection, or 
indeed to talk about the emotional state, or the meaning behind the enactment, they might have 
not needed to do it (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007).  
It can be argued that maintaining this therapeutic stance throughout treatment will 
eventually enable the client to develop a mental representation of their own inner experiences. 
Developing a symbolic capacity will arguably allow the client to move away from the physical 
to the more abstract realm of reality and will debatably reduce the confusion and the loss of 
control that the individual may feel when faced with strong affect. It can also be hypothesised 
that this, in turn, will reduce the need for mental states to be managed through the body. The 
literature reviewed suggests that emotional states, will, in time, be recognised and differentiated 
from those of others, included those of the therapist (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). This will 
arguably foster the awareness of existing as a separate being, with inner and outer boundaries.  
Despite the approach having been traditionally and successfully associated with the 
treatment of BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999, 2008, 2009, 2013), it has more recently been 
suggested and applied to the care of ED as well (A llen et al., 2008; Balestrieri et al., 2015; 
Robinson et al., 2014; Skarderud, 2007). It is arguable that a model developed for a specific 
clinical population cannot simply be used for the treatment of another population and, indeed, 
adaptations have been made to the original protocol. At the same time, due to phenomenological 
similarities between individuals presenting with ED and individuals presenting with SH, as well 
as the significant comorbidity between the pathologies, it might be useful to think 
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transdiagnostically. In particular, it has been suggested that it appears to be crucial to focus on 
the concept of “embodiment”: the embodied mind and the embodied body (Skerderud, 2007). 
A lthough in its early stages of development, research on Mentalisation based therapy 
for Eating Disorders (MBT-ED) has grown and expanded in a multi-centre project in Norway 
(Skarderud, 2012) and in one of the leading clinical centres for the management and research of 
ED in London (South London and Maudsley NHS, 2011). In addition, Robinson et al. (2014) 
have undertaken a randomised controlled trial investigating the use of MBT-ED for the 
treatment of ED complicated by symptoms of BPD. A lthough analysis on the data collected by 
the NOURISHED study is continuing, preliminary results suggest that MBT-ED reduced BPD 
symptoms and that the approach reduced some ED symptoms such as weight and shape 
concerns more that Specialist Supportive Clinical Management (SSCM-ED) (Robinson, 2015). 
These positive results are further confirmed by Balestrieri et al. (2015) who concluded that, 
when compared to a psychodynamic-oriented well-established treatment for ED, both 
treatments led to considerable improvements. At the same time, the MBT-ED group had slightly 
less drop-out rates athough this difference was not statististically significant.  
T hinking T rans-diagnostically: Older and Newer Therapeutic E nterprises. 
The literature has suggested that the infant’s experience of an inter-personal exchange 
in which they find their own mind in the mind of the caregiver is fundamental in order for the 
growing child to experience separateness and to develop its own identity. In this model, a key 
idea seemed that of “feedback”, how first-order representations looped back into the interaction 
in order to create secondary-order representations. The notion of feedback loops also seems to 
be crucial in the therapeutic alliance.  
Not only the therapist continuously creates representations of the client’s mental states 
and “gives them back” in ways that are tolerable for the client to bear. Above all, the clinician 
ought to model reflectiveness (Bateman & Fonagy, 2007). For example, the mentalising 
clinician ought to use direct and indirect feedback from the client, as well as other relevant 
information, in order to assess their understanding of the client’s experiences. As a result of this 
new information, their insight might develop, or indeed change altogether. Bateman and Fonagy 
(2007) emphasise the importance for the clinician to make this last point explicit with the client 
in an attempt to demonstrate that having one’s mind changed by another mind is constructive 
and developmental, rather than humiliating.  
 
The notion of feedback as described by Gergely and Watson (1996) has reminiscences 
of ideas derived from cybernetics, the study of how information-processing systems are self-
regulating, controlled by feedback loops (Weiner, 1961 as cited in Dallos & Draper, 2005). 
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Indeed, it has been suggested that first-order representations loop back into the interaction in 
order to create secondary-order representations and that the therapist’s reflectiveness allows 
them to use the information gathered from the client in order to update their understanding. 
Hence, it seems appropriate to compare these concepts to the cybernetics’ notion of feedback 
loops as the mechanisms through which information is returned to the system and exerts an 
influence on it (Family Solutions Institute, n.d.). Cybernetics’ concepts, initially driven by 
military applications in the Second World War, soon unfolded and were swiftly applied to 
family communication patterns (Bateson, 1972) under an umbrella-term of “systemic therapy”. 
In this regard, the recent literature has confirmed that links between mentalising and systemic 
principles are obvious (Asen & Fonagy, 2012; Donovan, 2014) and mentalisation-based 
treatment for familes (MBT-F) has now become a well-established therapeutic approach.    
For example, systemic approaches highlight the interpersonal nature of problems, which 
is in keeping with the inter-subjective viewpoint of mentalising theory. In addition, systemic 
approaches focus on the larger context in which symptoms usually develop. This can be a 
family, or significant others, or the larger context that is seen as part of the solution, rather than 
the “problem”. Given the bulk of information on attachment issues and the inter-personal nature 
of ED and SH difficulties, systemic principles seem particularly relevant to this discussion and 
they appear to complement the propositions of the developmental theory of the self and the 
literature on mentalising. Whereas the latter two address the origins of mentalising difficulties 
and an initial focus of treatment, the former offers important contributions. 
 In particular, Boscolo and Bertrando (2002) highlight few reference points which 
appear to be relevant when working with individuals presenting with ED and SH. Among those 
are the notion of attachment, belonging, space, power, gender and time. The notion of 
attachment has been extensively covered. Indeed, it is universally agreed that if someone 
presents with an ED and SH, they did not form sufficiently healthy attachments in order to build 
trust and self-reliance and did not achieve an adequate balance between dependency and 
separation needs (Lemberg, 1999; Levitt et al., 2004; McAndrew & Warne, 2005; Suyemoto, 
1998). In addition, it can be argued that a major task for individuals presenting with AN in 
particular, is to develop a sense of belonging by negotiating separateness and individuality with 
a secure attachment. This will arguably allow the person to feel separate, yet connected within 
their own personal space.  
Indeed, the notion of personal space is highly significant for the population of this 
study, in that issues of proximity and distance are crucial in individuals who present with ED 
(Boscolo & Bertrando, 2002) and in individuals presenting with SH (Farber, 1995). These 
issues are also inextricably connected to the notion of attachment. Indeed, when a person feels 
safe within a secure attachment and within one’s own personal space, they have no need to use 
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dysfunctional power to control their distance from others, either by keeping them away, or by 
developing an enmeshed relationship. Power in healthy relationships can be relinquished 
because the individual knows that they are safely attached. 
Closely related to the notion of power is the concept of gender. Gender ought not only 
to be taken into consideration for the higher incidence and prevalence of ED and SH in the 
female population. Instead, it can be argued that the concepts of belonging, space, power and 
gender ought to be contemplated within a post-modernist, systemic framework. This emphasises 
the dilemma and power struggles that some individuals (especially women) experience in 
society as a result of the traditional “pull” to belong to conventional roles and responsibilities 
against the more recent “push” towards newer identities
10
.    
Lastly, the notion of time as described by Boscolo and Bertrando (2002) has also been 
widely used in psychology to explain mental distress as a loss of coordination of temporal 
paradigms. Whereas it can be argued that people who present with depressive symptoms tend to 
be projected towards the past, it can be suggested that people who display features of anxiety 
live perpetually in the future. Instead, time can be said to be split in psychosis, or fixed in post-
traumatic disorders (Boscolo & Bertrando, 2002). In this regard, it has been argued that the 
difficulties associated with AN can also be regarded as a break-down of the harmonic 
development of time. In particular, these issues have been linked to “the slowing-down in the 
tempo of individual development” (Boscolo & Bertrando, 2002, p. 96).  
Following these reflections and proposed associations of ED and SH to “transitional 
objects” (Farber, 1997; Favazza & Conterio, 1988) and substitutes for the comfort and the 
soothing that was not available from others, the current researcher wonders whether it is 
possible to interpret a SH act, or indeed a binge, or a purge, as being stuck in a particular 
moment in time. Namely, the time that Fonagy et al. (2002) describe as a pre-symbolic. 
The effectiveness of systemic therapy for the management of ED in adolescents was 
recently confirmed in a review (Carr, 2009, 2014). In addition, the idea of clinically combining 
the theory and the clinical roots of mentalising and systemic principles has recently been 
advanced and applied in therapeutic settings by Fonagy et al. (n.d) in Mentalization-Based 
Treatment for Families (MBT-F) and by Midgley and V rouva (2012). The former approach, 
previously known as Short-Term Mentalization and Relational Therapy (SMART) (Fearon et 
                                                     
 
10
 The researcher is aware that she is not doing justice to the multitude of crucial issues arising as a result of these 
reflections. Matters such as that of classism, sexism, racism, dominant ideologies in society and their impact on the 
social structure and the environment are at the forefront of the researcher’s philosophical and clinical outlook. 
However, due to space constriction, pragmatic choices had to be made as to what to discuss. Nevertheless, this does 
not reflect the researcher’s priorities. 
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al., 2007), is currently a working process displaying encouraging significant outcomes (Asen & 
Fonagy, 2012). MBT-F emphasises the importance of including significant others in the process 
of therapy, whether conjointly, or separately. Given the interpersonal nature of ED and SH, this 
seems particularly important. 
Regarding this, the literature revealed that adolescents ED treatments that encourage 
parents’ participation are the most effective, even if the significant others are not in the same 
room with the young person (Cottrell & Boston, 2002). Moreover, extensive empirical evidence 
supports the utmost importance of healthy social networks for the long-term recovery of 
individuals who present with psychological difficulties (Leff & V aughn, 1985; Rabstejnek, 
n.d.). As a result of these findings, it seems important to involve significant others in treatment, 
especially when working with young people who appear to be over represented in the 
population of this study. Indeed, the utmost importance of the larger environment was further 
pointed out by Suyemoto (1998) in his “environmental model of self-harm”. 
Lastly, it can be argued that the need to adopt a “Bio-Psycho-Social approach” (Engel, 
1980) to the understanding and treatment of mental distress should be augmented by a similar 
attention to the cultural, political and economic context in which the individual is embedded. 
Truly, individuals are extremely complex presentations which can also be described as social, 
political, ethical beings, as well as biological and psychological (Larner, 2004). In this regard, to 
claim that personal, relational and contextual factors such as culture, gender, narrative and 
family are irrelevant because not amenable to prediction and control ignores what is real in 
people’s lives, a stance that is not curious or scientific (Larner, 2004). 
 
Importance of the current findings for Counselling Psychology. While it is arguable 
that the current findings have significant implications for psychology at large, this thesis has 
important implications for the field of Counselling Psychology in particular. The recent interest 
of the Counselling Psychologist journal on the issue of EDs and its encouragement to deepen a 
working knowledge of these disorders has already been mentioned. In addition, a current article 
published in the Counselling Psychology Review emphasises the need for Counselling 
Psychology to join in to wider research areas and to be mindful of challenges and opportunities 
presented by the current and future economic climate (V ermes, 2014).  
V ermes (2014) speculates on the requirements that will allow the discipline to flourish 
in the future and argues that “it’s time to bring down some of our outdated professional fences 
[...] and think bigger”. She encourages doctoral programmes to engage in multi-site, long term, 
larger studies and to seek collaboration, team work and project developments with other mental 
health professionals. The present researcher argues that this study meets these criteria by sharing 
its data with a larger, worldwide project for the validation of the RFQ. By co-operating with 
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leading experts on the field of psychoanalysis, attachment, psychiatry and so-forth, the current 
findings position themselves and Counselling Psychology on the cutting edge of contemporary 
challenges and opportunities. Moreover, the present thesis will arguably introduce a Counselling 
Psychology perspective to state of the art enterprises.  
Furthermore, it is arguable that this thesis offers significant contributions to the field 
because it places itself in the context of “blending leading-edge qualitative methodologies into 
big-time quantitative endeavours” (V ermes, 2014) as it supports significant qualitative findings 
from the discipline (Spivack & Willig, 2010). The literature reviewed so far and the current 
findings seem congruent with the reports from Spivack & Willig’s (2010) study in which 
participants reported a split sense of self. In line with the current results that support the 
presence of pre-mentalistic states of mind in individuals who present with ED, the participants 
describing their inner world as “surreal, confused and confusing” (Spivack & Willig, 2010). 
Above all, the partakers’ accounts that therapy was too focused on the body, but not the mind, 
are in line with what suggested so far.  
Lastly, this study offers significant contributions to Counselling Psychology because it 
meets the core principles of the field as described by Cooper (2009). Moreover, by advocating a 
transdiagnostical approach in which power and other wider factors are taken into account, the 
post results recommendations fit in with Counselling Psychology’s social justice agenda that 
advocates empowerment of the individual, as well as active confrontation of injustice and 
inequalities (K agen et al., 2011). This point and all the others mentioned above are arguably 
significant contributions to the field.  
L imitations and strengths of the study. 
Recruitment and sampling. The researcher had originally planned to recruit 
participants awaiting treatment at a renowned NHS site specialised in treating individuals with 
ED. The choice to target people prior to therapeutic interventions was made in order to reduce 
any possible confounding effect of therapy on mentalising. Nevertheless, following difficulties 
recruiting enough participants and following reflections on the literature that confirm that 
engaging individuals with EDs in research can be problematic (Tierney et al., 2010) and that 
extending recruitment possibilities is an option (McDermott et al., 2004), a pragmatic decision 
was made with the research supervisor to extend the recruitment process also to individuals 
already in treatment. It was also decided to start recruiting through other avenues. Hence, ED 
charities and associations were approached. However, when recruiting through the NHS, 
screening according to the inclusion/exclusion criteria was thorough. Instead, when individuals 
completed the survey online, the researcher had less control over initial screening.  
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As a result, 15 people who completed the test online did not meet the SCOFF threshold 
and had to be excluded from the analysis. It is questionable whether they did not meet the 
screening baseline was due to their not having an ED. Bearing in mind that anyone who feels 
that they struggle with eating-related difficulties can access support through the associations, 
another possibility might be that these people suffered from eating-related psychopathology, but 
not severely enough to warrant detection according to the criteria used for this specific study. 
Furthermore, the SCOFF, used to screen for EDs addresses core features of AN and BN 
(Morgan et al., 2000). It is questionable whether the participants who did not meet the SCOFF 
threshold presented with other ED, such as BED, OSFED or UFED, which might have not been 
detected.  
Indeed, people with the latter eating psychopathologies display less severe symptoms 
than individuals who present with AN or BN. A lthough the researcher opted on the side of 
caution, hence excluding these participants, it can be argued that the heterogeneity of the sample 
within the general diagnostic criteria of EDs might have been compromised. Should this be the 
case, then it can be argued that the current study might not have shed light on mentalising 
abilities of all individuals suffering from eating related difficulties. Furthermore, although this 
cannot be guaranteed for the online sample, it is important to highlight that in the NHS one, 
those with more severe symptoms and in-patients were not approached due to ethical issues.  
  Another issue worth considering in relation to the sample is the nature of the study 
itself and that recruitment was carried out mainly through the internet and that participation was 
entirely voluntarily. Whereas it is absolutely imperative that people are not pressurised to take 
part in research, it is important to reflect on that this might have impacted on the typology of the 
participants, creating a sampling bias. Indeed, the nature and length of the questionnaire might 
have attracted people who were interested in the subject, who were more psychologically 
minded, as well as those whose psychopathology might not have been as severe. Furthermore, 
because recruitment happened mainly online also meant that all those individuals who do not 
typically use the web have been precluded from taking part.  
Worth noting is also that nine people had to be excluded from the control group due to 
scoring above the SCOFF threshold for detection of ED. One explanation for this might be that 
eating psychopathology is more common in the general population than was considered. 
Another explanation could be, instead, the false-positive rate of 12.5% found in the literature 
(Morgan et al., 2000).  
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Measures. Issues around the choice of the RQF as a not-fully validated measure have 
already been discussed in the method section and will not be repeated here. However, another 
issue worth mentioning includes the RFQ scores measure both a person’s ability to mentalise, 
but also an individual’s insight into their ability to mentalise. One can speculate whether insight 
might vary across different conditions and severity of psychological difficulties. Indeed, the 
literature has often reported that emaciation and the severity of AN, or indeed personality 
disturbances, can be associated with poor psychological insight (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 
Greenfeld, Anyan, Hobart, Quinlan, & Plantes, 1990).  
Whether this might have affected individuals’ responses and subsequent performance 
on the test is worth bearing in mind when conducting future research. Moreover, the issue of 
psychological insight is extremely pertinent when talking about mentalising. Whereas some 
vulnerable individuals might ordinarily display adequate levels of mentalising, this capacity 
appears to collapse in the face of stress, especially attachment stress (A llen et al., 2008; 
Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). It is worth considering that in this particular study, stimuli were 
administered outside any controlled therapeutic intervention related to the research. Hence, one 
can wonder whether in different circumstances, especially those that stimulate and intensify 
attachment emotions and the attachment-system, participants might have performed differently. 
It has also been questioned whether mentalising abilities might actually change on the basis of 
whether the emotion mentalised is positive, negative, or neutral (Rogoff, 2011).  
Further, some authors have argued that the theoretical framework in which mentalising 
is embedded is not yet to be seen as a fully developed theory (L iljenfors & Lundh, 2015). 
Instead, the authors emphasise the ongoing development of this framework, and emphasised 
that, at the present stage, the theory of mentalising should not be expected to be complete and 
free from inconsistencies. A  discussion on inconsistencies and points that deserve further 
consideration in the mentalising theory has already been presented in the critical appraisal 
review and will not be repeated here. The reader is referred to that section for a reminder. 
In addition, one can retrospectively reflect on whether a different, more thorough scale 
for assessing eating psychopathology might have been more appropriate, especially in the light 
of expanding recruitment strategies. Indeed, the choice of using the SCOFF was based on the 
initial idea that recruitment would have taken place in ED specialist units where people present 
with formal diagnoses. To change measure once the study had started would have been 
unfeasible within the constraints of this study. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether the choice of 
a different, more robust screening measure would have shed light on and made a difference to 
the number of participants that have been excluded by the analysis. 
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Additionally, the question added to screen self-harmers, “During the past week have 
you deliberately hurt yourself [...]” also deserves consideration. The strict temporal criteria set 
(the past week) might have precluded the inclusion of many self-harmers who nevertheless had 
not engaged in SH within the previous week. Hence, a broader inclusion criterion, such as three, 
or six months, would have perhaps been more appropriate and increased the SH sample size.  
Lastly, the choice of self-reported measures is in itself a limitation to any study as it can 
be argued that these might not be as accurate as objective tests. Tiredness, interest, bias, 
commitment, social desirability effect, amongst many other factors can affect individuals’ 
responses. In this regard, the length of the questionnaire might have precluded some individuals 
from taking part. Instead, the “social desirability affect” was addressed by the RFQ through the 
use of polarised, reversed and median scoring questions. Ultimately, when choosing 
questionnaires, it is always a balance and a trade-off between accuracy and practicalities such as 
time constraints and recruitment difficulties, amongst other factors. This holds exceptionally 
true for trainees.  
Strengths. At the same time, the current research has a number of strengths which are 
worth mentioning. First of all, the timing of the study. Indeed, this project comes at a time when 
research on mentalising and on the RFQ in different populations has only just started. Hence, it 
is hoped that this thesis will play a role in expanding the knowledge of these concepts. It is also 
hoped that the study will contribute to the understanding of mentalising functions and ability in 
different populations and more specifically, in the researched client-group. To the researcher’s 
knowledge, this is one of the first studies to shed light on a very complex, yet under-researched 
relationship that is not usually disclosed by clients (Levitt et al., 2004). The only comparable 
study carried out in France (Badoud et al., 2015) looked at the relationship between mentalising 
and SH in a community-sample.   
In addition, the criteria used to measure SH were quite narrow, excluding suicide 
attempts, overdosing and indirect self-harm. Hence, it can be argued that this contributed to 
highlighting a picture of a “purer” relationship between ED and SH. In addition, participants 
came from different countries (established by glancing over the ID website-addresses of the 
partakers) which suggests that the relationship ED/SH cuts across geographical boundaries and 
it is fairly culture-free, implying some “universal” association. Another important point is that 
this project is contributing to the validation of the RFQ in individuals presenting with ED. 
Future research. Given that this is one of the first studies of its kind, the importance of 
follow up studies appears self-evident. It seems crucial to replicate the current findings in order 
to gather more data on this client group. Furthermore, particular attention could be given to 
exploring mentalising differences between adolescents and adults within a clinical population in 
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order to investigate whether there might be differences in terms of RFQc/u subscales. In 
addition, given the higher comorbidity rate found between BN and SH, compared to AN—
reportedly 33% and 22% respectively (Cucchi et al., 2016), and that individuals with BN 
display significantly lower mentalising abilities compared to participants with AN (Wilshere, 
2011), it appears that people who present with BN engage more in SH and exhibit less reflective 
functioning skills. Hence, further research could concentrate on ED subgroups and explore 
whether, for example, individuals presenting with BN and concurrent SH display less 
mentalising skills that those without SH. The same could be investigated in AN groups.  
Thanks to the widespread availability of the internet and that this technology  
breaks down geographical boundaries, participants completed the questionnaires from all over 
the world. The possibility of comparing mentalising ability in individuals presenting with ED 
with and without concurrent SH cross-countries seems important. In addition, given the 
complex relationship between mentalising and the related concepts described in the 
Introduction, the possibility of further prospective studies that take into consideration the 
interaction of potential mediating factors seems crucial (J ewell et al., 2016). In particular, future 
studies ought to clarify the relationship between attachment, mentalising and affect-regulation. 
Jewell et al. suggested the possibility of case-control study designs in which individuals are 
matched for level of eating pathology, but differ on mentalising and attachment in order to 
investigate the impact, if any, of each factor. 
Brief Summary and Conclusions 
This study aimed at investigating mentalising differences in individuals presenting with 
ED with/without concurrent SH. A control group was also added. Indeed, hypotheses were 
supported as individuals who presented with concurrent pathology reported less reflective 
function than individuals who presented with ED only. In addition, both clinical groups reported 
significantly less mentalising ability than the control. Given the bulk of empirical evidence 
reviewed in the critical appraisal section of the Introduction, it seems appropriate to be positive 
about the development and clinical application of the concept of mentalising. At the same time, 
the information discussed reveals the breadth of the territory surrounding mentalising and the 
highlights that the research on this and related topic has only just started.  
Hence, further studies ought to be carried out before meaningful conclusions can be 
drawn. These analyses ought to replicate the current project and to further explore the 
relationship between mentalising, ED and SH psychopathology in different age groups and in 
different settings. At the same time, it seems important to remember the upmost importance of 
routinely screening for comordid SH in individuals who present with ED and to reflect on the 
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clinical implications that a lack of a mentalising stance can have on individuals’ ability to 
engage with the therapeutic process and to initiate change.   
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Appendix 2: Participants information sheet  
Dear Participant, 
Y ou are being invited to take part in a research study. Y our decision to take part in this 
study is entirely voluntary and you are under no obligation to do so and your care will not be 
affected in any way. Before you decide whether or not to take part in this study it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. If there 
is anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information please ask your clinician. 
After you have read through the information take some time to decide whether or not you still 
wish to take part.  
What is  the purpose of the research study?  
I am looking at the reasons why some people have difficulties with impulsive behaviours, 
such as self-harm and what their feelings are around food. This study aims to look at how 
people pick up on what others are thinking and feeling, as well as how people think about 
their own thoughts and feelings. Greater knowledge in this area will help in designing better 
psychological therapies for people who have impulsive behaviours or strong feelings they 
find it difficult to deal with. 
Why have I been chosen to take part in this study?  
E ating disorders and impulsive behaviours represent two very common, but under-
researched areas. I want to focus especially on people who present with difficulties around 
food, as well as difficulties around self-harm so I can see how things like understanding 
other’s feelings and emotions impact on their capacity to engage in therapy.  
Who is organising the study?  
I am Angie Cucchi, a trainee counselling psychologist, based at City University. My email 
address is:  
Who reviews the study?  
All research in the NHS  is looked at by an independent group of people, called a 
R esearch E thics Committee to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity.  
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you would like to take part, you will be given a consent form and questionnaire to fill 
out. The consent form asks if you consent to taking part in the study. The questionnaire asks 
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a series of questions mainly directed at feelings about yourself, other people and food. The 
questionnaire will take about 30 minutes. When you receive the questionnaire-pack, if you 
are happy to participate, please fill in the questionnaire and when you have finished please 
give the questionnaire and the consent form to myself or to your clinician in a sealed 
envelope. Y ou can also post them back directly to me in the Freepost envelope provided.  
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What are the possible risks and benefits of taking part?  
While it is unlikely, it is possible that you might become a little tired from doing the 
questionnaire. Y ou may experience some upset feelings from answering the questions. If you 
have concerns about disordered eating, impulsive behaviours or thoughts of hurting yourself, 
please contact your GP or your keyworker/clinician on your team. The knowledge gained 
from this study may help improve the treatment of people with strong emotions, self-harm 
and problems with eating. 
Confidentiality 
All documents relating to the study will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and only the 
researcher directly involved in the study will have access to them. No-one outside the study 
will have knowledge of your name. Y our answers on the questionnaire itself will not be linked 
directly to your name. The completed consent form and questionnaires will be kept 
separately. Data will be stored electronically with a number, not personal names identifying 
people’s answers. Y our GP will not be informed of your participation in this study. 
What will happen to the results  of this study?  
I will use the results of the study to complete a doctorate research project. Nevertheless, 
your identity will not be revealed. A summary of the results will also be available. This can be 
emailed or sent to you by post. Please contact me should you wish to be informed of the 
results.  
Who do I speak to if I decide to withdraw from the study or if I want more 
information?  
Y ou are free to decline to enter or to withdraw from the research at any time without 
having to give a reason. Y our care will not be affected in any way if you do so. If you have 
any questions about the study, please contact Angie Cucchi by email or speak to the 
keyworker/clinician involved in your care. General information about participating in 
research can be obtained from INVOLVE  (promoting public involvement in NHS , public 
health and social care research) www.invo.org.uk, 02380 651 088. Alternatively, you can 
contact your local Patient Advisory Liaison S ervice (the number is available through NHS  
Direct 0845 46 47) who can also help if you want to make a complaint about this research.  
 
S hould you wish to take part, you will be given a questionnaire and a consent form. 
Please sign the consent form and complete the questionnaires. Put your consent form 
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together with the questionnaires in the envelope provided, give this to myself or your 
clinician or post it back in the Freepost envelope. Please keep this information sheet for 
future reference 
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Appendix 3: Consent form  
Name of Researcher: Angie Cucchi  
Please tick box 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving 
any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
Postal Address 
 
Name 
 
 
House number 
 
 
Street 
 
 
Town 
 
 
Postcode 
 
 
 
 
____________________________  ________________  _________________________________   
Name                               Date    Signature 
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Appendix 4: L ist of support numbers 
 
Contact numbers and websites for further support  
 
NHS  Direct 0845 4647  
www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk  
 
S amaritans 08457 90 90 90  
email: jo@ samaritans.org  
24-hour telephone helpline offering emotional support for people who are experiencing 
feelings of distress or despair, including those that may lead to suicide.  
 
S ANE  helpline: 0845 767 8000  
email: sanemail@ sane.org.uk  
web: www.sane.org.uk  
S ANE line and S ANE mail offer emotional support and information to those experiencing 
mental health problems, their families and carers.  
 
Beat (E ating Disorders Association) helpline: 08456 341414  
www.b-eat.co.uk  
email: help@ b-eat.co.uk  
 
SE L F-INJ UR Y  SUPPOR T   helpline: 0117 925 1119 
www.selfinjurysupport.org.uk 
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Appendix 5: Online advertisement flyer  
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Appendix 6: NHS E thical Approval RFQ V alidation application form 
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Appendix 7: NHS ethical approval  
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Appendix 8: NHS ethical approval-time extension   
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Appendix 9: C ity University E thical Approval 
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Appendix 10: Number of cases excluded from analysis and cases with mean 
substitution  
 
 
 Number of people with mean substitution 
 RFQ-54 PTS K IMS TAS RMET 
CONTROL         0     0      0       2      4 
ED_SH         3     0      1       2      2 
ED_noSH         6     2      2       0      3 
 
  
 
Number of people excluded from the analysis due to having more than 5% items missing 
 
 RFQ-54  PTS K IMS TAS RMET 
CONTROL          0       0        4       4      4 
ED_SH          0       5        5       7      8 
ED_noSH          0       13        13       15      17 
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Appendix 11: Z-scores for each measure before and after removing outliers 
 
Z-scores for each measure before removing outliers 
    
  
Skewness  
  
 
  
K urtosis  
  
 
GROUP  N  
 
Statistic  Std. Error  Z score 
 
 Statistic Std. Error Z score  
  EDSH  58   -0.35 0.31 -1.11   0.14 0.61 0.23 
RFQ  EDnoSH  96 
 
-0.50 0.24 -2.06 
 
0.47 0.48 0.96 
 
CG  74 
 
-0.60 0.27 2.14 
 
0.10 0.55 0.19 
  Mix sample  228   -0.62 0.16 -3.87   0.49 0.32 1.53 
           
  EDSH  53   -0.08 0.32 -0.25   -0.99 0.64 -1.54 
PTS  EDnoSH  84 
 
-0.35 0.26 -1.34 
 
-0.53 0.52 -1.02 
 
CG  74 
 
-0.30 0.27 -1.08 
 
0.00 0.55 0.00 
  Mix sample  211   -0.52 0.16 -3.25   -0.15 0.33 -0.45 
           
  EDSH  53   0.87 0.32 2.68   0.24 0.64 0.38 
K IMS  EDnoSH  83 
 
-0.02 0.26 -0.07 
 
-0.83 0.52 -1.59 
 
CG  70 
 
0.61 0.28 2.13 
 
-0.16 0.56 -0.28 
  Mix sample  206   0.24 0.16 1.50   -0.33 0.33 -1.00 
           
  EDSH  50   -0.71 0.33 -2.11   0.43 0.66 0.65 
TAS  EDnoSH  81 
 
0.12 0.26 0.46 
 
-0.24 0.52 -0.45 
 
CG  70 
 
-0.05 0.28 -0.18 
 
-0.11 0.56 -0.20 
  Mix sample  201   0.18 0.17 1.05   -0.59 0.34 -1.73 
           
  EDSH  51   -0.73 0.33 2.19   1.73 0.65 2.63 
RMET  EDnoSH  81 
 
-0.07 0.26 -0.28 
 
-0.60 0.52 -1.13 
 
CG  70 
 
-0.52 0.28 -1.82 
 
-0.07 0.56 -0.13 
  Mix sample  202   -0.47 0.17 -2.76   0.26 0.34 0.76 
           
  EDSH  58   1.06 0.31 3.41   0.50 0.61 0.81 
AGE  EDnoSH  97 
 
0.77 0.24 3.20 
 
-0.31 0.48 -0.64 
 
CG  74 
 
0.42 0.27 1.55 
 
-0.07 0.55 -0.12 
  Mix sample  229   0.60 0.16 3.75   -0.37 0.32 -1.15 
** Numbers in bold refer to distributions whose numbers are above 1.96 Z scores for samples < 100 (CG, ED_noSH, ED_SH ) and above 
3.29 for samples between 100 and 300 (Mix sample) (Fifa-Shaw, 2011). 
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Z-scores for each measure after removing outliers 
 
   
  Skewness    
 
  K urtosis    
    
Std.  
   
Std.  
 
 
GR OUP N Statistic E rror Z  score 
 
Statistic E rror Zscore 
  E DSH  58 -0.15 0.31 -0.48   -0.56 0.61 -0.91 
R FQ  
E D no SH  96 -0.16 0.24 -0.66 
 
-0.53 0.48 -1.08 
CG  74 -0.41 0.27 -1.49 
 
-0.56 0.55 -1.02 
  Mix sample  228 -0.41 0.16 -2.56   -0.26 0.32 0.81 
          
  E DSH  53 -0.05 0.32 -0.16   -1.05 0.64 -1.63 
PT S  E D no SH  84 -0.25 0.26 -0.96 
 
-0.79 0.52 -1.52 
 
CG  74 -0.1 0.27 -0.35 
 
-0.51 0.55 -0.92 
  Mix sample  211 -0.476 0.167 -2.85   -0.25 0.33 -0.75 
          
  E DSH  53 0.72 0.32 2.2   -0.17 0.64 -0.27 
K IMS  E D no SH  83 -0.02 0.26 -0.09 
 
-0.82 0.52 -1.56 
 
CG  70 0.52 0.28 1.83 
 
-0.35 0.56 -0.63 
  Mix sample  206 0.17 0.16 1.06   -0.46 0.33 -1.39 
          
  E DSH  50 -0.44 0.33 -1.32   -0.43 0.66 -0.65 
T AS  E D no SH  81 0.04 0.26 0.17 
 
-0.51 0.52 -0.96 
 
CG  70 0.01 0.28 0.06 
 
-0.29 0.56 0.51 
  Mix sample  201 0.2 0.17 1.17   -0.72 0.34 -2.11 
          
  E DSH  51 -0.07 0.33 -0.22   -0.61 0.65 -0.94 
R ME T   E D no SH  81 -0.02 0.26 -0.07 
 
-0.71 0.52 -1.34 
 
CG  70 -0.32 0.28 -1.13 
 
-0.62 0.56 -1.1 
  Mix sample  202 -0.23 0.17 -1.35   -0.43 0.34 -1.26 
          
  E DSH  58 1.06 0.31 3.41   0.5 0.61 0.18 
AGE   E D no SH  97 0.77 0.24 3.2 
 
-0.31 0.48 -0.64 
 
CG  74 0.42 0.27 1.56 
 
-0.07 0.552 -0.12 
  Mix sample  229 0.6 0.16 3.75   -0.37 0.32 -1.15 
 
Numbers in bold refer to distributions whose numbers are above 1.96 Z scores for samples < 100 (CG, ED_noSH, 
ED_SH ) and above 3.29 for samples between 100 and 300 (Mix sample) (Fifa-Shaw, 2011). 
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Appendix 12: Z-scores -.length of therapy— before and after transformations  
 
 
Z-scores for length of therapy before log transformation.  
  
   
   
  Skewness    
 
  K urtosis    
    
Std.  
   
Std.  
 
  GROUP  N  Statistic  Error  Z score     Statistic Error  Zscore  
Length  EDSH  58 3.16 0.31 10.19   10.85 0.61 17.78 
of  ED no SH  97 2.32 0.24 9.66 
 
6.18 0.48 12.85 
therapy  CG  74 2.29 0.27 8.48 
 
4.66 0.55 8.47 
  Mix sample  229 3.49 0.16 21.7   15.45 0.32 48.28 
 
 
        
** Numbers in bold refer to distributions whose numbers are above 1.96 Z scores for samples < 100 
(CG, ED_noSH, ED_SH ) and above 3.29 for samples between 100 and 300 (Mix sample) (Fifa-
Shaw, 2011).  
 
 
 
          
          
 
Z-scores for length of therapy after log transformation. 
     
   
  Skewness    
 
  K urtosis    
    
Std.  
   
Std.  
 
 
GROUP  N  Statistic  Error  Z score  
 
Statistic Error  Z score  
Length  EDSH  58 -0.9 0.31 -2.9   -0.24 0.61 -0.39 
of  EDnoSH  97 -0.76 0.24 -3.16 
 
-0.48 0.48 -1 
therapy  CG  74 0.54 0.27 2 
 
-1.42 0.55 -2.58 
  Mix sample  229 -0.34 0.16 -2.12   -1.35 0.32 -4.21 
** Numbers in bold refer to distributions whose numbers are above 1.96 Z scores for samples < 100 
(CG, ED_noSH, ED_SH ) and above 3.29 for samples between 100 and 300 (Mix sample) (Fifa-
Shaw, 2011).  
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C. Section three 
 
Professional practice 
 
 
 
A  Journey Through the “Rational Mind” and the “Paradoxical Logic 
of the Unconscious”: 
 
An Integrative Case Study. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The client referred to in this report provided full consent for details to be used. All 
identifying details used in this report have been changed in order to preserve 
confidentiality. 
 
 
 
  
